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Introduction
I would like to focus primarily on Japan, which holds a
unique position in Asia, and provides important insights for
understanding various methodological, attitudinal, and ide-
ological issues about the uses and users of English.  In East
Asian region Japan has been one of the first countries to
articulate positions about the acceptance of English and an
identity with it, and about the rejection of the language and
proposing a distance with it.  The case study of Japan and
its ongoing love–hate relationship with the language has a
lesson for us all.  A large body of such writing is in Jap-
anese and therefore is not as well-known as it ought to be
in Asia and elsewhere.1 (Kachuru 1997: 68)
For in isolating beginnings as a subject of study my whole
attempt was precisely to set a beginning off as rational and
enabling, and far from being principally interested in logical
failures and, by extension, ahistorical absurdities, I was try-
ing to describe the immense effort that goes into historical
retrospections as it set out to describe things from the
beginning, in history. (Said 1975: xi–xii)
1.  Purpose
The aim in this paper is to reexamine Mori Arinori’s 1872–73 lan-
guage reform discourse within a new theoretical framework, and
to elucidate his Weltanschauung shaped by his early language
experiences at home and abroad.  Thus I want to offer an alterna-
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tive interpretation of what Mori was really aiming at in his plan for
national language reform.  The main reason that I will deal with
Mori Arinori’s philosophy of life in connection with his language
use is that, as Braj B. Kachuru (1997) points out in the above
quote, if we look at the history of modern (Meiji) Japan, we will
find that quite a few samurai intellectuals “articulated positions
about the acceptance of English and an identity with it, and about
the rejection of the language and proposing a distance with it.”
Kachuru is doubly right when he says that Japan is one of the first
countries that tackled head on the question of the “local politics”
of “English as a global language” (Crystal 1997; see also Sonntag
2003); and he also aptly takes up as a starting point for discussion
Mori Arinori’s discourse on English and Japanese.  Mori’s idea for
the introduction of a “simplified” English into Japan is worthy of
remark precisely because it can be seen as an unprecedented
attempt at English orthographic reform by a non-English speaking
nation in world history.  Given the distinct geo-cultural/political
position of modern (Meiji) Japan in East Asia, it is well worth
examining how Meiji samurai intellectuals such as Mori Arinori
looked uopn the hegemony of English in the new world order as
the crucial part of the “national language” issue in terms of nation-
state building (Kobayashi 2001).
While, in Japan, there are some distinguished Japanese schol-
ars (Tsuda 1990; Oishi 1990, etc.) who are interested in figuring
out synchronically how the hegemony (or the dominant use) of
English has contributed to “language inequality and distorted com-
munication” in international and domestic settings, it would
appear that they do not treat Mori Arinori as the first samurai
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intellectual who explicitly problematized the politics of the English
language for the benefit of non-native English speakers.  It is obvi-
ous that the historical and diachronic study of the problem of
national language in Japan in relation to English linguistic hege-
mony will help us gain more insight into the essence of the ques-
tion of a “global” language facing the Japanese today.  In order to
understand in much greater depth the contemporary relevance of
the question of the “big language” for the Japanese in the past, we
need to develop our understanding of how the English language
came to be historically, geopolitically, and culturally situated in the
early development of a new branch of Western Learning in mid-
nineteenth century Japan; this is where, as I shall argue in this
paper, the modern language recognition of the Japanese had
begun in earnest.
In the field of English studies abroad, most of the papers deal-
ing in English with the problems associated with the hegemony of
English in the world have more to do with the former colonies of
Britain and America; very few focus on the case of Japan.2
Recently, however, some serious attempts have been made by for-
eign scholars (naturally, in English) to reexamine socio-linguistic
issues surrounding the question of English in Japan (Stanlaw 2004;
Kachuru 1997; Unger 1996).  Regrettably, while they bring up for
discussion Mori’s proposal for language reform in the early Meiji
period trying to understand its historical significance in terms of
modern Japan’s political and cultural development, they nonethe-
less seem to fail to go beyond the socio-linguistic interpretative
framework and get at the reason why the samurai-diplomat intel-
lectual had to hammer out new Japan’s linguistic strategy in 1872–
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73.  Our concern, therefore, is to take a critical look at the estab-
lished theory on Mori’s language reform discourse from a broader
perspective, and thereby shed new light on his hitherto ill-famed
enterprise.
It goes without saying that his ideas for national language
building and education in Meiji Japan have posed many difficult
problems (aporias) from the present standpoint of multicultural-
ism, multilingualism, and postmodernism, and that the down side
of his attitude and approach to the issues of modern language and
society also needs to be retrospectively examined.  However, ques-
tions of such a controversial nature regarding the other side of the
equation demand a separate study and go far beyond the scope of
this paper; here I limit the discussion to reevaluation of the histori-
cal and theoretical misinterpretations of his language reform dis-
course and his Weltanschauung.
2.  Methodology
Theoretical framework for textual criticism3 of Mori Arinori’s
English discourses on language
Mori Arinori’s 1872–73 discourse on language reform in Japan has
long been seen as resulting from his nihongo pesimizumu (pessimism
over the future of the Japanese language) or kokugo shouaku setsu
(belief in the inherent inferiority of the Japanese language to the
larger languages such as Chinese and English) (see Watanabe
1993; Tanaka 1989).  Consequently, it has been generally held to
be a controversial proposal for “the abolition of the Japanese and
the introduction of the English language into Japan.”  Such vague
and unreasoned conjectures helped perpetuate the accepted theory
― 4―
rather than encouraging thorough textual criticism of the discourse
by way of re-examination.  Such being the case, it is necessary to
problematize the old assumption behind the unmerited denuncia-
tion of Mori’s serious proposal and seek to figure out new ways of
getting at the truth of the matter.  The conventional study of Mori
Arinori, however, only seems to provide an insufficiently limited
framework for understanding his linguistic tactics and strategy in
the political, economic, cultural, and historical contexts.  Whether
we can succeed in challenging the long-established theory on
Mori’s language reform discourse and thereby further extend the
knowledge in the study of Mori Arinori in a small yet significant
way, largely depends upon the methodology of this new study.  To
this end, we definitely need to formulate a new theoretical and
interpretative framework for making possible an alternative inter-
pretation of Mori’s “stigmatized” discourse on language reform in
early post-Restoration Japan.
Historical-sociological approach to a case study
This is a historical-sociological re-examination of Mori’s Weltan-
schauung and language experiences within a new theoretical/inter-
pretative framework in which we will attempt to establish our
hypothesis.  Since historical-sociological approach can and should
be hermeneutical in its own right, this methodology, first of all, as
Tsutsui Kiyotada (1997: 3) explains, is intended “not to construct a
general theory of modernization or social change (such as the theo-
ry of evolution) in dealing with the establishment and develop-
ment of modern society, but rather to interpret the historical
significance or to elucidate the cause and effect of individual
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cases.”  Also, this approach involves using what C. W. Mills (1956)
called the “sociological imagination.”  Indeed, as Mills cogently
argues, “neither the life of an individual nor the history of a society
can be understood without understanding both.”  After all, it is this
sociological imagination that only “enables its possessor to under-
stand the larger historical scene in terms of its meaning for the
inner life and the external career of a variety of individuals….
The history that now affects every man is world history” (Mills
1956: 3–6).  For this very reason, the present writer, born and
raised and still living in this country, uses the “sociological and his-
torical imagination” to carry out a case study of a samurai individ-
ual in late-Edo and early Meiji Japan so as to understand his lan-
guage-thought and behavior in the context of world history (Yuasa
1996).
Another feature of this historical-sociological approach is that,
as Tsutsui (ibid: 6) comments, “it borders on many other academic
traditions or disciplines,” and therefore, “is open to a wider range
of approaches.”  To conduct textual criticism of Mori’s language
experiences in the late-Edo and early-Meiji periods necessitates
incorporating geo-political and cultural perspectives; for Mori was
a globetrotting diplomat who put forth his “notoriously radical”
proposal for language reform in Japan in light of the international
balance of power and a colonial reconfiguration of East Asia by
Western nations in the new world system.  Thus, it is very impor-
tant to understand how Mori looked at the problem of language
reform in Japan in connection with the “politics of English”
(Holborow 1999) as an international language.  As Alistair
Pennycook (1994, 1998, 1999, 2001) developed English studies by
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incorporating the concept of the “cultural politics of English” from
the field of cultural studies into the field of applied linguistics in
the 1990s, he showed how the global spread of English as an inter-
national language causes social and cultural problems in local
countries.  Pennycook’s works have been instrumental in elucidat-
ing in terms of colonialism and cultural imperialism the “politics of
Engilsh as a world language” (Mair 2003) in its local context, thus
further developing the studies of World Englishes pioneered by
Braj B. Kachuru (1983, 1985, 1986, 1997), and of English linguistic
imperialism propounded by Robert Phillipson (1992).
However, Japan has not been given due attention in the previ-
ous works by those non-Japanese scholars engaging in the field
mentioned above, chiefly because of its distinct geo-political and
cultural history of kokugo (the “national” language).  In order to
fully understand the question of a world language in Japan, we
need to develop Pennycook’s (1994) idea of the “cultural politics”
of English in former British and US colonies a little further into the
“geo-cultural politics” of English in relation to the language of
Japan (see also Wallerstein 1991).4 Only by looking at the histori-
cal structure of language in Japanese society from this broader the-
oretical perspective can we delve into the essence of the question
of the national language and English in Japan.
Like English studies abroad, the counterpart in Japan, using
descriptive approach as its time-honored mainstream methodolo-
gy, fails entirely to consider the political and cultural implications
and ramifications of English (teaching and learning) for modern
Japan’s national language building in the midst of reconfiguration
of the world (nation-state) system.  As a result, few attempts have
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so far been made to develop a broader understanding of the Jap-
anese language experiences; the traditional descriptive approach
with no theoretical/interpretative framework only makes it difficult
(if not impossible) not only to reexamine Mori’s thinking on the
language of the new Japan but also to appreciate its historical
significance and contemporary relevance.  For this reason, in con-
ducting textual criticism of Mori Arinori’s language reform dis-
course, we need to use historical-sociological approach so that we
may understand the geo-cultural politics of the modern Japanese
language in relation to English linguistic hegemony which was pre-
vailing in the world in the mid-and-early nineteenth century.  In
this light, this paper seeks to comprehend Mori’s idiosyncratic lin-
guistic behavior and his method and intention of language reform in
the global and local dynamics of the beginning of the new Japan’s
nation-state building in the new world order, thus interpreting an
ideogramic case study of Mori Arinori within a nomothetic or the-
oretical framework.  Therefore, in dealing with the beginning of
Mori’s language reform discourse, we need to adopt the kind of
approach that is at once “pragmatic and theoretic.”  The reason for
this is succinctly described in Edward W. Said’s Beginnings:
Intention & Method as follows: “Beginning is not only a kind of
action; it is also a frame of mind, an attitude, a consciousness.  It is
pragmatic—as when we read a difficult text and wonder where to
begin in order to understand it, or where the author began the
work and why.  And it is theoretic—as when we ask whether there
is any peculiar epistemological trait or performance unique to
beginnings in general.  For any writer to begin is to embark upon
something connected to a designated point of departure” (Said
― 8―
1975: xv–xvi).
A historical and sociological study of English studies in Japan
The theoretical underpinnings of this study also derive from a his-
torical and sociological analysis of eigaku (the English Studies or the
English Learning)5 in late-Edo and early Meiji Japan.  In those tur-
bulent days eigaku itself served not so much as a purely academic
language research rather as a purposeful “area studies” dealing
with Western (= Anglo-American) civilization.  Area studies almost
always involves first learning “local” languages so as to gain an
overall understanding of the logos, pathos, ethos, and mythos of
the target people from geo-political and cultural standpoints
(Nakajima and Johnson 1989).  As I shall explain in Part I, for
Japanese samurai intellectuals, English Studies at the dawn of the
age of bunmei kaika (civilization and enlightenment) and fukoku
kyohei (wealthy nation and strong army) in modern Japan, by defi-
nition, was nothing less than the cutting-edge area studies intended
not only to recognize the Japanese Self by looking upon the West
as the significant Other(s), but also to acknowledge the significant
Other(s) as a mirror image of the Self.  Consequently, I would like
to emphasize that the English Studies of the time can and should
be treated as a form of what is now called area studies in its own
right.
As Yoneo Ishii (1989: 218) points out in Area Studies and Social
Sciences, “The scholars engaging in area studies tend to choose for-
eign countries as the target of their study.  But this does not neces-
sarily mean that the choice of ‘otherness’ abroad is mandatory in
this field; for instance, Japanology by Japanese scholars can and
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should be legitimately counted as one of area studies.”  In this
light, the present writer sees a historical and sociological case study
of Mori Arinori’s cross-linguistic/cultural experiences as legiti-
mately subsumed under transdisciplinary “area studies.”
Relevant to Ishii’s claim is Japanese historian Irokawa
Daikichi’s prosopographical approach to the nature of the “Jap-
anese mind” (Christoper 1983) in Meiji era.  Irokawa regards
prosopography as a new way of understanding history, maintain-
ing that “such historical studies would not be a worthwhile and
rewarding endeavor in life if you were not driven by a “desire to
capture history as it was happening” (Irokawa 1976: 245–246).
Irokawa argues:
It is important that we try to capture the essence of the
social, political and cultural problems by focusing as a focal
point on the psychological, linguistic and behavioral
aspects of a particular individual whose interior experi-
ences typify the zeitgeist or the whole spirit of the times in
which he or she lived….  Historians can only look specifi-
cally at the historical facts as they seek to elucidate the
process of the course of events in order to describe the pos-
sibilities of an active person or class group achieving their
true potential, and the ways in which they acted or could
have acted within the bounds of the times.  By so doing we
demarcate a man’s objective possibility and their percep-
tion of the reality, thereby getting at the true nature of the
individual or group. (ibid.: 208)
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Irokawa further emphasizes the need for a new methodology of
the historical studies of modern Japan as follows.
The methodology used in the historical studies of the
Western thought will simply not suffice in understanding
non-Western countries such as modern Japan which is char-
acterized by its cultural and philosophical hybridity as well
as its overdetermined structure of the mind-nature (mentali-
ty) of the people.  It is clear that an alternative and original
perspective and more elaborate research design are
required for the historical studies of modern Japan.  This is
why a number of adventurous approaches are welcome in
this field of study today. (ibid.: 240)
Regarding historians’ historical imagination for hypothesis-mak-
ing, Irokawa goes on to say:
Likewise, it is a historian’s imagination that propels the
development of the historical studies.  In this case, his
imagination serves as the powers of hypothesizing.  In this
very process of hypothesis-making lie all historians’ con-
cerns about the pressing issues of today.  Based on their
hypothesis, they dare to attempt to “make an epistemologi-
cal journey from the present to the past.”  Working in the
field of human science, they take pleasure in exercising
their creativity as the powers of hypothesis-making.  And
they find the pleasure in testing and verifying their hypoth-
esis by way of comprehensive investigation; along the way
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they meet many other related people and unexpectedly
learn new facts, thus developing their consciousness on a
higher plane with a broadened hypothesis and getting at a
larger truth. (ibid.: 210–211)
Given the nature of this prosopographical case study of Mori
Arinori,6 the methodology we shall employ in this treatise is hypo-
thetic-deductive and inductive, or hermeneutic and constructive
(on this point, see Takeuchi and Ueyama 1977).  As Ishii (1989:
217) argues, “while area studies is to be conducted empirically, we
must make constant efforts to propose a hypothesis and thereby
construct a theory.”  As a matter of course, this methodological
process, if applied to discourse analysis in the field of historical
sociology, involves seeking hard evidence in authentic primary
documents so as to verify a hypothetical proposition theoretically.
Indeed, this hypothetic-deductive and inductive method is indis-
pensable to the study of an individual’s political and cultural
thought, which falls somewhere between humanities and social sci-
ences.  We may recall that this method has much to do with what
Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914), a founder of American prag-
matism, would call hypothetic inference or abduction (Takeuchi
and Ueyama 1977; Yonemori 1981).  The discourse analysis of
Mori Arinori’s language reform, I believe, should be conducted in
this hypothetic-deductive (or abductive) and inductive way.
Kimura Rikio (1986: 3), citing Peirce as Mori’s contemporary, sug-
gests that after we have generated a hypothesis regarding the
abducted image of Mori Arinori, we almost always need to test it
by way of both deduction and induction (Interestingly enough, as
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we shall see once again in the conclusion of this paper, Mori’s
Weltanschauung bears a striking resemblance to Peirce’s).  Using
this interdisciplinary approach, we will try to understand Mori’s
individual experiences in the late-Edo and early Meiji periods in a
broader context of the social history of modern Japan and world
history.
The English language as a vicarious means of Mori Arinori’s
English discourse analysis
Finally, I, as a Japanese, write this paper in English in the Japanese
discourse community in an attempt to examine Mori’s thinking on
the English language and his linguistic behavior which can be
largely attributed to his early language experiences in his Satsuma
student days—especially from eigaku or the English Studies.  This,
by itself, is closely connected with the whole theme I deal with in
the subsequent discussions; the means has a great deal to do with
the end.  In order to get to the heart of Mori’s Weltanschauung
represented and actively projected in his English discourses, the
very act of this writer interpreting and writing in English ( just as
Mori himself experienced the language) will certainly help to
relive his foreign language experience and thus get behind his lin-
guistic strategy in cross-cultural diplomatic settings in mid-and-late
nineteenth century Japan.  Consequently, this paper is intended
mainly for ( Japanese and non-Japanese) students at home and
abroad of Mori Arinori and English studies, including other stu-
dents of language and languages in general who are interested in
socio-linguistic, politico-cultural issues around English as an inter-




This writer’s central argument in this study is that Mori’s idea for
language reform in Japan was the beginning of the building of
“Imperial Japanese language” or “kokugo (the national language),”
and that his scheme for imperial language building is based on the
then-popular geopolitical-cultural philosophy of datsua nyuou
(Leave Asia, Enter Europe [the West]) which implies more than
just dissociating the East (Chinese-writing community based on the
Confucian ethic) and assimilating into the West (e.g. English-speak-
ing community based on the Christian ethic).  It can be argued
that Mori had a higher purpose in mind; his hidden agenda was
that the new imperial Japan would overtake and transcend Western
civilization.  Thus, Mori’s geopolitical and cultural thought on lan-
guage is best characterized as datsua nyuou chouou [= Leave Asia
(the East), Enter and Transcend Europe (the West)] in which the
new Japan was seen as a site of reconciling the Chinese imperial
ideogram-based language and the English imperial phonogram-
based language.  And a working hypothesis that we want to estab-
lish in this paper can be summarized as follows:
Mori’s 1872–73 discourses on language reform in Japan
involved (1) abolishing the Chinese hieroglyphics from the
conventional written language of Japan; (2) romanizing the
Japanese spoken language as the new written; and (3)
adopting a “simplified English” primarily as a source of
new vocabulary.  This radical triple scheme for language
reform in Japan can be viewed as marking the beginning of
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the modern Japanese “imperial language” awareness for
imperial nation-state or empire building in East Asia; his
unprecedented proposal for the “abolition” (= reform) of
both the Chinese hieroglyphic-dominated Japanese written
language and the not-completely phonetic English written
language, was arguably the forerunner of modern Japan’s
counter-hegemonic linguistic initiative in the geo-cultural
politics of the Chinese–Japanese–English triad which would
emerge as a subsequent site of kindai no choukoku (Over-
coming Modernity) in the mid-and late-nineteenth century,
and culminate in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity
Sphere governed by kokugo (the imperial language of Japan)
in the first half of the twentieth century.
It could be argued that Mori’s ultimate aim in his language reform
was to create a new language of the Japanese Empire.  That there
was a shift in the means (tactics) in the process does not necessarily
mean that Mori abandoned the end (strategy); whether or not
(simplified) English was intended to be introduced into the new
Japan, failure in his proposed tactics would not have made much
difference in his linguistic strategy for building a new language for
the imperial Japan.
Mori’s attitude to the imperial languages of the significant
Others was meant to be methodologically ambiguous in the cross
cultural-lingual settings: it was strategically dialectic/eclectic, and
transcendentally assimilative and resistant, which is due in large
measure to a triple reciprocation and construction of Self and
Other within what I term the Imperial Language Triangle (ILT)—
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the Chinese–Japanese–English triad—in East Asia.  I would also
like to put special emphasis on the fact that there is a direct paral-
lel in his strategic attitude to the introduction of Christianity and
the English language into the country without compromising
Japanese national and cultural integrity.  In order to corroborate
my view on Mori’s linguistic strategy, I shall analyze his discourse
on religion along the same lines.
By exploring the third space between the imperial languages of
Eastern and Western civilizations, Mori strove to find a way of
transcending the two big languages at the same time as he sought
to form an alternative imperial Self (subjectivity) in the building of
the new language of Japan (He was fond of using the term the
Japanese Empire or Japanese civilization as against the counter-
parts of the Imperial Others in the East and the West).  Employing
the Anglo-American imperial language (=English) instead of the
yet-to-be-built Imperial Japanese language, Mori set out to project
in the English “discourse community” (Watts 1999) the image of
the Japanese Empire or the imperial Japanese nation as an “imag-
ined community” (Anderson 1991) by tracing its history to the
mythological ages and thereby mythologizing and substantializing
the myth of the Imperial Japan (See also Harris 1981; Hobsbaum
and Ranger 1983).  The reason why Mori took great pains to rep-
resent the new Japan in English-speaking communities is that in
the eyes of Westerners he wanted to differentiate Japan from
China as a distinct imperial entity.  In the same way, he wished to
set the Japanese (language and people) apart from the Chinese
(language and people).7
With the working hypothesis above, we shall take a new and
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critical look at the established theory of Mori Arinori’s discourse
on language reform by reinterpreting it as the beginning of the
imperial (modern) Japan’s language recognition in terms of the
geo-cultural politics of the new Japan in the mid-and late-nine-
teenth century.  In so doing, I hope to make clear how Mori devel-
oped his language attitude to the Self and the imperial Others as
he contemplated reconciling the differences in strength and weak-
ness between the Chinese and Anglo-American imperial languages
in Japan.  Given that China is presently reemerging as the “neo-
imperial” power in East Asia, this study of Mori Arinori’s language
reform discourse, I believe, has much greater significance for con-
temporary Japan’s geo-cultural politics of language in East Asia.
The unsolved mystery of Mori’s discourse on language reform
It will be useful here to address some unsettled questions concern-
ing Mori’s discourse on the so-called “adoption of the English lan-
guage in Japan” (henceforth AELJ).  The biggest question is one of
interpreting the incoherence of his logic in the statements about
his language reform.  Let us now look at the main points that Mori
discussed in the following two texts below:
A.  Mori’s letter to William D. Whitney (1872)
(1) The romanization of Japanese (= the adoption of
Roman letters)
(2) The introduction of a simplified English
B.  The preface to Education in Japan (1873)
(3) The renunciation of the romanization of Japanese
(4) [No reference to simplified English]
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(5) Forecast for the future—“disuse”—of “the language
of Japan”
What has been left unanswered and still remains a mystery for us
is the missing link between (1) and (2), and the logic behind his
reasoning that leads to (5).  These questions various scholars have
so far attempted to explain, but without a great deal of success.
Most interpretations of AELJ tends to echo the view of accepted
authorities on Mori Arinori and slide all too easily into the same
old argument (or the mere impression) that Mori was an “ultra-
Westernized Japanese” who revered the English language and
therefore came to enternain such a “wild view” of the adoption of
English and the abolition of Japanese in Japan (See Okubo 1944:
46–48).  It has been established that since Mori was so obsessed
with his idea for the “substitution of English for the national lan-
guage,” he never “listened to Whitney’s (or anybody’s) advice and
tried to push ahead with his plan.”
If we look closer at Mori’s thinking on AELJ, however, we find
that there is good evidence to show that that was not really the
case: the matter of the fact is that Mori’s discourse had been dis-
torted for political reasons and so came to be accepted as it is
today.  Lee Yeounsuk is perhaps the first scholar to give attention
to the politics of discourse connected with Mori’s AELJ proposal.
As for the politically-charged discourse that has gone unchallenged
over the past century, Lee (1996: 9) made a scathing remark that
“such unfounded inference is nothing but a devious gossip made
by (pseudo) intellectuals.”  As Sakamoto (1969: 214–215) observed,
Mori, the first Education Minister, was abhorred by Shinto priests
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who labeled him as a Christian scheming to abolish Shinto religion
in favor of Christianity.  By the same token, Mori was detested by
Shinto-affiliated scholars of the Japanese language; they looked
upon him as an “unpatriotic traitor” who sought to do away with
Japanese by adopting English instead.  In short, Mori was an
embarrassment to those priests and scholars.  Evidence suggests
that they had a very strong motive for launching a propaganda
campaign in an attempt to eliminate him from the government.  It
is worth mentioning briefly its historical background.  In the early
Meiji period, as Sato Hideo (1979) correctly observed, Education
minister Mori was made the target of criticism by Motoda
Nagazane (1818–1891), an influential “ultra-nationalist” whose
opinion was directly opposed to Mori’s on education in general,
especially the matter of religion.  This is largely because Mori did
not believe in a “state religion” Motoda and his cohorts strongly
advocated.  What has to be born in mind is that Mori’s death was
coincident with the promulgation of the Constitution of the Impe-
rial Japan in 1889, which is too symbolic to be dismissed as just
another common occurrence in those days.  Mori was stabbed to
death at home on the very morning of the ceremony that he was
to attend, which ironically heralded the beginning of modern
Japan as a nation state.  Given the domestic political situation at
the time, we can only conjecture that there must have been some-
thing behind the killing of the incumbent Minister of Education.
While this still remains an unsolved mystery, to follow up this mat-
ter further would carry us too far away from the purpose of this
paper.  Paradoxical and ironical as it may seem, Mori’s primary
goal of building an imperial nation-state was only to be realized
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upon his own death, which in turn set the stage for establishing a
new National Learning, a long-cherished desire of Mori’s.
My interest here is not so much in uncovering the political con-
spiracy involved in the process of the historical formation of the
AEJ discourse but rather in looking at Mori’s language reform
from a new angle in order to find out what it was really about and
who misinterpreted it first when and how.  Thus, it will be advis-
able, at the outset, to dissociate Mori’s discourse in question from
the stigmatic name eigo saiyou kokugo haishi ron (a discourse on the
abolition of Japanese with the adoption of English, hereafter cited
as AJAE).  Instead, for the sake of argument, we would like to call
it a “Japanese versus English” discourse ( JVE); for reasons we
shall go into later, Mori’s idea for language reform is concerned
with Japanese and English at the same time; before plunging into
an detailed analysis, it is very important to suspend judgment on
what Mori meant to do in his plan.
In examining the texts of Mori’s JVE, very few scholars have
so far placed it in the historical, economic, cultural, and philosoph-
ical context.  There has been much uncritical discussion of AJAE
but little textual analysis done of JVE in terms of its historical
significance.  Consequently, no attempt is made to provide a more
adequate explanation of JVE which throws light on Mori’s lan-
guage attitude to Japanese in relation to English.  In her kokugo toiu
shisou, Lee (1996) discusses Mori’s JVE discourse from a historical
point of view, although she is interested in dealing with JVE only
in terms of Japanese, not English.  What Lee is trying to show is
when and why and how kokugo (an imperial Japanese language)
came into being in the Meiji era and “oppressed” Koreans in the
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early twentieth century.  She treats Mori’s discourse as a historical
background for her main discussion of the emergence of kokugo in
the late Meiji period.
Whereas Lee’s well-documented argument clarifies the role lin-
guist Ueda Kazutoshi (1867–1937) played after the 1890s in creat-
ing the Imperial Japanese language based on kokutai (the national
polity constituted by the imperial institution in Japan), it does not
provide any sufficient explanation for the significance of the histor-
ical watershed in the 1890s that made a difference in the way intel-
lectuals of the time viewed the language issue in modern Japan.
Lee takes up Mori’s discourse on language but fails to examine its
discursive continuity or discontinuity that could have influenced
Ueda’s language policy one way or the other after the mid-Meiji
period.  The problem with Lee’s argument is that although she
comes close to finding out about the true nature of Mori’s dis-
course, she winds up representing Mori merely as a troubled intel-
lectual who was not sure of his own language and saw no future in
“the language of Japan”; there is no mention of the possibility of
Mori being a logical precursor of the creation of an imperial Jap-
anese language that was to be subsequently advocated by Ueda.
As a consequence, Mori has been overshadowed by the later
scholars of kokugo such as Ueda whom Lee focuses on as major
agents that typified what she calls “modern Japan’s linguistic
recognition.”
Although Lee succeeded in tracing the beginning of the kokugo
ideology (cultural and linguistic nationalism) to Ueda, she does not
seem to recognize the fact that it was Mori’s assassination that
clear the way for the ensuing change in the government’s national
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and foreign language policies.  As Sato Hideo (1979) points out,
the conservatives and ultra-nationalists rolled back as Education
minister Mori’s “enlightening” line of education was terminated in
1889.  In the following year, Ueda was sent by the government to
Germany to study Western linguistics after which kokugo was to be
developed; after three and a half years of research, he returned
home in order to begin work on the national language project.
What happened several months after he came back from his mis-
sion was the Sino-Japanese war (in June of 1894), which was to
decisively “trade places” with China afterwards as a newly-emerg-
ing imperial nation-state.
The first question to be raised here is whether there was any
essential difference or similarity between Mori’s view of language
as a means of civilization and Ueda’s perception of kokugo as con-
stituting the national polity itself.  It is important to note that Meiji
saw a qualitative change in the course of Japan’s national educa-
tion; seen from a phenomenological or philosophical point of
view, only after Mori was killed by a fanatic was there the govern-
ment’s reactionary transition from a dynamic to static approach to
the language issue.  Yet it would appear that many scholars pay lit-
tle attention to its historical significance; they believe that Inoue
Kowashi (1843–1895) took over Mori’s work after his death, and
that Mori had been thinking along the same lines as his successor;
in a eulogy Inoue delivered at his funeral, Mori was made out to
be a “true nationalist” who would surely approve of the “Imperial
Rescript on Education” drafted by Inoue and Motoda—Ueda’s
language ideology goes hand in hand with their political thought.
Sato (1979) considered it open to dispute by demonstrating that it
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was Inoue’s fabrication: Inoue used Mori as a political justification
for their new educational policy.  Assuming it to be true, then
there should exist the discontinuity of Mori’s philosophy of educa-
tion before and after 1889.  At the same time we must not forget
that Mori, as we shall see, did view the history of Japan’s imperial
institution as what Pierre Bourdieu (1991) calls “cultural capital” in
Japan.  What do we make of this?  Was he a “true nationalist” or
“more liberal internationalist” (see Umesao 1987: 123–135)?  Did
Mori have something in common with Inoue in terms of educa-
tional reform in some respects?  If so, what was it?  Could it be
that Mori had already paved the way for Ueda’s kokugo ideology?
Or did Mori have his own vision of what education in Japan
should be?  In order to delineate “modern Japan’s recognition of
language,” we must explore these questions in depth.
Although I recognize the importance of Lee’s assertion that the
Japanese language took on the imperial ideology in the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth century because of the active involve-
ment of nationalistic linguists such as Ueda in the national lan-
guage building project, it seems to me that in the first place she
leaves out of account many aspects of what triggered the emer-
gence of kokugo in the late Meiji period.  Her argument fails to
explain sufficiently the historical conditions in the early Meiji peri-
od that determined the direction modern Japan was to take in the
latter part of the Meiji period.  Thus, to group Mori and Ueda
together as typical Meiji intellectuals who symbolize “modern
Japan’s recognition of language” is to oversimplify the nature of
the dynamics of the language situation in the Meiji era.  Lee’s oth-
erwise cogent argument would be misleading, for it is apt to mag-
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nify only one side of modern Japan’s dualistic recognition of the
new world.  Here I must point out that Lee is wrong in her as-
sumption (if I interpret her analysis correctly) that the primary
purpose of Ueda’s mission is not to create kokugo so as to control
and oppress other Asian peoples and their languages.  This is not
to say, I must hasten to add, that the consequential oppression of
modern Japan in neighboring countries should be neither perfectly
justified as “inevitable” nor condemned as “absolutely unpardon-
able.”  My point here is that it is of great significance to consider
historical conditions and geopolitical factors as the cause of mod-
ern Japan’s dualistic recognition of language, From this point of
view, we would like to focus attention to the first half of the Meiji
period (when Mori tackled the problem of education in Japan) as a
crucial site of the geo-cultural politics of the Japanese language.
What I am interested in showing is how Mori Arinori looked at
issues to do with languages of the significant Others in the East
and the West.  I see Mori Arinori as the first Japanese who took up
the issue of the geo-cultural politics of English as a “global” lan-
guage.  I would like to stress that Mori brought it up for discussion
in English within the English “discourse community,”8 which in its
own right marks the beginning of the Imperial Japanese language
awareness leading to the Japanese “writing back” to the imperial
Other in a foreign language (see Ashcroft et al. 1989).
In the following chapters I would like to question the veracity
of the generally accepted view on Mori’s discourse on the adop-
tion of the English language in Japan.  I will then reexamine the
text critically based on corroborative evidence I collected from
other writings of Mori and his circle of friends.  As I shall argue
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later, the key to an unsolved mystery concerning Mori’s thinking
on language reform is his notion of setchu-shugi (eclectic, selective
and dialectic approach) and datstua nyuou chouou [Leave Asia (the
East), Enter and Transcend Europe (the West)].  For the above rea-
son, I limit the discussion on Mori Arinori’s strategic language atti-
tude to the big languages (Chinese and English), and thus we are
not concerned with how other Western languages (French, Ger-
man, Dutch, and Russian) acted on the minds of the Japanese
intellectuals and ordinary people in pre- and post-Restoration
Japan.
4.  Outline
This paper consists of the following two parts:
Part I: Before carrying out a discourse analysis of Mori’s language
reform, we shall formulate a new theoretical/interpretative frame-
work for discussion whereby we can verify our working hypothe-
sis; we aim at defining modern Japanese language recognition as
typified in Mori Arinori’s idiosyncratic linguistic behavior; first we
will be looking at how his geo-cultural and political awareness and
his cross-culturally strategic mind was nurtured and developed in
the local learning environment in which the super-samurai’s
Western Learning (especially English studies) was historically con-
ditioned to channel imperialism into building a new imperial lan-
guage for a new education (National Learning).  We will also dis-
cuss his Weltanschauung behind how Mori understood modernity
and strove to overcome it without compromising Japanese cultural
integrity.  Finally, we will be dealing with what he learned and was
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taught by Western thinkers in Britain and how he tackled the issue
of imperial nation-state building in Japan in connection with the
geo-cultural politics of the British Empire’s “Queen’s English” in
the mid-and late-nineteenth century.
Part II: We shall conduct textual criticism of Mori’s discourses on
language reform along with other related materials with a view to
demonstrating how his true intentions behind the text could have
been misconstrued as abolishing the Japanese language in favor of
the English language, and how the misinterpretations of his ulti-
mate purpose of the plan were perpetuated and further repro-
duced until it became a fait accompli.  We shall further look at
Mori’s purposeful and strategic language choice and attitude in
connection with his other discourses on religion and thereby elab-
orate on his Weltanschauung and mindset regarding the clashes in
the new Japan of imperial languages between Oriental and Occi-
dental civilizations.
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To get barbarians under control, we must first find out
about their game.  To know their scheme, we need to
become familiar with their language.  Therefore, to know
their language is to enable us not only to know our enemy
but also to control them … we should establish an institu-
tion in which we intensively translate barbarian books and
their history into our own language and lay bare their
game.  And it is to be hoped that we can utilize the intelli-
gence to deal with them in the best way possible….
(Sakuma Shozan 1871: 36–37)
Be proficient in languages for pragmatic purposes.  No
more, no less. (Mori Arinori 1864)
The purpose of English learning in Imperial Japan is none
other than to reinforce her strengths and remedy our weak-
nesses.  The ultimate aim is to glorify the power of our
imperial nation in every nation of the world….  This Eng-
lish-Japanese dictionary will help those learning the English
language using the language of imperial nation soar to great
new heights.
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PART I  THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS
The Geo-Cultural Politics of English Studies in
1860s–80s Japan: Dialectic Linguistic Imperialism
(Preface to the 1869 “Satsuma Dictionary” by Satsuma students)
In this chapter we will first look from a socio-linguistic stand-
point at Mori’s personal language experiences in his formative
years in relation to Satsuma’s local education system, and then
inquire into how Mori as a globetrotting samurai developed his
Weltanschauung9 in the new world order and how he approached
the problem of the national language building in connection with a
“world language” in his pre- and post-Restoration periods.  In so
doing we will place his local language experiences in a larger cul-
tural and historical context of the international geo-politics of the
new Japan.  In what follows, we will examine, as a starting point,
how Mori’s attitude to language was shaped and influenced by his
home domain’s local education before he made the world his
stage.
1.  English Learning as “know-your-enemy” studies
Language education for super-samurai10 building
Mori experienced the “Western impact” during his formative years
as he saw a re-configuration of the world system giving rise to the
clashes of civilizations between the significant Others in the East
(imperial China) and the West (imperial Britain).  As Ivan Hall
(1973) points out, the education he received in his Satsuma days
played a significant role in developing his attitude to language
learning.  Mori was born and educated in Satsuma which was
famous for its Go¯ju¯ (village fraternity) and Zoshikan11 school edu-
cation which laid the foundations for the ethos of the Satsuma peo-
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ple.  At the age of twelve Mori studied the Chinese classics thor-
oughly at the Zo¯shikan where he rose to the rank of assistant
instructor.  Three years later, aside from Chinese Studies, he se-
cretly began to pursue English Learning under the tutorship of
Ueno Keikan, senior student of English.  After the Zo¯shikan, at the
age of seventeen Mori went on to the Kaiseijyo School (for Western
Studies) and majored in English Learning for about a half year
until he, as one of the students, stealthily left Japan for Britain on
the Satsuma goveverment-sponsored covert mission in 1864.  It
seems reasonable to suppose that these two written languages
(Chinese and English) played a significant role in forming Mori’s
Weltanschauung.  As Hall (1873: 48) says, the Go¯ju¯ and the
Zo¯shikan “had trained Mori to read, to think, and to express him-
self in writing.  His later career as social critic and man of letters is
unthinkable without that basic foundation.”
Our concern here is the distinctive features of the Go¯ju¯ and the
Zo¯shikan education: the tradition of bun-bu ryoudou (ways to master
both literary and military arts) was part and parcel of samurai’s
way of life; consequently, the purpose of Satsuma’s bun-bu oriented
education was to “learn to perfect ourselves and to govern others”
(Hall 1973: 51).  Indeed, samurai’s codes of behavior can be
regarded as a product of the arts of both self-discipline and self-
defense, physical and mental.  Thus, education for the super-samu-
rai in Satsuma was cultivated in the soil that would encourage
samurai students to combine and develop literary and military arts
into a system of learning (Hall 1973: 45).
Moreover, in the days of Mori Arinori’s youth, the Go¯ju¯ insti-
tutions, after having long undergone necessary reforms in line with
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the times, were further developed to provide education for build-
ing super-samurai intellectuals who could practice jitsugaku or
Japanese pragmatism to cope with the new reality.12 In bun-bu
integrated super-samurai education, language training served as
building a “man of character and action” and thus unifying his
mind–body in a commonsensical way (see Kaminuma 1979, 1995).
As Satsuma domain lord Nariakira’s “gakumon no taihon” (cardi-
nal principles of learning) dictates, “Learning which cannot tear
itself loose from literary exegesis and enlighten men on ethics and
other practical matters, is as good as no learning at all”13 (cited in
Hall 1973: 54).  What needs to be stressed is that the rationale
behind jitsugaku was the ethics of samurai that not only control
himself as an individual but also maintain and reinforce the order
of the society that he lived in.  As the Cardinal principles say:
We insist that the essence of education lies in the fulfillment
of our most urgent task, which is to serve the sovereign and
our parents in a spirit of loyalty and filial piety, and keep
ourselves above reproach.  To this end we must clarify our
sense of duty, and bring moral dispositions into alignment,
so that by learning to govern ourselves we may achieve the
capacity for governing others. (cited in Hall 1973: 54)
Here it must be noted that “learning as the art of defense” for
samurai-intellectuals was intended not only to protect their own
domain or country from their enemies, but also to maintain,
reform, and develop it as a better society that they deserved to
serve.  And educating individuals as a unit of the community was
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the key to achieving the goals.  The educational philosophy in
Satsuma put premium on ethics and politics that were designed to
develop individual discipline, build esprit de corp, and establish
order in the country.  It is not surprising, then, that Mori’s basic
ideas of education—learning and teaching language, native or for-
eign—should be nurtured by his Satsuma education with its
emphasis on the political and moral conscious of students.14
Education in Satsuma, as Hall (1973: 54) states, was “to be rooted
in ethics, and oriented toward politics, in the broadest sense of the
term.”  As I shall discuss later, such academic training Mori had in
his early years was to have a much greater impact on his later dis-
courses on education in modern Japan that deal with the issues of
language and religion reforms for imperial nation-building.15
Equally important is the thought of jitsugaku closely connected
with his language learning experiences (Kaminuma 1995).  The
point to observe is that soon after he became well grounded in
Chinese and English studies Mori wrote in the style of the Chinese
classics his famous “shi tashinamu beki jyojyo” (points to be culti-
vated by the samurai).16 One of his personal precepts that we must
draw attention to is “gengo tatsuyou made no koto” (Be proficient
in languages for pragmatic purposes.  No more, no less).17 What
exactly did Mori mean by this statement about his language atti-
tude?  For Mori, as I have already suggested, literary arts and mili-
tary arts were mutually complementary; as with swordsmanship,
pragmatic language skill, too, was samurai (warrior)’s way of life.
Further, Mori saw literacy as empowering an individual in terms of
the art of not only personal but also “national” self-defense/disci-
pline.  As Mori’s letter to his brother Yokoyama Yasutake reveals,
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he firmly believed that it was imperative that samurai change his
raison d’etre or their existential code of ethics “from a small bu
(individual military spirit) to a greater bu (national military spirit)”
(SMAZ, Vol. 3: 45–59).  Here we have his new political awareness
of nation-state building in Japan.  What I want to argue here is that
Mori’s new consciousness of a greater bu (the concept of the art of
self-defense for the new Japan), by extension, would lead to a shift
in his choice of a medium of education from the Confucian-based
Chinese language to the Christian-associated English language.  As
Inuzuka (1986: 40) points out, the small bu had long been dictated
by the Confucian ethic so much so that Mori had to redefine his
old samurai identity by “washing one’s dirty (conventional, Con-
fucian-bound, feudalistic) soul.”  Mori’s later proposal for the abo-
lition of samurai’s sword as the symbol of Confucian-based small
bu bears witness to his higher principle of born-again samurai in
modern times.  As suggested earlier earlier, the concept of bu (mili-
tary skills) has a great deal to do with the concept of bun (literary
skills).  As I shall argue, just as Mori had an idea of both small and
greater bu in his military spirit, so he saw a small bun in his literary
spirit as a way of building personal character (disciplining oneself),
and a greater bun as a means of controlling the significant Others
(arch-rival nations) as well as building an independent nation-state.
With Mori’s early education background in mind, the basic
question we need to ask here is: what was the quintessence of
English studies superseding Chinese Studies for super-samurai
intellectuals of the time?  Now let us inquire into the innermost
core of English Learning in the political and cultural contexts.
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The Anglo-American studies
The beginning of English Learning in Japan can be traced back to
the early nineteenth century when the arrival of the “enemy” ships
created the unprecedented national crisis.  It all began with the
Phaeton Incident in 1808 when the British ship disguised as the
Dutch one with the bill of entry illegally sailed into harbor at the
port in Nagasaki.  The Japanese were shocked by the British inva-
sion of the country.  Forty five years later, there was another
national commotion created by the US black ship that appeared in
Uraga (1853).  Viewed in the context of world history, these past
incidents in the history of Japan was seen by samurai intellectuals
of the day as symbolizing the major shift of the world hegemonic
state from Holland to Britain (and America).  Indeed, shortly after
Mori was born in 1847, there was an Anglo-American hegemony
looming over Japan in the 1850s.  In 1860, when he began to
study English, Britain and America were expanding its geo-politi-
cal and economic influence over the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans to
East Asia.  This eventually resulted in the so-called “Western
impact” on Japan.  Given that the two English-speaking nations
(Britain and America) were beginning to secure their supremacy
not only in the West but also in the East, the “Western impact” on
Japan can be better described as the Anglo-American impact.
Indeed, it was this Anglo-American impact that caused the old
paradigm of old Wesetern (Dutch) Learning in Japan to give way
to a new Western Learning: English Learning.  Thus, English
Learning emerged as the study of the world hegemonic state in the
new world.  In short, it can best be described as the study of an
enemy nation’s language by way of samurai’s intelligence opera-
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tion for national security.
Again, from the viewpoint of Wallerstein’s World-Systems
Theory, the world was undergoing a dramatic geo-political re-
configuration in the 1840s–50s.  The symbolic events that took
place in the world during the period are: the Opium Wars (1840–
42), the publication of Marx’s The Communist Manifesto (1848), the
Arrow War (1850–60), the Taiping Rebellion in China (1853), the
Crimean War (1853–56), the Indian (Sepoy) Mutiny (1857–59), the
downfall of the Mogul Empire (1858), and many other incidents.
In short, this was the age of Western imperialism and colonialism.
Against this international geopolitical background, Japanese super-
samurai gradually awakened to the realization that they must start
jockeying for the position in the new world order.  Thus, English
Learning emerged as a geopolitical and cultural product of “glob-
alism” in the nineteenth century (See Sonoda 2003).
Given its original nature, the English Studies took the form of
the “know-your-enemy” studies that carried on the tradition of the
preceding Western Learning18 (Toyama 1993).  The pioneer work
in the “know-your-enemy” studies was typified by Hayashi Shihei
(1738–93), an enlightened social critic.  Sensing a barbarian threat
due to the then-current geopolitical reconfiguration at the end of
the eighteenth century, Hayashi had already predicted correctly
the invasion of foreign ships into the country, which later tran-
spired in 1808.  At the age of fourteen, when Mori still devoted
himself to Chinese Studies (in 1860), he came across Hayashi’s
Kaikoku heidan [Discussion of the Military Problems of a Maritime
Nation (1791)], a most inspiring and enlightening book that dealt
with national military strategy and gave warning that the maritime
― 34―
Japanese nation must build up the defenses and fortify the coasts
of the country with barbarian foreign enemies approaching Japan.
This book written in the Chinese style is said to turn him on to
English Learning for the “know-your-enemy” studies in 1861.  In
the following year, Satsuma went to war with Britain.  In Mori’s
eyes, Britain now became a new enemy of Japan.  As Inuzuka
(1986: 18) points out, this is when Mori, overwhelmed and im-
pressed by the bu (military) power of Britain, set out to “seek the
source of their strength” in the power of their bun (embodied in the
realm of science, art and religion) and “find out what is behind
Western civilization.”  Thus, English Learning was to serve as
alternative foreign studies that took on the character of intelligence
gathering.  Mori’s interest here was not in the purely academic/sci-
entific study of the English language per se, but rather in the geo-
political/cultural studies of “Anglo-American” civilization.  As for
Mori’s motive for English Learning Hall writes:
Why Mori should have picked English in the first place is
nowhere explained.  Hayashi’s references to European
other than Russians are primarily to the Dutch.  Perhaps
even before the Kagoshima Bay encounter, Mori may have
known enough about Uraga and Canton to realize that in
his day the waterborne peril was in great measure Anglo-
American. (Hall 1973: 60; emphasis added)
Indeed, there was supposed to be the spirit of small and greater
bun behind Mori’s language choice.  He saw Britain and America
(= an offshoot of the former) as Satsuma’s [and the new Japan’s]
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potential enemies.  As he perceived the new reality, he chose their
common language—English—as the wave of the future.  Con-
sequently, the English Studies in the 1860s–80s came to function
as the Anglo-American studies, which was to be at the center of
Western Learning in Meiji Japan.  Toyama Shigehiko (1993: 31–
50; 254–268) explains, Japanese approach to English Learning as
the “know-your-enemy” studies19 urged those super-samurai intel-
lectuals to examine thoroughly the civilization of their new ene-
mies with a view to internalizing whatever it was that they pos-
sessed as their strength so as to compliment their own weaknesses.
Then, super-samurai intellectuals pursuing English Learning
should be characterized not merely as mere linguists but rather as
today’s investigative journalists or intelligence experts who worked
in the capacity of keiseika who often served as politician, philoso-
pher, scholar, journalist, and scientist; they studied the English lan-
guage not because they were interested in analyzing the internal
system of the language purely for academic purposes, but because
they eagerly sought to “know their enemy” cross-culturally and
politically in order to emulate and beat them at their own game.
In short, they were expected to engage in strategic intelligence
gathering operations in the English Studies.  The following sums
up their political conscious in their literay arts:
Since defense against the foreign threat is the most vital
business of the day, we must go beyond our Japanese and
Chinese texts to achieve a true understanding of the world
of the barbarians, and adopt those things in which we are
weak and they strong.  Government and people in perfect
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harmony should expand the Imperial might to check these
barbarians of the West.  This is the urgent duty of the
valiant men of today.  Remaining strength should be devot-
ed to the diligent study of Western texts in Japanese transla-
tion, so that we may be able to discriminate the worthwhile
from the worthless among the customs and artifacts of the
West, and make use of them in displaying the Imperial
authority towards all nations. (quoted in Hall 1973: 56–57)
Similarly, the essence of the “know-your-enemy” studies at the
time is most aptly expressed by leading super-samurai intellectual
Sakuma Shozan (1811–64)’s following statement:
To get barbarians under control, we must first find out
about their game.  To know their scheme, we need to
become familiar with their language.  Therefore, to know
their language is to enable us not only to know our enemy
but also to control them … we should establish an institu-
tion in which we intensively translate barbarian books and
their history into our own language and lay bare their
game.  And it is to be hoped that we can utilize the intelli-
gence to deal with them in the best way possible…. 
(Sakuma 1871: 36–37)
Like Sakuma, for most samurai scholars of those days, studying
English meant none other than breaking away from the old (neo-
Confucian) paradigm and acquiring the knowledge of the civiliza-
tion of their new archrivals from the West.  They undoubtedly had
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a definite goal in mind; they were all eager to read and interpret
the meanings behind the English text as they ventured to explore
into the unknown world so they could come closer to and unravel
the principles and essence of Western civilization; they were curi-
ous and eager enough to compete with the Western powers on an
equal basis, which is a most striking characteristic of the first gener-
ation eigakusha (scholars of English Learning).20
Translation as the art of cultural war
As what started as English Learning developed into the full-
fledged English Studies, samurai scholars devoted themselves
more and more to “knowing thyself” and “learning from thine
enemies.”  In the Anglo-American studies, the aim of English
Learning was to “translate” into Japanese what they understood
from the English books as the strengths and weaknesses of their
barbarian enemies.  With their relativistic critical mind, samurai
scholars would cross-culturally compare and contrast themselves
with their adversaries in both English and Japanese.
Mori had precisely the same attitude as Sakuma to foreign lan-
guage learning.  Through English Learning he came to see Britain
not so much as a barbarian enemy to fight against, but rather as a
more civilized enemy from which the Japanese could learn and
should emulate.  He was well aware that Japan must assimilate into
a higher civilization before she could really “beat them at their
own game” (on this point see Matsumoto 1994: 243).  Interest-
ingly, we can find much the same mindset in Nakamura Naomasa
(1832–1891), a prominent Tokugawa government official, who was
sent by the shogunate to Britain around the same time that Mori
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was studying there.  As regards a proper attitude to English
Learning as the “know-your-enemy” studies, Nakamura writes:
From what I have been told, Western barbarians have six
strengths of theirs: astronomy, geography, arithmetics,
mechanical engineering, navigation, and medicine.  These
sciences are so elaborate and sophisticated that the Chinese
are far inferior to Westerners in these respects.  That said,
Western barbarians, too, are only human.  Then why not
adopt their advanced sciences and make them our own?  It
is not wise for us to just sit back and watch them monopo-
lizing the advantages when we now know we are far behind
in science.  To begin with, these sciences have their origins
not in Western civilization: much of the astroronomical
knowledge came from Egypt; Christianity, their religion,
derived from Israelites, not Westerners.  These examples
are too many to enumerate.  This only goes to show that
Westerners came to have their advantages as a result of
adopting those of the significant others.  Although I think
Westerners are ugly barbarians, they have learned from
other people’s strengths and successfully internalized them
as their own.  That being the case, the imperial nation
( Japanese) should not lag behind them, for we are capable
of catching up with, emulating and outperforming those
barbarians. (cited in Takanashi 1967: 57–58)
The point to note here is that Nakamura argues for the importance
of learning even from barbarians who continued to develop their
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own strengths with a pragmatic attitude to foreign cultures (Note
the same logic in the aforementioned Sakuma’s statement).  What
is more, as a reminder of the dangers of studying foreign languages
Nakamura warns:
However, in translating and learning from foreign books
we must bear in mind that Western barbarians learn the
Chinese language and read Chinese books not because
they attach themselves to the Chinese way of life, but
because they aim to have a good grip of the trends of the
times and take stock of the whole situation in China so that
they may turn things in their favor.  The Japanese scholars
of Western Learning should have the same attitude as that
of those Western barbarians engaging in Chinese Studies.  
(cited in Takanashi 1967: 58)
What Nakamura suggests is that Japanese students of foreign lan-
guages should learn from their enemies who adopt a right ap-
proach to the “area studies” of China for more strategic purposes.
It is worth pointing out, in passing, that although Ruth Benedict’s
The Chrysanthemum and the Sword is well known as the first academ-
ic book published after World War II that relentlessly elucidates
the cultural and behavioral patterns of the Japanese, it was in fact a
product of the U.S goverment-sponsered “area studies” of Japan
for military purposes.  The history of such area studies of Japan,
however, goes back to the mid-nineteenth century when Commo-
dore Perry’s black ship arrived in Japan.  Perry was convinced that
in their version of the “know-your-enemy” studies, Japanese lan-
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guage learning was a prerequisite for controlling Japan.  As the
admiral clearly states in his The Personal Journal of Commodore
Matthew B. Perry:
A long time will elapse before any full and authentic
account of their (= Japanese) internal laws and regulations
will be obtained; certainly not until we can establish men of
intelligence in the country in the character of consular
agents, merchants, or missionaries who, to enable them to
make any progress, should acquire a knowledge of the lan-
guage. (Pineau 1968: 180)
What is important in this connection is samurai intellectuals’ mind-
set nurtured in the Anglo-American studies where English lan-
guage learning was required to “know their enemy” in exactly the
same way as Americans did with the Japanese around the same
period (see also Samuels and Weiner 1992).  This is how super-
samurai scholars who pursued English Learning such as Mori and
Nakamura developed their mind-nature in conducting the English
studies.  Now it should be obvious that when Mori wrote the pre-
cept “Be proficient in languages for pragmatic purposes.  No more,
no less,” he meant that language—native or foreign—should be
studied not merely for pleasure and self-indulgence but for build-
ing super-samurai’s character with the spirit of bun as an integral
part of the art of bu.  Recall here the above-quoted Nakamura’s
plea for strategic language attitude: “The Japanese scholars of
Western Learning should have the same attitude as that of those
Western barbarians engaging in Chinese Studies.”  In this view,
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Mori’s personal admonition with respect to language learning can
be seen as reminding himself of the danger of falling into what
might be called “lingo-cultural snobbism” which makes students of
foreign language too much obsessed with an exotic way of life and
its literary and cultural prestige associated with it.21
Most importantly, the fact that samurai scholars of the English
Studies engaged in active “translation” from the language of the
Anglo-American Empire into their own points to the essence of
their mind-nature: they assumed a counter-civilizational attitude to
the enemy’s language.  Indeed, Mori’s counter-civilizational lan-
guage attitude was nurtured in the English Studies in Satsuma in
the 1860s.  It could be argued, then, that Satsuma’s education
based their Western Learning on the geo-cultural politics of lan-
guage in the world.  The reason that Mori decided to learn English
instead of Dutch is apparently because he had a counter-civiliza-
tional attitude to the hegemonic language in the new world order
as he increaslingly felt the need to build a new nation-state with “a
new language” in Japan.
It is clear by now that the English Studies in Mori’s young days
was in a state of flux and dynamic in that it attempted to explore
into the unknown world and to create a new civilization of its own.
As I shall argue in the next section, there was a dialectal and
overdtermined structure of samurai intellectuals’ language thought
in late- nineteenth century Japan.  To further develop our under-
standing of Mori’s personal precept regarding language attitude,
which was written down in Chinese characters while he was con-
centrating on the English Studies, we need to understand the
dynamics of the English Studies in a larger context of the geo-cul-
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tural politics of Satsuma vis-à-vis the Tokugawa government.
The geo-cultural politics of learning in Satsuma
The English Studies in mid-nineteenth century Japan was a new
Western Learning that originally emerged as the “know-your-
enemy” studies.  Simply put, it was the studies of the new world
order of “barbarians” that people viewed Westerners as.  The
super-samurai in Satsuma saw the English or their enemy “barbar-
ians” possessing arguably the biggest imperial language in the
West, namely English.  While a number of historical facts pertain-
ing eigaku (the English Learning) in the nineteenth century has
been chronologically well-documented in the historical studies of
English education in Japan, very little research has been done
from a social-historical linguistic perspective on super-samurai
intellectuals’ shift in eigaku approach from one that was primarily
aimed at “beating Western “barbarians” at their own game,” to one
intended to emulate Western “civilization and enlightenment.”  No
attention at all has been paid to the process of how super-samurai
intellectuals transformed their mind-nature or attitude to English,
the language of their worst enemy nation; now they began to look
upon it as the language of civilized nations which they once
viewed as that of barbarians.  Here it is important to keep in mind
that when the geopolitics of Satsuma supported by Britain and the
Tokugawa government backed by France was developing in the
late-Edo period, what Thomas Kuhn (1962) called “paradigm
shift” was taking place in the epistemological trasformation of the
nature of knowledge through English Learning (= studies of the
Anglo-American Empire).
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As I suggested earlier, the English Studies was started upon the
Western impact as the “know-your-enemy” studies intended to
provide super-samurai intellectuals with literary arts for pragmatic
(military and industrial) purposes.  But the nature of English
Learning was soon to change in the course of time.  A brief look at
the following chronological table helps us to understand how the
Japanese established the institutes for English Learning as a form
of intelligence bureau for studying their enemy nations.
*1808    Phaeton Incident (the arrival in Nagasaki of a British
ship disguised as Dutch one)
*1811    Bansho wagegoyo (Institue for translating Barbarian
Books into Japanese)
*1839    Bansha no goku (Imprisonment of the Companions of
Barbarian Studies)
*1847    Mori was born in Kagoshima
*1853    The arrival of US black ship in Japan
*1856    Bansho shirabejyo (Institute for the Investigation of
Barbarian Books)
*1862    Yosho shirabejyo (Institute for the Investigation of
Foreign Books)
*1863 Kaiseijyo: Tokugawa Institute for Enlightenment.
*1864 Satsuma Kaiseijyo was established
*1865    Mori set sail for Britain as an appointed student
*1868    Meiji Restoration
Here we can clearly see that the early eigaku started as the know-
your-enemy/barbarian studies.  And it came to be later called
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“institute for enlightenment” which would “function mainly as a
full-fledged governmental agency for military science; the whole
program offered in the institute was primarily based on English
Learning that covered a wide range of subjects such as astronomy,
geography, mathematics, as well as other branches of science that
deal with products, instruments, refining, fine arts, and type found-
ing” (Nihon Eigakushi Gakkai 1976: 77).22 What is of most signifi-
cance is the 1862 watershed in their perception of English
Learning.  It would appear that English learning as the “know-
your-enemy” studies transformed itself from Western barbarian
studies into Western civilization studies.  Apparently, this episte-
mological paradigm shift occurred just as the political thought of
the time in Japan was mutating from the “revere-the-emperor-
expel-the-barbarians” into the “open-the–country-and-compete-
with-the-civilized” line.  This suggests that super–samurai intellec-
tuals began to view their potential enemy not so much as lesser
barbarians to beat, but rather as violent yet more advanced people
to emulate, thereby distinguishing themselves from the significant
Other in a new way.  Here we should draw attention to the fact
that Mori was born and raised and educated in the middle of this
epistemological transition period of Western Learning, and that he
started learning English in the very early 1860s when English was
being regarded as the language of their archrival nation: Britain.
There is one further point we must not ignore in terms of the
geo-cultural politics of language learning in late-Edo Japan.  In the
1860s, Satsuma, Mori’s home domain, was emerging as a counter-
imperial power against the Emperor-approved Tokugawa govern-
ment.  It is well known that soon after British merchant Thomas
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Blake Glover (1838–1899) arrived in Japan in 1859, Glover and
Co. supplied arms to the domains of Satsuma and Choshu, centers
of antishogunal activities.  Choshu concluded an alliance with
Satsuma in 1861 as they both independently continued to study
carefully their old enemy (the Tokugawa government) as well as
their enemy’s enemy (Britain) for intelligence gathering.
A few years later, in retaliation for Satsuma and Choshu samu-
rais’ anti-foreign violent acts, there was a Kagoshima bombard-
ment (1863) by British warships and another one in Shimonoseki
Straits (1864) by a combined Western fleet of seventeen ships (nine
British, three French, four Dutch, and one American).  But it was
not long before Satsuma and Choshu came to terms with Britain
and other Western nations; strategic reconciliation with their
enemy’s enemy meant tactically concentrating their energies on
overthrowing their long-standing foe: the Tokugawa Shogunate.
If we now return to the mind-nature of super-samurai intellec-
tuals in Satsuma, we need frequently to remind ourselves of their
language education for super-samurai building because of the geo-
cultural politics of the marginal domain and the Tokugawa govern-
ment in a rapidly changing world.  It is noteworthy that in 1864
Satsuma established Kaiseijyo, a counterpart of the Tokugawa gov-
ernment-run school of Western Learning, which was called exactly
the same.  The fact that the school was intentionally named after
the Tokugawa government’s “intelligence agency” clearly indicates
that in so doing Satsuma’s super-samurai intellectuals decided to
take a counter-Tokugawa line so as to secede from the old Japan
(Inuzuka 1986: 18–19).  Like the Tokugawa school, Satsuma’s
counterpart taught a wide range of special subjects such as” the
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arts of army and navy artillery, warfare, maneuvering, castle-build-
ing, as well as other courses including astronomy, geography,
mathematics, surveying, navigation, machinery, shipbuilding,
physics, analytic chemistry, and medicine.”  As Hall (1973: 47)
notes, “Kaiseijyo (Western Learning Institute) which was to perform
the same function as the Tokugawa government’s Bansho shirabejyo
(Office for the Investigation of Barbarian Books).  Incidentally, the
layout of the Zo¯shikan was a “smaller copy of the Shoheiko in
Edo.”  Again, all this suggests that Satsuma began to position itself
apart from the central government with the view of overthrowing
it and instead creating the new Japan for themselves.
As Inuzuka (1986: 21) points out, the year 1864 was a turning
point for Satsuma in many respects.  Not only did they build
Kaisejyo in 1864, but there was also an anti-Tokugawa movement
rapidly growing among such influential super-samurai as Komatsu
Kiyoyasu, Saigo Takamori, and Okubo Toshimichi who played a
key role in governing the Satsuma domain.  The point to note here
is that it was against this political backdrop in 1864 that Mori
entered Kaiseijyo and majored in English Learning and wrote the
famous personal precepts, one of which encapsulates his language
attitude that says “Be proficient in languages for pragmatic purpos-
es.  No more, no less.”
In 1865, one year ahead of the Tokugawa government,
Satsuma sent the select students (including Mori) to Britain as the
counter-Tokugawa measure.  As Inuzuka comments:
The purpose of Satsuma’s sending students to Britain is that
they felt the urgent need to learn Western cultural and mili-
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tary arts—especially naval science—and to promote
friendly relations with the enemy country; they did so with
the true intention of the latter outweighing the former.
That is, it was because of their anti-Tokugawa motive that they
dispatched a goodwill mission to strengthen the ties of
friendship with Britain.” (Inuzuka 1986: 24; my emphasis)
Added to this, Satsuma decided to form a military alliance with
Choshu against the Tokugawa government in 1866.  Furthermore,
in 1867 the Satsuma domain participated in the World Exposition
held in Paris in rivalry with the Tokugawa shogunate which was
supposed to represent Japan overseas.  Here we can see that there
were Satsuma and the Tokugawa government trading places in
terms of international geo-cultural politics.  As has been noted
above, they both concurrently redefined the once-barbarian stud-
ies (English Learning) as the new platform for enlightenment and
civilization between 1863 and 1864; although at the beginning
both parties believed in the same cause of “expelling the barbar-
ians and revering the Emperor.”  In 1863 when Satsuma was
defeated by Britain, those super-samurai intellectuals decided to
found a Western Learning school of their own (Kaiseijyo) in emula-
tion of the Tokugawa Shogunate as they changed their stance from
anti-barbarian to anti-Tokugawa.  What needs to be emphasized
from the standpoint of the cultural politics of Satsuma, the
Tokugawa Shogunate, and Western nations is that in the early
1860s Satsuma came to modify their political tactics from sonnou
jyoui (“revering the Emperor and expelling the barbarians while
keeping the country closed”) to sonno kaikoku (“revering the
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Emperor, opening the country and associating with the civilized
Western nations).”  As Inuzuka (1986: 2) points out, this whole
phenomenon can be viewed as the process of transformation of
the Emperor-centered national polity, which once had to be de-
fended and maintained against foreigners as the absolute flag to die
for, into the relative flag to capitalize on in the interests of the parties
involved in the intra/international geoculture and geopolitics.
Here we must draw attention to the fact that there were trilater-
al conflicts arising from the power struggles among Satsuma, the
Tokugawa government, and Britain, which in turn gave rise to the
parallel construction of the geopolitical position of Satsuma and
their attitude towards language learning in relation to their signifi-
cant others.  Kaiseijyo was a place where their know-your-
enemy studies (English Learning) was conducted; the English lan-
guage was not only Satsuma’s enemy (Britain)’s language and what
another enemy (the Tokugawa government) studied as the lan-
guage of their potential enemy.  Consequently, conventional West-
ern Learning with its emphasis on Dutch Learning was to include
English Learning in both Kaiseijyo in the Tokugawa government
and Satsuma.  For Satsuma’s super-samurai, English Learning was
none other than a means for projecting a new reality which would
allow for epistemological transformation needed to adapt to the
changing domestic and global environments.  In developing their
thought on language, Chinese Learning was instrumental in pro-
viding them with feudalistic and idealistic/ideological ethos as
against Western values, while Western (English) Learning helped
inculcate anti-bakufu and pragmatic ideas into them.  In this way,
their strategy for language learning would incorporate Chinese
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Learning and English Learning as a dual and dialectic site for gen-
erating a higher platform that would allow them to shift their posi-
tion legitimately from anti-foreigner to anti-bakufu to pro-Anglo-
Saxon depending on the changing social and political circum-
stances.
What needs to be further clarified is that it is the structural
dynamics of Chinese Learning in contraposition to Western Learn-
ing that dialectically combined the Confucian ethos of taigimeibun
(one’s flag to die for) with the pursuit of practical knowledge of the
most advanced “enemy” nations in the world.  All this, as I shall
argue later, led to the resurgence of National Learning in between,
which strongly advocated the patriotic slogan “revere the emperor,
expel the barbarians.”  More important is the fact that Satsuma
found in cultural nationalism an opportunity to use the imperial
flag to die for as a cause for turning the conventional ethnocentric
and anti-barbarian National Learning into the patriotic yet more
liberal one that would open the imperial nation to a higher civi-
lization.  Indeed, not only did Satsuma form an alliance with their
biggest enemy from the West (Britain) so that they might over-
throw the Tokugawa regime and thereby build a new country try-
ing to break away from the Chinese (Confucian) ethics, they were
also willing to strive to learn from their enemy’s strengths with the
aim of outstripping the British Empire.  And it was the then-cur-
rent stream of eigaku thought propelled by emerging Japanese
imperialism that necessitated and determined Satsuma’s dual
approach to the intra/inter-national “geopolitics and geoculture”
(Wallerstein 1991).23 Their strategic attitude to English Learning as
the “know-your-enemy” studies played a pivotal role in relativiz-
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ing the old Other (the Chinese Empire) in the East and the new
Other (the British Empire) in the West as it helped establish the
new Self (the Japanese Empire) in the geo-cultural politics of
Satsuma in the new world system.  That is, it would allow the new
leaders to challenge the “national politics” of the imperial Self vis-
a-vis the imperial Others.  This in turn led those super-samurai
intellectuals to seek a new National Learning whereby a new lan-
guage and knowledge were to be sought after.
2.  Channeling imperialism into a new National Learning
In order to bring about a greater understanding of Mori’s language
attitude and choice, it is very important to understand the histori-
cal significance of the geo-cultural politics of the English Studies as
a new branch of Western Learning.  What Mori was seeking in his
choice of English over Dutch was a new paradigm that would
open up a whole range of possibilities in the new realities unfold-
ing before his eyes.  Furthermore, English studies as a new learn-
ing was to go further beyond the realm of the conventional West-
ern Learning; it was meant to open the way toward a new National
Learning.  Of particular note here is the philosophy of (language)
education in Satsuma which had long continued to promote not
only Western Learning but also a “new National Learning”
(Yoshiga 1971: 707–710; Okita 1992: 51–110).  As Hall explains:
If the purpose of education was to create men of character,
with new political awareness and new capacity for political
involvement, then its content required a drastic broadening in
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the direction both of native Japanese studies and of Western
Learning. (1973: 55; emphasis added)
This can be confirmed by Satsuma lord Nariakira’s educational
policy.
The academic tradition of the Zo¯shikan has adhered to the
teachings of Chu Hsi exclusively, neglecting the historical
annals of our own native land.  Some, I have heard it said, go
so far as to despise Japan in their adulation of China and
try to do everything in the Chinese fashion.  That is a
frightening mistake….  We ought to establish an Institute of
National Learning in which the ways of our native land may be
studied, supplemented by Chinese- and Western-type subjects, with
a set of school regulations defining relative priorities in the curricu-
lum. (cited in Hall 1973: 56; my emphasis)
Japanese and Western studies, both urgently recommended in
addition to Chinese studies in Nariakira’s Exhortation, were to
serve each in its own way.
(1) Zo¯shikan (Institute for Chinese Learning)
(2) Kokugakukan (Institute for National Learning)
(3) Yo¯gakukan (Institute for Western Learning)
What we have here is the dynamics of what might be called
“dialectics of Japanese Learning: kokugaku or National Learning
was to be reinforced and developed by Chinese Learning and
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Western Learning; it would be enlarged to embrace the old with
the new to form a higher learning.  The point to note is that the
geo-cultural politics of National Learning envisioned by Satsuma
lord Shimazu Nariakira must have been inculcated in such a seri-
ous student as Mori Arinori.  As Beasley (1990: 25) says, “Japanese
[National] learning encompassed all the rest, including Confu-
cianism and Buddhism.  This left room for Dutch [Western] stud-
ies, especially scientific ones, to be assimilated, not rejected”.
Kokugakukan, a school for the study of National Learning within
the Zo¯shikan was effectively promoted with appointment of
Godaiin Mihashira, a disciple of (radical nativist) Hirata Atsutane
(1776–1843) who claimed to be a pupil of Moto-ori Norinaga
(1730–1801), one of the most influential scholars of National Learn-
ing in Japan.  Indeed, lord Nariakira was cognizant of the need for
a new National Learning.  He maintains:
In coping with the actual conditions of our contemporary
world, we can no longer rely as in the past on the sole guid-
ance of our official Confucian scholars.  It has become
impossible to rule the realm properly without opening our
eyes widely to the world around us.  The time has come to
permit communication with foreign countries and to enter
broadly upon intercourse with the entire globe.  It is of the
foremost importance that we exhibit our national power by
embarking upon relations with the outside world.  To this
end we must firmly establish the national polity, make good our
weak points by learning from others where they are strong, under-
take vigorous military preparations, and promote our shipping
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capacity.  If we follow this policy, the prestige of our Imperial
realm will shine throughout the world.  It is with this aim in
mind that I wish to establish our academic instruction upon
a broadened base of scholarship.  
(cited in Hall 1973: 55; my emphasis)
and
As radical nativist Hirata Atsutane put it in 1811, “Japan is
the land of the gods and we their descendants….  Japanese
differ completely from and are superior to the peoples of
China, India, Russia, Holland, Siam, Cambodia, and all
other countries of the world.”  
(quoted in Beasely 1990: 24–25)
As I shall explain later, Mori’s stance on educational and language
reform was inspired and driven by the philosophical ethos of the
imperial nation in Satsuma, which triply based all their Learning,
Chinese, National and Western, upon jitsugaku (pragmatism).  It is
worth mentioning, in passing, that Satsuma’s Western (English)
learning can be viewed as designed to emulate the following three
enemies: the Tokugawa shogunate, China, and Britain.  Thus, the
geo-political and cultural ethos behind English Learning in
Satsuma helped simultaneously and dialectically redefine both the
Self and the Others by unlearning what they had understood in
the Chinese-dominated paradigm and learning instead what they
could absorb out of the English-dominated paradigm.  In this way,
English Learning in Satsuma was to set the stage for creating a new
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language for a new National Learning in which the imperial nation
would be embodied in late Meiji.  To put it another way, the
essence of English Learning in Satsuma was made explicit in its
“comprehensive political and moral philosophy” of the imperial
nation which required that conventional logos (language) and
ethos (religion) for old national polity be replaced dialectically by
new logos and ethos for new national polity so as to provide a new
education for a new imperial nation.
There is evidence to show how Mori attempted to go about the
dialectic pursuit of power in the new imperial Japan.  Mori found
in education the key to rebuilding the nation in the new paradigm.
In making an official declaration of the new Japan’s determination
to adapt to a higher civilization, he compiled Education in Japan in
1873.  In it he argues that the building of the new imperial Japan as
a nation-state requires a new education that allows for new knowl-
edge construction and accumulation through a new language and
religion.  This discourse is an all-important exposition of Mori’s
Weltanschauung primarily because he wrote it in English, outlin-
ing the dialectic development of the history of old and new Japa-
nese imperialism against Chinese and Western (British) imperi-
alisms—hence, dialectic Japanese imperialism.  The theme recur-
ring throughtout his treatise revolves around the internal dynamics
of imperial regime change in relation to the imperial Others in the
East and the West; it undersores the historical legitimacy of Japa-
nese civilization by focusing on domestic upheavals leading to (1)
restoration and re-legitimization by the new forces (Satsuma and
Choshu domains) of the national polity (imperial genealogical line)
in Japan24 (thesis); (2) the declaration of imperial Japan’s national
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independence from imperial China2 5 (antithesis); (3) the
announcement of imperial Japan’s potential competitiveness in the
new world of Western imperialism (synthesis).
Satsuma (a major force in the new Japan)’s relativization of the
imperial Others at home and abroad would lead to the growing
awareness of a new National Learning that pivots around the new
imperial flag to die for.  And a new sense of National Learning
would allow them to develop their imperial subjectivity with a crit-
ical attitude to the studies of the imperial Others: Chinese Leaning
and English Learning.  Taking another look at their own strengths
and weaknesses as well as those of the Others’ in the “know-your-
enemy” studies, pragmatic super-samurai intellectuals considered
building a new imperial language for a new National Learning.  As
they relativized the legitimacy of the (imperial) Chinese language
embedded in the language of Japan, they tried to incorporate the
(imperial) English language into the linguistic fabric of the country.
Given the geo-cultural politics of Japanese language-knowledge
building in imperial Japan, the development of national imperial-
ism necessitated establishing a “new National Learning” for the
Japanese Empire; it was the logical conclusion of the simultaneous
relativizations of Chinese imperialism that had long legitimated
Chinese Learning and Western imperialism that now legitimated
Western (Dutch and English) Learning.
As observed ealier, the education Mori received in his Satsuma
days placed a high premium on pragmatism, and generated public
service-minded and political consciousness.  As previously noted,
Satsuma lord Nariakira keenly realized the importance of strategi-
cally creating a new identity of the new Japan in the world’s
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nation-state system.  This is the reason why Nariakira strongly rec-
ommended that they “go beyond our (old) Japanese and Chinese
texts to achieve a true understanding of the world,” and that a new
National Learning requires reexamining a native language while
engaging in a new Western Learning (English Learning) so as to
build a whole new language of Japan for the benefit of the whole
new nation.  Thus, both English Learning and Chinese Learning
now became indispensable catalysts for a new National Learning.
Equally important, Chinese Learning in Japan had long been in-
strumental in setting the stage for Western Learning as well as
Japanese Learning; the studies of Chinese civilization had defined
the Japanese strengths and weaknesses as well as mirroring the
imperial Self against the Western imperial Others.  To put it anoth-
er way, Chinese Learning in Japan played a key role in function-
ing as a catalyst for reflecting the old world order in recognizing
the new world order.  As Murata suggests:
(T)here are ample grounds for seeing Westernization in
Meiji Japan as a realization of the Chinese order in altered
form.  Watanabe Hiroshi points out that for Meiji advocates
of opening Japan, the West itself acted as the real “China.”
The Civilization and Enlightenment movement reenacted
progress toward this “China” from a barbarian state, a
desirable outcome even for the Chinese order itself….  In
other words, Japan had always been highly conscious of its
own marginality in its historical relations with China.
Once Japan had selected the West as the new focus of its
“China” model, it was able to reorganize itself quickly and
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easily into a nation-state without having to question its fun-
damental view of civilization. (Murata 2000: 32)
If we take a closer look at the process of modern Japanese lan-
guage building, we will find that there were the dynamics of
Chinese and Western and Japanese studies being generated as a
consequence of cultural conflicts of old and new languages in the
midst of the clashes of Oriental and Occidental civilizations in late-
Edo and early Meiji Japan.  It can thus be argued that the two
major foreign imperial languages of the East and the West—Chi-
nese and English—had served as “catalyst languages” of what
Koyasu (2003) calls hukahino tasha [inevitable significant Other] for
the creation of a new National Learning as well as the building of a
new language of Japan.  Simply put, a new National Learning was
to emerge as a result of the Chinese Learning model being dialec-
tically mirrored and applied in Western (Dutch English) Learning.
Then, it may safely be assumed that it was the learning environ-
ments in Satsuma that Mori first nurtured the idea of establishing a
new National Learning that would take advantage of both Chinese
and English Learning for the benefit of a new education in Japan.
In what follows I shall examine from theoretical and hermeneuti-
cal points of view the ways in which Mori’s linguistic behavior had
operated within the paradigm of Satsuma’s three-tiered language
education that would lay the groundwork for the subsequent
dialectical development of Chinese Learning and English
Learning into a new National Learning by means of a “new lan-
guage” of Japan.
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3.  New Japan’s tactical approach to a higher civilization
Eigaku performance in action: Cultural diplomacy
It was Mori’s eigaku performance in action that contributed a great
deal to paving the way for a new National Learning in Japan.  This
is best exemplified in Mori’s English publication of Education in
Japan during his stint in America in the early 1870s.  This can and
should be understood as an official declaration of the new Japan’s
national project for creating a new National Studies.  Why and
how did Mori decide to write in English and publish the book
abroad first?  Why in America?  Why not in Europe?  What was
his motive?  In order to answer these questions, we first need to
clarify where Mori resided as he made major moves on his cross-
cultural journey.
The first and most important fact that we have to bear in mind
is that Mori was a globe trotting super-samurai diplomat.  His cul-
tural shuttle diplomacy, private and public, or at home and
abroad, was to make a difference in his cognitive mapping of the
international geopolitics and geoculture of Japanese civilization in
the 1860s–80s.  The fact that Mori’s first overseas travel to Britain
was on a steamship speaks for itself.26 As Sonoda Hidehiro (2003)
demonstrates in his The Beginning of Voyage Around the World: the
Origin of Globalism, the practical use of steamships made it possible
to connect the Pacific Ocean and the Atlantic Ocean to bring the
“globe” into being in the literal sense of the word.  With the
advent of globalism, the super-samurai intellectuals became more
and more sensitized to the geo-politics and geoculture of Japan in
the “global” world; they began to realize the fact that Japan can be
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seen as located in both the Far East and the Far West on the globu-
lar extension of Asia and Europe.  In short, Japan, located both in
the East and the West as a periphery nation, was unconditionally
required to open her mind to the new world where she had no
other choice but to turn into the country which could challenge
her significant Others.  Putting in action his eigaku performance in
cultural diplomacy, Mori set out to study the strengths and weak-
nesses of Japan’s enemy nations while at the same time trying to
overcome her own weaknesses and let the world (international
community) know her own strengths.  With this background in
mind, let us take a closer look at where and how he took action in
such eigaku performance.  The following is the chronological table
of diplomat Mori’s geo-cultural political locations in the new world
order:
Where Mori Arinori (1847–1889) Lived and Worked
1847–1865   Satsuma (in Old Japan)
1865–1866   Britain
1867–1868   USA
1868–1870   New Japan (Meiji Restoration)
1871–1873   USA
1873–1875   Japan
1875–1878   China
1878–1879   Japan
1880–1884   Britain
1884–1889   Japan
Here we must draw special attention to the geopolitical positions
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Mori took as a diplomat-politician in his lifetime.  The point to
observe is that Mori spent one third of 42 years of his life with a
mission abroad; as the chronological table above shows, more
than half of the last half of his life after 1865 was spent in shuttling
between Japan and the significant other countries.  Thus, Mori
played a significant role in cultural diplomacy in the 1870s–80s.
More noteworthy is the fact that Mori’s overseas experience began
and ended with Britain over a span of twenty years.  This clearly
suggests that Britain was seen by many super-samurai to be Japan’s
number one “enemy” (rival) nation.  Closely connected with this is
the fact that Mori moved from Britain to America and vice versa
while placing China in the middle.  This indicates that the new
Japan was trying to approach the United States and China in such
a way that she could facilitate later talks with Britain and secure a
better place in the Western (Anglo-American) geopolitics.  There-
fore, in looking at what he stated in his English discourses, it is
very important to locate the texts within the context of his geopo-
litical maneuvering in cultural diplomacy.
While representing Japan in America, Mori spoke and wrote in
English most prolifically between 1871 and 1873; his important
works were intensively published during this period.27 All these
discourses made during the 1870s(–80s) should be seen as the
diplomatic products of his personal and collective acts of translat-
ing into English the Japanese views on both the Self and the
Other, which was a typical example of traditional eigaku intelli-
gence operation by super-samurai intellectuals.  For Mori, transla-
tion in the English Studies had to be interactive representations in
Japanese as well as in English of both Western and Japanese civi-
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lizations for geocultural and geopolitical purposes.  Therefore,
Mori not only encouraged samurai-intellectuals to translate
English into Japanese but also took the initiative in speaking his
Japanese mind to the Anglo-American discourse communities.
Indeed, the opening gambit for Mori’s eigaku performance in cul-
tural diplomacy in the early 1870s was a publication in Washing-
ton, D.C. of Life and Resources in America (1871), the first full-fledged
study by the Japanese of the United States of America (Van Sant
2004: x).  Again, it must be noted that it was a cultural and politi-
cal product of Mori’s (language) behavior propelled by the English
Studies which served as the “know-your-emeny studies.  The pre-
liminary note to Life and Resources in America disclosed Mori’s
intended purpose of the book as follows:
The knowledge furnished by all the better qualified minds
of the world, is a powerful element, rendering great service
in the cause of humanity.  It is often the case that enmity
and bloodshed, are the consequence of storing up preju-
dices, resulting from the want of mutual knowledge of the
parties engaged.  The object of this publication, is not only
to aid in removing those prejudices, but also to invite all
the lovers of their race, in Japan, to join in the noble march
of progress and human happiness.
(SMAZ, Supplementary Vol. 1: 5)
Here we can see that Mori firmly believed that “mutual knowledge
of the parties engaged” would help toward removing racial preju-
dices.  Added to this, equally important is the italicized indication
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on the facing pages of the book which says, “For circulation in
Japan.”  Considering the place of publication, it was supposed to
be intended for the Anglo-American readers.  So it may sound a
little strange when it says that it was also meant to be circulated for
the Japanese readers.  What should we make of the fact that he
wrote and published the book in English in an English-speaking
country when he wanted both the Anglo-American peoples and
the Japanese people to read it?28 It would appear that what Mori
was aiming at was enlightening both sides on the importance of
mutual understanding for diplomatic reasons; he was trying to
draw attention from both sides at the same time as he created
cross-cultural space where the “twain shall meet in English.”  This
might give us a clue as to why Mori attempted to maintain a geo-
political and cultural position by simultaneously representing the
Self and the Others in English.  The same is true of the successive
publications in the U.S. of The Japanese in America (1872), Religious
Freedom in Japan (1872) and Education in Japan (1873).
One further point to be raised here is why Mori engaged in
American studies instead of British studies.  As previously men-
tioned, it was because of Meiji Japan’s strategic diplomacy that
Mori set out to take advantage of the U.S. bargaining power so as
to gain a more competitive edge in the geo-cultural politics of the
Japanese Empire against the British Empire.29 In order to find out
why Mori began to study America on a large scale in his English
Studies after 1871, it is very important to understand the historical
significance of the year 1873 in terms of the international geo-cul-
tural politics of the British Empire and the United States of
America.  If we look at the year 1873 from a historical perspective,
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we can see it as marking a very significant transition period in
world history.  History suggests that the nineteenth century saw
the world hegemonic shifts from France to Britain to America.
According to the World System theory propounded by Emmanuel
Wallerstein, after the British Empire emerged the United States as
a new world hegemonic state in the late nineteenth century.  As
Waterstain writes:
One of the basic structures of the capitalist world-economy
is the cyclical rise and decline of “hegemonies” within the
world-system….  The story of the third of the hegemonies,
that of the United States, may be best be started in 1873,
the beginning of the so-called “Great Depression” of the
nineteenth century, the moment after which one could say
the era of British hegemony was over. (1991: 3)
The above historical view on the structural change in the world
system is worthy of note, because it suggests a possible connection
between the new Japan’s 1873 approach to the United States and
its hidden agenda for challenging the British Empire in a broader
context.
Furthermore, we must not overlook another event that simulta-
neously transpired in 1873 when the new Japan officially declared
the eclectic adoption of Western solar calendar in Japan by way of
spatial and temporal transformation.  In the introduction to Educa-
tion in Japan Mori states:
By a recent decree, the Western calendar has been adopted
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in Japan in all particulars excepting as the names of the
months, for which numbers are substituted, commencing
with January.  We have, therefore, since the first of January
just passed, come into a new relation with Western civiliza-
tion. (SMAZ, Vol. 5: 186–187)
Of particular relevance here is the simultaneous fact on the year
1873 that as the new Japan decided to enter the West, she concur-
rently made an official breakaway from the Chinese Empire30 (Ko
1995: 20–31; 217–219).  Indeed, in East Asia, Chinese hegemony
was over when Japan, as Ishikawa Kyuyo (1999: 198–199) suggests
in his A Nation with a Dualistic Language: Japan, officially terminat-
ed the long-standing Sino-Japanese tributary system in 1873 by
abolishing sanpai kyuhai (compulsory bowing ritual conducted
when a foreign guest was presented to the Chinese Emperor); this
political decision was tantamount to Japan’s declaration of inde-
pendence from China.  This is, as Ishikawa points out, a moment
when the “Japanese Empire” stood on an equal footing with the
Chinese Empire.  As Murata (2000: 25) says, “The nation-state sys-
tem first appeared in East Asia as a challenge to the tribute system
of imperial China.”  All this goes to show that the new Japan virtu-
ally attained independence from China in 1873 as an imperial
nation-state that began to challenge China’s hegemony and instead
establish her supremacy over East Asia.
The question that needs to be clarified here is how this geo-cul-
tural and political synchronicity affected Mori’s cross-cultural
approach to language.  What this suggests is that Mori’s 1872–73
idea for language reform points to the possibility of the conven-
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tional Japanese language developing dialectically into a new impe-
rial language that forms a trilateral relationship with the two other
imperial languages of the Chinese Empire and the British Empire.
It is also interesting to note that as Kawakatsu Heita’s explana-
tory model of the global economic development of maritime
nations suggests, Britain and Japan underwent a similar secession
from the continent of “Asia” when Japan left “Chinese Asia” in just
the same way Britain broke away from “Islamic Asia” (1996: 215).
Kawakatsu goes on to argue that these two nations’ secession from
the continent of “Asia” are closely connected with British and
Japanese ethnocentric (imperial) views of their own civilizations as
the highest in the world.  Viewed in this historical context of the
global geopolitics, as Kawakastu (2001: 22) observes, “Moderniza-
tion means involving both Britain and Japan (as maritime imperial
nations) expanding and creating new civilizations via the “Asian”
Seas in a contest for supremacy and seeking the status of the old
(French and Chinese) civilizations of the Eurasian continent.”
Based on Kawakatu’s theory I would like to carry my own ar-
gument one step further.  At the turn of the nineteenth century,
just as the British Empire had left Continental Asia, she also began
to secede not only economically but also geopolitically/culturally
from the continent of “Europe” whose civilizational ethos was rep-
resented by Latin/French culture.  And the British Empire (along
with America) continued to expand its imperial sphere of influ-
ence into the continent of China in the mid-nineteenth century.
Then there was the clash in East Asia of old and new “civiliza-
tions” between the East and the West.  Among the imperial nations
involved were Britain, China, and Japan.  Here we can find an
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inevitable current of history in which the new imperial Japan was
forced to find a way to challenge Western (Anglo-American) civi-
lization and Eastern (Chinese) civilization at the same time.  Thus,
this would as a necessary corollary lead Meiji Japan to attempt in
the long and medium terms to de/un-Easternize (de/un-Chinese)
and de/un-Westernize (de/un-Anglo-Americanize) the country so
that she might create a higher civilization than those of rival impe-
rial nations in the East and the West.
Considered in the light of the “world system” theory, we can
see the year 1873 as triply symbolic of the end of the Chinese
Empire’s hegemony in East “Asia,” the beginning of the decline of
the British Empire’s global hegemony, and the U.S. emergence as
a new hegemonic state in the world.  This is why the new Japan
decided to capitalize on the on-going reconfiguration of the world
system and chose the United States as the strategic platform for
negotiating the Japanese voice through the language of the Anglo-
American communities; they were looking to win over Americans
first and thus gain a more bargaining power in later talks with
Britain which had the last word on the issue of revision of unequal
treaties with Japan.  For modern Japan, successful revision of
treaties would mean becoming independent not only of all the
imperial Western nations involved, but also of the imperial China
being colonized by the West.  Thus, the leading samurai Japanese
were attempting not only to relativize and emulate not only China
(and the Chinese language) as the old imperial Other (and their
language), but also in the long run to emulate and surpass Britain-
led Anglo-American communities and (the English language) as
the new imperial Other and (their language).  What we have here
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is modern Japan’s geo-cultural politics that can be best described
as “Leave the East, Enter the West, Challenge and Transcend the
Imperial Others” (hereafter called LEEWCTIO).
As we have already seen, diplomat Mori continued to shift his
geopolitical positions with Japan as he shuttled between the imper-
ial nations in the East and the West: Britain/America, China, and
Japan.  In what follows, let us examine how his idea of LEEWC-
TIO was expressed in his English and Japanese discourses made
as he changed his location in cultural diplomacy.
The key to getting behind Mori’s world view that most reflects
his LEEWCTIO approach lies in the introduction to Education in
Japan (1873).  Given that America then was way ahead of Britain in
language and educational reforms, it is not surprising that in 1873
he displayed in America (not in Britain) his LEEWCTIO attitude
to the issue of language education in Japan.  (Apparently, Mori
realized that in order to reform Japan and surpass the British
Empire, Japan must emulate America, a newly-emerging hege-
monic state in the new world that was in the process of emulating
Britain.) As Hall (1973) points out, Education in Japan is “probably
one of Mori’s most revealing English discourses that unfolds his
Weltanschauung embracing his broad overview on the history of
imperial Japanese civilization.”  This treatise should be considered
as an all-important exposition of Mori’s personal Weltanschauung,
not only because it was written by himself in English, but also
because what is disclosed in the discourse represents his grand
vision for imperial nation-state building.  As we shall see in the
subsequent discussions, it is mainly concerned with the cultural/
ethnic/racial strengths as well as weaknesses of Japanese civiliza-
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tion, in which we can find much of what shapes his Weltanschau-
ung embracing the super-samurai’s mythos (national history based
on mythology, ethos (pragmatism), pathos (patriotism), and logos
(enlightened views on the science of language and religion).  All
these he attempted to express in English in the English discourse
communities.  As observed already, this can be seen as a super-
samurai’s linguistic behavior at the cutting edge of eigaku perfor-
mance.  (It is in this discourse published in the English discourse
communities that Mori would advocate the “adoption” of a “new
language” as well as a new “religion” required for creating a “new
National Learning” of the new people, by the people, for the peo-
ple, which we shall examine closely later.
What we are concerned with here is the connection he makes
in the discourse between the methodology of educational reform
in Japan and the mythology of the Japanese Empire.  The most
arresting feature of Mori’s historical view is found in his descrip-
tions of the evolution of old and new Japanese imperialism/civi-
lization against Chinese and British imperialisms/civilizations.
Here we can see his idea of LEEWCTIO as underpinning Japan’s
dialectic counter-imperial and anti-civilizational approach to
reforming education in order to achieve the national slogan as
expressed in the Meiji government-issued gokajyo no goseimon
(“charter-oath of five articles”) that says: “Wisdom and ability shall
be sought after in all quarters of the world, for the purpose of
firmly establishing the imperial domination.”  Thus, education,
Mori believed, furnishes the key to building an imperial nation-
state that could stand on an equal footing with hegemonic states in
both the East and the West.  For this very reason, Mori considered
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it necessary to expatiate on the legitimacy and superiority of the
Japanese Empire in connection with the potentialities of the new
education in Japan.31 Mori begins the introduction to Education in
Japan by mythologizing the beginning of the Japanese Empire as
follows:
The history proper of the Japanese Empire stretches over
2,532 years, and begins with the year of ascension to the
throne of the Emperor Zinmu, the first sovereign who
definitively established the empire.  Her dynasty, until the
present time, has suffered no change, and is therefore the
oldest in the world. (SMAZ, Vol. 5: 134; my emphasis)
There are two fundamental things that never should be sep-
arated from the throne; its great constitution and its great
authority.  Since the establishment of the empire, the impe-
rial dynasty has been one and the same, and it will so con-
tinue forever.  Every portion of the land, and every one that
lives, are of the throne.  This is what we call the Great
Constitution.  No one will be allowed to hold any property
in land without the imperial authority.  This is what we call
the Great Authority. (ibid.: 178)
[T]he unification of the power of the nation in the hands of
the emperor, so that Japan might become strong enough to
stand as an equal in the face of the nations of the earth.  
(ibid.: 173)
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The point Mori tries to highlight here is that the Japanese Empire
is the oldest in the world; therefore, it is perhaps one of the most
legitimate imperial nations.  Ten years later, while he assumed his
post in Britain as an official representative of Japan, Mori once
again disclosed much the same view of the history of imperial
Japan as follows.
It is a fact that, since the time of Emperor Zimmu—2,544
years ago—Japan has never been subjected to any foreign
rule; the same Imperial Dynasty has remained in sover-
eignty even to the present time, the throne being the center
of our national existence; and that these two facts have
been so cherished in the hearts of my countrymen, as to
create in them a profound and unqualified respect for the
Imperial Throne, and a peculiarly strong love for our coun-
try. (ibid.: 407)
I do not know how it is, or what it is that causes this intense
attachment of the Japanese to their country—an attach-
ment which neither time nor distance can weaken; but I
think that two of its great causes are—first, the fact that for
twenty-five centuries Japan has never passed beneath the
rule of a conquering race—for all that period Japan has
been free and unconquered, and that fact is one which we
always remember with pride; the second is that during that
same period—for 2,500 years—we have remained under
the same dynasty.  For a time, it is true, the representatives
of that dynasty were overshadowed by the power of com-
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manders-in-chief, whom you incorrectly call the Tycoon,
but the dynasty survived, and it is once more in full posses-
sion of powers.  No other State can point to such a record,
and it is but natural that we should feel a pride in our coun-
try—pride that makes us smile with amusement at the idea
that our importation of steam engines, telegraphs, or Parlia-
ments can in any way affect our Japanese heart.
(SMAZ, Vol. 1: 436)
Again, the main thrust of the discourses above is that the Japanese
Empire is undoubtedly the oldest civilization in the world on the
grounds that the imperial lineage has since ancient times been
unbroken and never been conquered by foreign nations.  As we
shall see later, the theme of unbroken and unconquered imperial
Japan often recurs in his other diplomatic English discourses con-
cerning the unique strength of the nation.  Mori chronologically
focuses on the imperial genealogy in connection with evolution
and revolution in Japanese civilization, which has progressively
caught up with and transcended a higher (model) civilization (from
China towards Western nations).  This view of his can best be sum-
marized as what might be called “dialectic Japanese imperialism”
developed by the geo-cultural and political thought of LEEWC-
TIO within the clashes of the old and new civilizations.
The methodology employed in Mori’s tactics for realizing his
strategy of LEEWCTIO can be found in his discourses on “imperi-
al Japan’s time-honored eclectic cross-cultural adaptation,” which
is closely connected with the geo-cultural and political thought of
the archrival-emulating English Studies.  In the introduction to
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Education in Japan Mori asserts as follows:
The highly-developed condition attained on the (Chinese)
continent in various departments of art, science, literature,
and also in religious sentiments and ideas, found ready
appreciation in Japan. (SMAZ, Vol. 5: 143)
Among many peculiar and interesting characteristics of our
people, the most remarkable was their noble and apprecia-
tive disposition with which continental civilization was
received.  Not only were its benefits appreciated, but so
ready and apt was then our nation as a pupil that it soon
equaled its master in the versatility of its knowledge, and
our whole race, morally, became identified with that of the
Asiatic continent. (ibid.: 146)
Mori also restates the idea three years later (1876) when he was
appointed as an ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to
China:
If our ancestors were still living they would without doubt
do exactly what we have done in regard to this very simple
business of changing costume.  Our ancestors about a thou-
sand years ago, adopted the Chinese costume as they then
found it better than one they had.  It is one of our national
characteristics to readily take in anything that is both good
and beneficial. (SMAZ, Vol. 1: 337)
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On the contrary we are quite proud of the change.  It was
never forced upon us but was made entirely at our own
free voluntary will.  I am happy to say that my nation is,
and has been, so well disposed as to readily take in all
things that are deemed good, from any quarter whatsoever,
Asia, Europe, or America. (ibid.: 378)
Furthermore, when he took his appointed post in Britain seven
years after his stint in China, he made the same comment as fol-
lows:
It is a fact that from early times Japan has possessed an
aptitude for appreciating, and readily making use of, for-
eign ideas, manners, and things; and that this aptitude of
Japan has enabled her to rise to, and in some respects, to
surpass, the state of civilization attained by the neighboring
countries; —in former times, Japan largely engrafted on
her political institutions many features belonging to the
highly developed systems of her Asiatic neighbors, and, at
the present time, she has already commenced a similar
process, as regards the systems of her European and Amer-
ican neighbors. (ibid.: 408)
Before he left Britain for Japan, he spoke about the cultural
strengths and its superiority over and over again.
But, I don’t know how it is, whether from the genius of our
nation, or from whatever other cause, the Japanese have
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ever been prompt to appropriate whatever is best in foreign
nations.  Hundreds of years ago they imported from the
Corea or China their arts, their costumes and much of their
Constitution.  Down to within the last three hundred years
the facility of assimilation, or imitation if you like to call it,
continued to be our great characteristic.  Three hundred
years ago a change was introduced.  The feudal system was
established, and remained stationary and shut up within
herself.  But at the close of that period she shook herself
free from the burden of feudalism, and assumed her old
national role.
and
People imagine here that Japanese during the last ten or
fifteen years is a new thing to us.  It is, on the contrary, but
a return to her historical role, the only difference being
that, whereas we formerly borrowed from the East, we now
borrow from the West.  It is not an unworthy policy to take
that which is best from all worthy nations with which we
come into contact.  That has been our policy in the past; it
is our policy to-day.  You think that this importation of
ideas and institutions from foreign and alien civilizations
will weaken and impair our strength.  I have too much
confidence in the Japanese heart.  Go all over the world,
take any Japanese you like, no matter how Americanized
or Europeanized he may be, and you will find in him the
same stout heart which beats in the breast of every native
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of Japan. (ibid.: 435–436)
All these discourses above clearly show that Mori held a strong
conviction that the Japanese imperial polity-centered approach to
cross cultural interaction would almost always make a difference in
importing whatever is good from abroad so as to create something
Japanese out of foreign civilizations, be it Chinese or Anglo-
American.  The conventional wisdom we find here might be called
“eclectic cross-cultural adaptation” which, as I shall argue later,
would have a great effect on Mori’s thinking on language reform
in Japan.  In Mori’s view, imperial Japan’s eclectic cross-cultural
adaptation would no doubt make for the LEEWCTIO approach to
relativizing other civilizations and incorporating foreign elements
into Japan with its cultural and national integrity intact.
In addition to the long-standing national polity that had com-
prised the integrity of the Japanese race, there is another important
element that came into play in the development of the English
Studies as super-samurai intellectuals’ vehicle for eclectic cross-cul-
tural adaptation; it was super-samurai’s kigai (spirit of indepen-
dence, self-respect, and personal honor that made it possible for
them to propel their English Learning into action with a well-
defined purpose in mind.  A notion that I find useful in conducting
an in-depth analysis of a super-samurai’s kigai is what Francis
Fukuyama (1992a) calls thymos or “spiritedness” that produces
human “desire for recognition.”32 Fukuyama argues that “an
understanding of the importance of the desire for recognition as
the motor of history allows us to reinterpret many phenomena that
are otherwise seemingly familiar to us, such as culture, religion,
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work, nationalism, and war” (ibid.: xix).  And he goes on to sug-
gest that the evolution of world history has been driven by human
thymos which consists of isothymia (desire to stand on an equal foot-
ing with others) and megalothymia (desire to excel others).  These
two concepts go a long way toward explaining well the ethos of
modern Japanese statesmen and intellectuals who believed in
bushido (the code of samurai).  Indeed, the soul of the warriors
derives from kigai (the Japanese ethos equivalent to thymos) which
dictated their behavior as moral imperatives (Nitobe 1989: 157–
165; see also Fukuyama 1992b: 19); Meiji government’s goal was
to rank equally with and surpass the imperial Others (China and
Britain/America) in every way.  Thus, it may be said that super-
samurai intellectuals’eigaku performance based on “honorific indi-
vidualism” (Ikegami 1995) was intended to transform the Japanese
into a nation with the highest civilization by capitalizing on the
dialectic dynamics of the imperial Self and the significant imperial
Others.
Meiji Japan’s national slogans such as “enrich the country,
strengthen the military” and “civilization and enlightenment” were
coined and propagated by super-samurai leaders with their eyes
set on the inter-civilizational competition for equality and suprem-
acy.  They were giving serious consideration to the question of
how long it would take to overtake and outperform the Western
great powers.  To this end, the government decided to dispatch the
Iwakura mission to America and Europe in 1871–1873 in order to
size up the major powers.  According to A True Account of the
Ambassador Extraordinary & Plenipotentiary’s Journey of Observation
through the United States of America and Europe, the official reports of
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the inspection tour in Britain, the Iwakuwa Mission came to the
conclusion that “Even in Europe it was only after the nineteenth
century that a number of wealthy people came on the scene.  And
still, as far as we can see, it took only forty years for them to reach
where they are now.”  As Kawakatsu (1999: 115) points out, “They
returned from the observation trip with the prospect that it would
take about one generation for Japan to overtake Western powers.
We can read their sense of rivalry between the lines in the official
reports.”  Here we must notice their spirit of emulation and
“counter-civilizational attitude to Western civilization.  This is
exactly how Mori felt about the geo-cultural politics of the new
Japan in the 1870s.  In an interview with Li Hongzhang (1823–
1901; a Chinese general and leading statesman of the late Qing
Empire) which took place in China in 1876, Mori was asked by Li
how he looked at the question of the introduction of Western ele-
ments into an Asian nation.  Then he clearly expressed his view as
follows.
That is a very great question.  It is, I should say, a question
concerning the competition for supremacy between the
races and the religion as well as for intelligence, power, and
wealth between two of the great divisions of the world (=
Asia and Europe). (SMAZ, Vol. 1: 379)
Note that Mori regarded the competition for supremacy between
the races as a fact of life.  While in Britain, he talked of the compe-
tition of commerce as nothing less than a “war”:
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You ask me about standing armies, and the impression
which is on the Oriental mind by a continent converted
into an army camp.  That spectacle, I am free to confess,
impressed far less than the war of commerce which, under the
name of “competition,” goes on unceasingly.  In military
warfare there is sometimes peace.  You have truces and
treaties, and you have intervals during which nations
abstain from armed strife.  But the war of commerce never
stops.  The competition of nation with nation for the
monopoly of the trade and industry of the world is constant
and cruel. (ibid.: 438; my emphasis)
Upon returning from Britain to Japan, he commenced directing
the people’s attention to achieving the highest civilization and so
winning a victory in the war called “competition” in the arenas of
national diligence and education:
I am of the opinion that there is nothing we do everyday in
Japan today that could not be regarded as a war in the face
of international competition; we have the war of com-
merce, the war of knowledge building (national education),
the war of individual and national independence that
would make Japan a good country in the world.  If we were
satisfied with Japan having its place in the international
community at the very bottom of its hierarchy, then we
would have nothing to worry about and thus no need to
prepare for such wars.  The Japanese Empire would only
continue to decline in spite of its name.  Japanese men with
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the samurai spirit must work harder and harder so that our
country, if now a third-class nation, may become a second-
class power in the near future; if now second-class, then she
aspires to becoming the first-class; and finally she will be
the world’s leading nation. (SMAZ, Vol. 2: 346–347)
To let the people know the fact relative to the international status
of Japan, Mori began to go on the road around the nation, visiting
governmental and educational institutions and speaking in public
repeatedly about the importance of acting in recognition of the
impending national crisis:
How powerful is our country compared with other nations
in the world?  To answer this question we need secondary
and tertiary education.  Some of you in the audience may
have overseas experiences and know something about for-
eign affairs.  Others may have read foreign books or have
heard about what is going on outside the country.  In short,
although it is difficult to know exactly what status Japan has
in the world community without finding out about foreign
countries, now it is common knowledge that our country
does not have class or commercial power, nor do we have
enough experience in international diplomacy.  It goes
without saying, therefore, that in order to compete with
other nations we need to conduct diplomatic activities
more actively while promoting domestic industry and
developing commerce.  Yet perceptive observers will real-
ize that conventional education falls short of achieving our
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goals. (ibid.: 409–410)
If you want to know why we need secondary and tertiary
education today, all you have to do is simply look at
whether Japan is powerful in comparison with other coun-
tries and where Japan stands in the world now.  Although
Japan adopted other approach to retaining the power of the
nation in the period of national seclusion, now that we have
opened the country and joined the international communi-
ty, it is urgent that we do what is necessary to achieve inde-
pendence in reality and in name and maintain national
prestige….  Sad to say, the reality is that Japan is way
behind the advanced nations and still has a long way to
go….  In spite of difficulties before us, we have no other
choice but to make a concerted effort to go forward un-
daunted; there is no way we can’t do it if we take two steps
forward when they take one; if they take ten steps, then we
take twenty. (ibid.: 424–425)
How do you think we are doing in this competition?
Where do you think we are in the world in terms of nation-
al progress, compared with Europe and America?  To be
perfectly honest and plain, the people do not realize the
hard fact that Japan still has a long way to go before she
catches up with them.  We have to admit that that is where
we are now and we are going to start from there and strive
to rank with them in the world of universal competition.
(ibid.: 442)
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Given the present national power, it is too risky for us to
participate in the universal competition in the world.  If we
fail to develop our nation, we are only left with two op-
tions: Japan will either be annexed by foreign countries or
become an “independent protectorate. (ibid.: 447)
All these quotes suggest that Mori felt a pressing need to edu-
cate the people in such a way that Japan as a new nation would
achieve political, economic, and cultural independence and there-
by stand on an equal footing with other advanced nations in the
“universal competition in the world.”  In Mori’s Weltanschauung
as exemplified in the above discourses can be found his blueprint
for the future of Japan; he expressed his belief that the new Japan
should and could reach the highest level of civilization in the new
world order.  As he declares in his letter to Whitney:
[T]he people of the Japanese Empire, aspire to attain the
highest degree of civilization, but are unprovided with that great
essential to their individual as well as national progress,—a good
language—. (ibid.: 56; my emphasis)
Of particular importance here is his reference to the connection
between the realization of his grand project and the necessity for a
“good language” for individual and national education.  In the
next section, then, we shall examine ways in which Mori adopted
the LEEWCTIO approach to the development of a new language
for imperial nation-state building.
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4.  Confronting modernity through a new imperial language
From geo-cultural and political standpoints, Meiji Japan was locat-
ed in the sites of the clashes of the old and new civilizations
between the East and the West, which inevitably led to the linguis-
tic-epistemological clashes of imperial languages between
ideogramic and phonogramic languages: Chinese and English.
Thus, language reform movement emerged as one of the most
urgent problems associated with modernization (or Westerniza-
tion) of the country; to establish national education necessitated
unifying the spoken and written language.  Without what Mori
implied by a “good language” that unifies the people, nation-sate
building would not have been possible.  The new Japan as a
nation-state was to meet the challenge of seeking the third way in
the geo-cultural politics of Chinese and English linguistic imperi-
alisms, thereby forging a new national identity (intersubjectivity)
through a new imperial language of its own.  As we shall discuss
later in Part II, Mori’s language reform discourse was all about cre-
ating a superior language for a higher civilization in a struggle to
deconstruct in its own way the civilizational hegemony of the
significant imperial Others.  As we have seen, the tactical method-
ology Japan adopted can best be encapsulated in the concept of
“dialectic linguistic imperialism” driven by LEEWCTIO. (By
“dialectic” here I mean strategically assimilating and resisting for a
higher purpose). This can also be viewed as the new Japan’s
counter-hegemonic linguistic initiative or Japanese counter-linguis-
tic imperialism in the geo-cultural politics of the imperial lan-
guages of the Self and the significant Others.  The politics of
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LEEWCTIO demanded that the new Japan develop its “dialectic
intersubjectivity” as belonging to both the East and the West or
neither the East nor the West.  Thus, the new Japanese nationalin-
tersubjectivity hinges on the dialectic interaction with their
“significant Others.”  As Murata (2000: 29) points out, the “forma-
tion of national self-identity begins with the designation of an adja-
cent Other as the indispensable second party between which a line
of distinction can be drawn between “Us” and “Them.”  Murata
goes on to argue:
Historically, Japan had always been conscious of its mar-
ginality in the Chinese sphere of civilization.  Even when
claiming cultural superiority over China, Japan could not
create a positive identity for itself without reference to the
Other of China.  Without question, the eighteenth-century
nativist discourse that sought to replace China with Japan
as the center of civilization ( Japanese-style Chinese ethno-
centrism) served as a prototype for modern Japanese
nationalism.  However, even as its proponents sought to
avoid submission to the weight of Chinese civilization, they
were still in the end bound by the center-periphery rela-
tionship, unable to exercise from their subconscious the
role played by China as a mirror. (Murata 2000: 33)
My argument here is that modern Japanese reflexive recognition
of the Self against the perception of China as the significant Other
was dialectically developed by pitting the image of the “West”
against the China’s; in order that the new Japan might deal with
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the “West” and its civilization represented by the British Empire,
The “East” had to be redefined as replacing the civilizational cen-
ter of imperial China with that of imperial Japan.  As Yamaszaki
Masakazu (1987: 140) points out, the idea of “Asia” (= the East)
was “ironically discovered as a result of the “West” denying the
Self,” which has much to do with what Edward Said (1979) called
Orientalism.  Modern Japan rediscovered the Self at the same time
she found the “West” by dissociating herself from the Western
image of “Asia” which is represented by imperial China (Kano
2001: 30).  When Irie Akira (1966: 171) states that “Japan’s diplo-
matic policy has often been dictated by the concept of “Japan
belonging between East and West,” it means that modern Japan
has long taken the geopolitical and cultural position that belongs
in both/neither the East and/nor the West.  Thus, the Japanese
image of the Self was doubly symbolic; it mirrored the reciprocat-
ing images of the significant imperial Others in the East and the
West.  Thus, it is Japan’s geo-cultural politics that inevitably en-
tailed creating “dual imperial intersubjectivity” or a new national
identity created by the dialectical interaction between two imperi-
al/civilizational systems expanded by the Chinese and the British
Empires in East Asia.  Regarding the role of China as Japan’s civi-
lizational mediator, Murata states:
Neither Chinese nor Japanese nationalism developed with-
in a strictly binary relationship with the West.  Rather, they
were indelibly imbued by their regionally specific historical
context….  In the Japanese case, late Tokugawa and early
Meiji cultural contact between Japan and the West was con-
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tinually mediated by the Other of China. (Murata 2000: 28)
The point to observe here is that it was through China as the inter-
mediary Other that the “West” was discovered in Japan.  At the
same time, China was relativized as a consequence of the discov-
ery of the West, through which the Japanese rediscovered the Self
as a mirror for both the East and the West.  More importantly, the
recognition of Japan as the Self against the significant imperial
Other was initially induced by the discovery of her own indige-
nous language.  When much of the conventional knowledge had
been constructed in the world of the Chinese classics and its hiero-
glyphic characters came to be relativized by the knowledge of the
new world provided by Western Learning and its phonogramic
symbols, there was a new awareness of their native language grow-
ing among samurai-intellectuals in the movement of National
Learning.  Harootunian (1980: 17–19) discussed the reflexive role
of the Chinese language in helping the Japanese discover their
own language:
China functioned as a reminder of Japan’s centrality.  In
fact, the premises governing the Chuka/barbarian opposi-
tion were reversed; the resulting classification represented
transformations from one side of the opposition to the
other.  Much of this made possible by resorting to a new
kind of linguistic strategy; nativism, in its call for a return to
the pure meaning of words, acknowledged the failure of
representing reality with “Chinese” words.  Indeed, their
whole quest was to dramatize how language itself, elevated
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to a privileged position by Confucians, serving the task of
representation, ascribed to itself a transparency it could
never hope to achieve.  Discontent took the form of a new
“human science” which they called kokugaku.  In other
words, nativists, like many other Confucian colleagues, had
perceived the problem of ascribing to language a privileged
status as instrument of representation, and thus the dispari-
ty between the world and the knowledge men might have
of it.  They assumed that language was a thing like other
things, with no special position, since all were the creation
of the deities; since language was like anything else, to
assign it the task of representing the world of things, as
though it might perform the task adequately, was a pro-
found mistake.  This criticism of language was manifest in
their attack on Chinese Learning and in their ultimate cele-
bration of “wonder,” silence, the things that could not be
said or explained.
Regarding the denial of the Chinese spirit behind Chinese
Learning in the process of the discovery of the Japanese spirit in
the native language of Japan, Harootunian goes on to explain:
In this sense Japan functioned as the opposite of China, just
as what was essentially pure and real (nature) functioned as
the opposite of what was authentic functioned as the oppo-
site of what was inauthentic.  Despite the nativist denuncia-
tion of the “Chinese spirit” (Karagokoro), the attack was
not prompted simply by an inherent dislike of China, but
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rather by the linguistic strategy itself.  Their view of China
was merely another way of saying that life could no longer
be represented by words in eighteenth-century Japan….
The obvious consequence of this strategy was to see Chi-
nese as different from Japanese, and therefore to designate
all Japanese as similar to each other by virtue of their com-
mon origins.
The point to observe here is that the Western impact on samurai
intellectuals not only gave rise to relativization of China but also
led them toward the seeking of a “different modality of representa-
tion” (= their own language).  Harootunian clearly sums up the
point as follows.
Japanese writers in the late Tokugawa period had first to
make sense of China in terms of the epistemological and
linguistic strategies available to them.  Thus China was seen
increasingly as simply an instance of decline….  Okuni, by
referring to China as shina, had already shown how far it
had been removed from its earlier identification with civi-
lization and excellence.  For most late Tokugawa writers,
China was simply one more country among the nations of
the world, constituting differentiation in one sense, as Eng-
land, America, or France represented differences, but a
nation just the same, like all others.  To reach this kind of
conclusion was possible only in so far as writers could ap-
peal to a different modality of representation. (ibid.: 29–30)
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Thus, the discovery of the Japanese indigenous language and its
spirit in kokugaku (National Learning) made the Japanese cognizant
of their imperial subjectivity.  This epistemological and linguistic
change should be understood in the geo-cultural politics of Japan;
it was the Western impact that caused the Japanese version of
Chinese ethnocentrism to generate Japanese (linguistic) imperial-
ism which reacts against Chinese (linguistic) imperialism.  An
important point to note here is that there was the trilateral reci-
procity of Western Learning, Chinese Learning, and National
Learning coming into play when the Japanese attempt to seek and
identify their own national subjectivity.
Modern Japan’s linguistic recognition must be discussed within
this interpretative framework that embraces the geo-cultural poli-
tics of the Japanese imperial linguistic subjectivity in the new
world.  Only by so doing will we be able to understand not only
how Mori intended to compete for national linguistic supremacy
over English as well as Chinese in the site of the international poli-
tics of imperial languages, but also how he sought to empower the
national linguistic subjectivity in establishing a new education in
Japan.  Apparently, Mori’s linguistic attitude to Chinese and
English was determined by the geo-cultural and political position
of Japan which inevitably involved developing a new National
Learning into one that could withstand and survive the impact of
the clashes of Eastern and Western civilizations.
What we are concerned with is the geo-cultural political posi-
tion of Japan that defined language attitude and choice of the new
Japan.  As Huntington (1996: 135; 197–202) points out, “Japanese
civilization is virtually identical with the single Japanese core
― 89―
state,” despite the fact that it has long been caught between
Western and Chinese civilizations since the anti-colonial period.
Indeed, the emergence of Japan as a “counter civilization” (Okada
2001d: 24) made her geographical location a site of the clash of
Chinese and Western civilizations in the mid-nineteenth century.
The logical conclusion is that in order for Japan to gain politico-
cultural independence there needed to be a counter imperial
Japanese language that challenges the two Eastern and Western
imperial languages: Chinese and English.  The rationale behind
the politics of imperial language was a new epistemological
dichotomization of Us and Them or Our language and Their lan-
guage in the age of nationalism (Mazrui 1990: 13; see also
Kobayashi 2001; 98–102).  Here we find that the geopolitics of
Japan involved experiencing an imperial linguistic configuration in
East Asia with the Japanese confronting the two “big languages.”  I
would like to call this geopolitical site of trilateral linguistic battle
“the Imperial Language Triangle” (hereafter referred to as ILT).
This notion of ILT helps establish a diachronic and geopolitico-lin-
guistic perspective in this study.
Super-samurai intellectuals with thymos by definition would
emulate and outpeform the significant imperial others.  By
employing Fukuyama’s notion of isothymia and megalothymia we
can interpret theoretically the dual nature of modern Japan’s
geopolitical challenges in the ILT.  As I argued elsewhere
(Kobayashi 2001), when the first Japanese Education Minister
Mori Arinori contemplated the creation of the new Imperial
Japanese language (not the “abolition” of the native language) in
the aforementioned proposal, what he was trying to do was to seek
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out ways of competing with both Eastern and Western Imperial
Powers (China and Britain/America) for linguistic superiority and
equality.  The most salient feature of Mori’s countervailing linguis-
tic strategy, as I shall argue later, is marked by its “dialectic duali-
ty” that operates in such a way as to accommodate linguistic resis-
tance and assimilation.  Japan was and still is geopolitically situat-
ed in a site of contest for linguistic hegemony in the ILT where she
has had no alternative but to keep her native language evolving
strategically and dialectically just to maintain her intersubjectivity.
The point to observe here is that modern Japan eventually chose
to adopt dialectic (both-East-and-West or neither-East-nor-West),
not dichotomous (either-East-or-West) approach in making a cross-
cultural breakthrough.  What we have here is the reciprocating
ethno-cultural construction whereby Japan becomes Janus-faced
with a Western front when looking at the East, and an Eastern
front at the West.  The reason for this is that “by reasserting its
own cultural identity,” as Huntington (1996: 107) remarks, “Japan
emphasizes its uniqueness and its differences from both Western
and other Asian cultures.”  Once again, we must not forget that
this geo-cultural politics of modern Japan applies in principle to
the matter of national linguistic strategy.
Many scholars, Japanese or non-Japanese, believe that the cen-
ter of the geo-cultural politics of modern Japan shifted from
Chinese to Western civilization when she had worked out the
national strategy “datsua nyuou” (Leave Asia [the East] and Enter
Europe [the West]).  Yet it would be misleading to interpret the
national slogan to mean Japan’s complete turnabout on language
policy.  Kachuru, therefore, is wrong when he concludes that:
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There is thus a need for shifts in paradigm and in attitude.
There was a time when the politically astute philosophers
of the Meiji era (1868–1912) argued for “secession” from
Asia and identification with the Western Powers.  That
phase has been characterized as datsu-ah, nyuu-oh or “Leave
Asia and Enter Europe [the West].”  And now the phase
that has been ushered in is Datsu-oh, Nyuu-ah (“Leave the
West and Enter Asia”).  This indeed would mean a swing in
another direction.  What is preferable, of course, is the
Buddhist middle path, madhyam marga, and that would
mean: Nyuu-oh, Datsu-oh (sic), “Enter Asia and Enter the
West.” (1997: 82)
It is clear that Kachuru’s argument is based on the assumption that
Meiji Japan’s cross-cultural approach was too dichotomous to fol-
low a middle course today.  While we must appreciate Kachuru’s
contribution to bringing up for discussion the politics of English in
Japan in the English discourse community, I should point out that
he seems to misunderstand the geo-cultural politics of language in
Japan and thus gives a distorted account of the above-mentioned
Mori’s linguistic strategy by forming a hasty conclusion that “per-
haps Japan is the only Asian country in which a proposal was
made over a century ago to abandon Japanese and ‘adopt instead
some better, richer, stronger, language, such as English or French’”
(1997: 70).  The truth of the matter, however, is that, as I shall
explain in more detail by conducting textual analysis in Part II,
Mori considered implementing 1) script and stylistic reform of the
Japanese language with the abolition of Chinese characters and the
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adoption of the Roman alphabet, and 2) orthographical reform of
the English language for the purpose of the introduction of (sim-
plified) English into Japan.  He thus aimed at creating a new impe-
rial Japanese language which was to be characterized as both
Eastern and Western or as neither Eastern nor Western, and which
would surpass both Chinese and English in linguistic efficiency
and richness.  Although he soon found the “means” of implemen-
tation (the Roman alphabet-based compromise method) impracti-
cable, he relentlessly continued to achieve his end with an alterna-
tive (Chinese-character based) “translation and compilation”
method (Kobayashi 2001: 115–127).
Thus, we can recognize from what has been said that modern
Japan’s language policy in the cultural politics of datsua nyuou was
not only to break away from and transcend Chinese civilization
(i.e., feudalism) by remedying the particularity (weaknesses) of
Chinese characters by entering the West, but also further to assimi-
late into and transcend Western civilization (i.e., modernism) by
emulating the “universality” (strengths) of the English alphabets
while strategically drawing on the Chinese linguistic and semantic
tradition (see Matsumoto 1994: 222).  From this point of view, I
want to advance a hypothesis that there are three phases constitut-
ing Mori’s discourse on language reform: “Leave the East, Enter
the West, and Challenge and Transcend the Imperial Others”
(LEEWCTIO).  Accordingly, in light of post-colonial English stud-
ies by Japanese scholars,33 Kachuru’s interpretation of Mori’s lan-
guage policy should be corrected by saying that perhaps Japan was
the only Asian country —the first non-English speaking nation in
the world, for that matter—in which a proposal was made over a
― 93―
century ago to challenge the standard English language with its
unique (dialectic) linguistic strategy.
What needs to be emphasized here is that in creating a new
Japanese language, their subjectivity was being located between
and redefined by English and Chinese wherein there was a clash
of these two imperial languages in the geo-cultural politics of trans-
lation and word-formation.  Here we find the super-samurai trying
to put their subjectivity on a higher plane by virtue of cultural and
linguistic eclecticism and open “the third way” (Giddens 2000) of
linguistic-epistemological interpretation dialectically toward the
creation of a new language and new national identity.  As
Nakamura Yujiro (2000: 189–215) has observed, eclecticism was a
“most characteristic feature of Japanese culture” that contributed
to the idea of modern Japan’s kindai no choukoku (challenge of tran-
scending Western modernity) (see also Tsurumi 1960).  Nakamura
refers to the notion of what Japanese postmodern architect Isozaki
Arata (1985) terms “schizophrenic eclecticism,” suggesting that the
term “eclecticism”, combined with the adjective “schizophrenic,”
begins to take on an international and modern nature in this day
and age.  Here I would like to lay special emphasis on the key
word “eclecticism”, for it was (and has long been) Japan’s tradi-
tional cross-cultural approach that can be interpreted as a “strategi-
cally schizophrenic” way of spontaneous assimilation into and
resistance to a higher civilization.
While a strategic approach was taken to dialectically “redefine
its civilizational identity,” the fact remains that the geopolitics of
modern Japan eventually made her a “torn country” causing
national and cultural identity problems (Huntington 1996: 139).
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Relevant to this point is Huntington’s following remark:
Political leaders imbued with the hubris to think that they
can fundamentally reshape the culture of their societies are
destined to fail.  While they can introduce elements of
Western culture, they are unable permanently to surpass or
to eliminate the core elements of their indigenous culture.
Conversely, the Western virus, once it is lodged in another
society, is difficult to expunge.  The virus persists but is not
fatal; the patient survives but is never whole.  Political lead-
ers can make history but they cannot escape history.  They
produce torn countries; they do not create Western soci-
eties.  They infect their country with a cultural schizophre-
nia which becomes its continuing and defining characteris-
tic.” (ibid.: 154)
Thus, modern Japan evolved in the pre-colonial and independent,
colonial, occupied, and post-colonial periods34; she first emerged
as a nation-state (which resisted and assimilated into the West); she
then became a colonial empire (which expanded and governed in
the East [mainland China and other areas]); after the Greater East
Asia War she ended up as an occupied (colonized?) democracy
(which collapsed and rebuilt) and became a “sovereign democra-
cy” (which has assimilated and grown up to this day).  After all she
had to go through, modern Japan has continued to develop its
“dual character” (Yamamuro 2000) in a struggle to maintain her
geo-political/cultural equilibrium between the East and the West.
In considering modern Japan’s geo-cultural politics of language, it
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is very important to keep this historical fact in mind because it was
largely due to its dual subjectivity torn between the East and the
West that determined the duality of her linguistic (and therefore
national) recognition.  In fact, what Meiji Japan did was to try to
secure its geopolitico-linguistic position in the midst of the civiliza-
tions through translation, thereby attempting to transcend the
other two conflicting imperial languages: hence, the new imperial
Japanese underpinned by what I term “inter-imperial subjectivity”
and countervailing colonialism/imperialism.  Thus, translation not
only helped create Meiji Japan’s national language but also caused
dialectic interpretation and re-configuration of its national subjec-
tivity and cultural identity (see Sakai 1997).  The point I wish to
stress here is that it was none other than Meiji super-samurai’s thy-
mos that triggered dialectic translation of inter-imperial linguistic
subjectivity which prevented the West from controlling the Japa-
nese native language and the people’s mind at least during the pre-
colonial and independent periods.  To ignore this hard fact is to
lose perspective on the historical construction of modern Japan’s
language recognition.
With this explanatory model for Meiji Japan’s geo-cultural poli-
tics of language in the new world, we are now able to make better
sense theoretically of the proposition that “imperial language a-
wareness of the Japanese today derives from their counter-civiliza-
tional language mentality”; their “imperial” language attitude
began to be formed in the pre-colonial and independent period
when the Japanese went to great lengths to claim and protect their
“language right” by securing a “countervailing politico-linguistic
public sphere” (Nakamura 1993: 99–100; 2000a: 26–27; see also
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Lee 2000: 347–348).  This alternative linguistic public sphere only
existed within modern Japan’s daitoa kyouei ken (the Greater East
Asia Co-prosperity Sphere), which collapsed at the end of the
independent period in 1945 with the defeat in World War II.
Viewed in this light, we can see that the Greater East Asia Co-
prosperity Sphere was a testing site of reconciling the duality of
modern Japan’s intersubjectity between the East and the West and
overcoming Western modernity in the long run.  The imperial
Japan expanded its public sphere in order to seek an ultimate solu-
tion to this civilizational conflict; the territorial expansion of the
Japanese Empire was driven by not only politico-economic but
also politico-cultural/linguistic factors.  It was imperative that a
new imperial language be created so as to establish a new National
Learning through which the people in the Empire were to be unit-
ed with a larger subjectivity as against the old (Chinese) hegemony
and the new (Western) hegemony.  The imperial Japanese lan-
guage, therefore, was required to embrace the dialectic develop-
ment of morality, ethnicity, and nation-state through the interac-
tion between “universal” and “particular” languages (see Dowak
1994).  For this very reason, the modern Japanese language
emerged as a counter-imperial language against Chinese and
English linguistic imperialisms.  Language was a site of representa-
tions of the dialectic development of morality, ethnicity, and
nation-state between “universal” and particular languages.
As has been pointed out, it was decades before the early twen-
tieth century that attempts at the overcoming of modernity had
been seriously made by the pre-Restoration and early Meiji super-
samurai intellectuals by realigning the politics of knowledge that
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underpinned the Tokugawa establishment through “reconfigura-
tion of the language of Japan” (see Yasuda 1997).  As previously
mentioned, with the first wave of full-fledged Western (Dutch)
learning35 in the early-and mid-eighteenth century, there began a
gradual paradigm shift in the Tokugawa world: the body of knowl-
edge dominantly provided and sustained by the government-
authorized Chinese Studies came to be relativized through West-
ern Learning in such a way as to change the way they perceived
the world.  Then there was a national awareness growing in the
form of Japanese indigenous language movement which later led
to kokugaku or National Learning.  In the early nineteenth century,
the new national sentiment arising from National Learning would
coalesce with the second wave of Western (English) Learning (see
Okita 1992).
The point we must clarify here is the Japanese counter imperial-
ism occurred as the response to the “clashes of civilizations” in East
Asia.  As “civilizations” were seen by many super-samurai intellec-
tuals as another form of Western imperialism, what the new Japan
did was to strategically employ long-standing Japanese imperial-
ism in its own right as counter-civilizational approach to the signifi-
cant imperial Others in the East as well as in the West.  As a result,
super-samurai intellectuals raised their counter-imperial linguistic
awareness, which led to the cultural movement for a new National
Learning.  Thus, Japanese counter-linguistic imperialism emerged
as a driving force behind a new National Learning aimed at emu-
lating and transcending both English linguistic imperialism and
Chinese linguistic imperialism simultaneously.  In this way English
Learning was to be incorporated into a new National Learning in
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contraposition with Chinese Learning.  As I shall argue later,
English Learning was thus to serve as a new platform for building
a new language for a new National Learning or a new education in
Japan.  The geopolitics of a marginal domain as well as national
pragmatics nurtured in the soil of Satsuma helped generate a patri-
otic movement for a new learning that would required learning the
language of their new archrival nation (Britain) in comparison with
the old model nation (China) so that the new Japan could not only
overtake but also transcend their new model civilization.  Whether
or not Mori was aware of this, this observation makes it possible to
formulate a theory that Mori’s scheme for ingenious plan for lan-
guage reform in Japan can be traced back to Satsuma’s pragmatic
therefore eclectic approach to the creation of a stronger nation
with a better civilization; this would necessitate radical linguistic
reform through which the two imperial languages of Oriental and
Occidental civilizations—English and Chinese—were to be rec-
onciled in the “language of Japan.”
Of more importance is the dialectic development of national
linguistic subjectivity by means of the studies of hegemonistic
imperial languages of other civilizations in the East and the West.
It was this newly raised national subjectivity underlying the succes-
sive acts of samurai-intellectuals’ language learning, that would
pave the way for the later formation of a “new National Learning”
in Meiji era.  The most important part of this argument is that in
this tradition of Chinese and Western Learning lies the latent
impetus for a new National Learning that would allow for a new
national/linguistic subjectivity.  We can be fairly certain that the
momentum toward a nation-state building gave rise to the coales-
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cence of both Chinese and English Studies into a new National
Learning that would make it possible for the new Japanese to
obtain a new knowledge in a new language of their own.
As I have already suggested, English Learning as the “know-
your-enemy studies” became a mainstream Western Learning in
the 1870s which focused primarily on Anglo-American discourse
communities.  By the time it developed into a full-fledged platform
for nation-state-building in the 1890s (after Mori passed away),
there emerged the new movement for the studies of the new Japan
spearheaded by fierce patriots Miyake Setsurei (1860–1945) and
Kuga Katsunan (1857–1907), which paved the way for a new
National Learning.  This stream of thought in turn led to patriotic
linguists such as Ueda Kazutoshi orchestrating a national project of
bringing into being the science” of kokugo or the national language.
Viewed in this light, we can see that the English Studies that began
as the “know-your-enemy” studies in the mid-and late nineteenth
century laid the groundwork for the new National Studies of the
imperial Japanese language in the early twentieth century.  In
short, the new National Learning was brought into being for the
purpose of challenging and deconstructing modernity translated
mainly through the English Studies into the Japanese mind and its
national polity (see Oguma 2002; Lee 1996).  A new language of
Japan was evolved and created dialectically and eclectically
through translation principally between the two Imperial Others’
languages36—Chinese and English—to establish a new kokugogaku
(National Studies of the Imperial Japanese Language or a new
National Learning) and transcend the hitherto mainstream Chi-
nese Studies and the subsequent English Studies.  The reason for
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this is precisely because of the essence of overcoming modernity
that involves realigning and reconfiguring the national linguistic
and epistemological subjectivity.
The beginning of the movement for overcoming modernity
that emerged in Japan from the turn of the twentieth century
onward can be traced back to the mid-and late-nineteenth century
in which the new Japan was founded and led by such super-samu-
rai as Mori Arinori.  My argument here is that Mori’s unprecedent-
ed language reforms plan put forth in the 1870s should be seen as
serving as a precursor of a super-samurai linguistic act of overcom-
ing modernity37 which was to be embodied in kokugo-gaku estab-
lished to transcend the Imperial Others’ languages (Chinese and
English) in the early twentieth century.  In order to bring about a
better understanding of “modern Japan’s language recognition,”38
it is important to verify this hypothesis in the context of the geo-
cultural politics of language in the 1860s–80s.  As I shall explain in
detail in Part II, it was as early as the 1870s when super-samurai
intellectuals such as Mori Arinori and his opponent Baba Tatsui,
both driven by their “Japanese (indigenous) language” sentiments,
had already argued that the further spread of Chinese and English
imperialisms in Japan, would inexorably lead to not only “linguis-
tic discrimination” but also “social polarization” in a new society,
with the realization that there was an urgent need to create a new
language of Japan in defense of national and cultural integrity
(Kobayashi 2002: 53–57).  In light of much of what I have written
so far, it is well worth examining more closely Mori’s linguistic
and epistemological recognition as well as his counter-colonial
politico-linguistic awareness behind his discourses on language
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reform and nation-state building.  Before conducting a textual criti-
cism of his discourses with those points in mind, we also need to
understand how he could have developed his seemingly original
idea for the reform of the languare of Japan.
5.  Mirror for kokugo-building: English linguistic imperi-
alism39
The Dean’s English (1864)
As we have seen, the political thought of Japan as an imperial
nation was central to National Learning.  As with the preceding
Western (Dutch) Learning, English Learning based on the ethos of
the National Learning, emerged as a new Western Learning that
functioned as the “study of a new enemy’s language” that scruti-
nized the Anglo-American hegemony over the world and thereby
sought national linguistic independance.  This will lead us further
into a consideration of where and how Mori got the idea for the
building of kokugo or a new national language for imperial Japan.
While no studies have ever tried to look deeper into the case,
there is conclusive evidence that supports our working hypotheses.
It is one of Mori’s library books: The Dean’s English: a criticism on
the Dean of Canterbury’s Essays on the Queen’s English.  This small
English book was published in 1864 in London by George
Washington Moon, an American journalist and Fellow of the
Royal Society of Literature.  The polemic writer first wrote it with
the view of criticizing A Plea for the Queen’s English, the book which
Henry Alford (1810–71), the then Dean of Canterbury, produced
in an attempt to defend the “Queen’s English” in the Victorian
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Age.40 Although Moon himself is essentially an advocate of the
“Queen’s English,” he took issue with Alford for more practical
and political reasons.  This “national language” debate got transat-
lantic press coverage in Britain and America.41 Controversial as it
was, The Dean’s English sold so well that it went into the third edi-
tion in the year it was published.  Mori had its fourth edition
which was printed in New York in 1865.42 Mori’s copy, which is
now owned by the National Diet Library, has his ownership stamp
as well as an official seal on the facing page that says “issued in the
eighth year of Meiji (1875) by the Ministry of Education.”  It must
be noted here that this small publication makes a big difference in
our investigation of Mori’s thinking on national language reform.
As we shall see, this book provides us with a number of important
clues as to the beginning of Mori’s 1872–73 discourse on the adop-
tion of “simplified English” in Japan.
Before turning to a closer examination of the Dean’s English in
connection with Mori’s own language reform discourse, one more
point must be clarified; it is about the place where Mori obtained
the book.  The year 1865 was not only when the fourth edition
was printed, but also when Mori was sent from Japan on a secret
mission to Britain.  This suggests that Mori was studying in Britain
just when there was a heated debate on the national language
among the English-speaking people: the Queen’s English.  It is
therefore reasonable to assume that Mori must have heard and
known the Queen’s English issue in Britain, and that it’s highly
probable that he obtained the book there.  However, one question
still remains as to why it was the US version, not the British one
that he came to possess.  It is possible to build up two hypotheses.
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One possibility is that, given that the US version was not readily
available in Britain if he had got hold of the book there, there is no
denying that Mori might have received the book from someone
else, British or American, who must have been very much interest-
ed in the debate and wanted to let him know about the issue.
Another possibility is that, since the official stamp on the facing
pages of Mori’s own copy indicated that it was given to the
National Diet Library in 1875, Mori might have take possession of
the book either when he traveled from Britain to the U.S. in 1867–
68 or while he was working in the U.S. as chargé de’affaires in
1871–73.  I consider the latter case more likely because of the
official position Mori assumed in the Meiji government.  Assuming
it to be true, then it makes better sense: Mori referred to the book
in America when he was contemplating national language reform,
and after he returned to Japan he no longer needed the book for
reference, so he later donated it to the Ministry of Education,
which in turn contributed it to the National Diet Library.  Be that
as it may, what is more important here is that Mori did learn of the
“national language” debate (the “Queen’s English” controversy) in
Britain long before he developed his own idea for the national lan-
guage reform in Japan.  Therefore, the question which we must
consider in the following discussions is how Mori understood
Britain’s national language situation and came to develop his idea
for the 1871–73 proposal for language reform in Japan.  In what
follows, we shall take a closer look at what Mori saw in the
“Queen’s English” controversy in mid-nineteenth Britain.  Then
we shall further explore how Mori worked over his plan as he
viewed Britain’s “English studies” from the standpoint of Japan’s
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counterpart—the English Studies (eigaku) or “know-your-enemy”
studies.
The debate on national language in Victorian Britain: The
Queen’s English and Standard English
As has been noted, the dispute over the issue of national language
reform in Britain began when G. W. Moon severely criticized
Henry Alford for imposing his “biased” view of grammar and style
on the people, although they were both ardent advocates of the
Queen’s English.  There is fairly general agreement that the
Queen’s English served as a model for standard English in
Victorian Britain.  Connected with this is the emergence of the
middle class English that laid the foundations for standard English
(Crowley 1989: 129–131).  The middle class English came into
being in Britain as the pace of national industrialization accelerat-
ed with the result that there was a class distinction between the
educated and the non-educated.  Interestingly, the new English
created by the middle class had an effect on the Queen’s English.43
However, the standardization of the middle class English as the
basis for the Queen’s English left much to be improved as it was
still replete with grammatical, orthographical and conjugational
irregularities and regional differences.  All this led Moon and
Alford to address the issue of the Queen’s English, thereby spark-
ing a debate over the building of the standard spoken and written
English.  The linguistic situation in Britain at that time was very
similar to that of Japan.  As Max Müller said of English orthogra-
phy in those days, “if we compare English as spoken with English
as written, they seem almost like two different languages; as Latin
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is from Italian” (1876: 209).  In the late 1860s, just when Mori was
studying in London, this debate received much media coverage as
the “Moon-Alford Controversy” not only in Britain but also in
America.
In this debate on the “Queen’s English” as the national lan-
guage of Britain, Alford takes a progressive stance of placing
importance on the colloquial style of English as well as arguing for
the conventional usage,” while Moon takes up the position as a
“conservative prescriptive grammarian who insists on the purity
and logic of language” (Tagiri and Egawa 1968: 287) (It is not hard
to imagine Mori keenly realizing the need to reform the language
of the imperial Japan when he learned from the debate about the
issue of the national language in Britain.  As we shall see later,
Mori took the same position on the national language of Japan as
Moon’s.  Suffice it to say here that the fact that Mori owned
Moon’s The Dean’s English, not Alford’s A Plea for the Queen’s English
attests to his stance on the Japanese language).  In his Jyunsei Eigo
(Pure English), Tagiri Hisazumi, a Japanese expositor on A Plea for
the Queen’s English suggests that in the 1860s when there was a
national language reform movement growing in Britain, a general
approach to grammar was seen as “shifting from prescriptive to
descriptive.”  As for Alford’s insight into language Tagiri also
remarks as follows:
We must acknowledge Alford’s foresight in dealing with the
language issue.  The first edition of A Plea for the Queen’s
English was published twenty years before the first volume
of the Oxford English dictionary, the most authoritative
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English dictionary in the world that is the ultimate product
of descriptive and positive approaches to language, finally
came out in 1884 when Alford’s revised edition was print-
ed. (Tagiri and Egawa 1968: 272)
From this view point we may say that the Moon–Alford controver-
sy was well worth considering in the historical studies of the
English language.  However, our primary concern here is not with
the socio-linguistic analysis of the modern English, but rather with
the socio-historical study of how the debate on national language
reform in Britain came to influence Mori’s thinking on English and
Japanese.  It is important to gain this perspective on what the con-
troversy was all about, for it would allow us to interpret the Queen’s
English differently from Japanese scholars of English such as Tagiri.
In light of the historical studies of the English language within the
socio-linguistic framework, Tagiri was right in understanding the
Queen’s English as jyunsei eigo (Pure English) in his commentary
on Alford’s work.  But once we place it in a wider context of the
cultural politics of the English language in the world, we will find
that the Queen’s English is not necessarily what it seems to be.
Viewed from this politico-cultural standpoint, the Queen’s English
can be seen not merely as connotating “Pure English” in the acad-
emic sense but as representing the imperial English language or the
language of the British Empire that reigned the world under the
rule of the Queen in the nineteenth century.  Alford draws a paral-
lel between the Queen’s English and the highroad that could
extend to every corner of the world ruled by the British Empire as
follows:
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It [The Queen’s English] is, so to speak, this land’s great
highway of thought and speech; and seeing that the Sover-
eign in this realm is the person round whom all our com-
mon interests gather, the source of our civil duties and cen-
tre of our civil rights. (cited in Tagiri and Egawa 1968: 11)
The important point to note here is that Alford regards the
Queen’s English as the “highway” language of all the British sub-
jects that defines the people who employ it in the realm of the
whole Empire.  Thus, by extension the phrase “in this realm”
could be taken to encompass much broader regions of the British
Commonwealth of Nations.  For this political and semantic reason,
it would be a mistake to understand and translate the Queen’s
English merely as jyunsei eigo or Pure English (as Tagiri did),
because the national language in the inland can also mean the
imperial language in its foreign parts of the British Empire.
Indeed, as we shall see in the following discussions, it was the
“imagined” imperial language of Britain that was emerging as it
was triggered by the Anglo-Saxon language purification move-
ment in the 1860s.
It may be worth pointing out, in passing, that Shoichi
Watanabe, a Japanese scholar of the English language, has done us
a great service in doing pioneer work on the imperial thought of
the English language in his the History of the National Learning in
Britain (Watanabe 1990).  In it, he cogently argues that just as there
was kokugaku (the National Learning or the National Studies) in
Japan which connects the history of imperial nation and that of its
native language, so there was a similar counterpart in Britain.  The
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English version of National Learning demanded that the Queen’s
English be seen as the model for standard English required to
unify the inland nation; and that it further serve as the symbol of
the British Empire that was prevailing in the world.44 As
Nishikawa Nagao remarks on the political realignment taking
place in Europe and America in the 1870s, “Victorian Britain was
faced with the considerable challenge of furthering the colonial
rule to establish Pax Britanica in the world while at the same time
trying to realize the new national integration by means of the new
revision of election law and the enactment of Education Act”
(Nishikawa and Matsumiya 1995: 27).  Anticipating such social,
political, and cultural transformations at home and abroad, there
emerged a new national language (the Queen’s English) move-
ment in Britain in the 1860s.  It is against this background that
Alford’s A Plea for the Queen’s English and Moon’s the Dean’s English
were put forth as they triggered national debates about standard
language as well as national linguistic identity.
Again, it is worth noting here that all this will lead us further to
a consideration of Mori’s political and cultural thought of national
language in Japan.  Given that he wrote a letter to his older broth-
er in 1865 insisting upon “showing the Japanese imperial flag to
die for across the globe” (SMAZ, Vol. 3: 51), it is reasonable to
assume that if Mori had read The Queen’s English and found the
place where Alford expressed the language of Britain as “this
land’s great highway of thought and speech,” he would have raised
hope that the language of Japan would also prevail as the
“Emperor’s Japanese” throughout the world in the same way.  We
shall return to this point later.
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It is generally agreed that the standard Japanese was estab-
lished after the model of Western modern languages as Meiji Japan
underwent modernization; but it is not always understood exactly
why and how the Japanese “native tongue” evolved into what it is
today in the international geo-cultural politics of language (see
Kaganoi 2002).  In the early Meiji period Mori not only saw
English as the most “copious and expanding European language”
that should be introduced in Japan, but also regarded it as an
imperfect language that should be reformed in such a way that
non-native speakers of English would benefit from it.  As I shall
argue in what follows, it was not only in the newly emerging
Japanese Empire but also in the British Empire that there was a
concurrent movement for national language reform in the mid-and
late-nineteenth century.
Cultural nationalism and socio-linguistic Darwinism
Britain saw the economic development and social stability in the
1850s, a decade prior to Mori’s sojourn in London, and there was
a growing awareness among the people of their national language
and its history (Crowley 1989: 5–54).  The question we must con-
sider here is: of all the advanced nations, why did the movement
for the Queen’s English and the national unification take place in
the 1850s–60s?  According to Watanabe (1990: vii), “the National
Learning in Britain” can be said theoretically to have developed
from the mid-sixteenth to the mid-eighteenth centuries, while the
counterpart of Japan emerged from the late-seventeenth to the
mid-nineteenth century.  And yet, on closer inspection we can see
the National Learning in Britain did continue up to the mid-nine-
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teenth century.  Tony Crowley explains the reason:
The answer lies in the important point that the construction
of a national identity is not settled at one point and then
fixed for ever (as most of the nineteenth-century commen-
tators would have argued), but a constant process of change
and development determined among other things by the
political purposes that such constructions were to serve.  In
this sense nationality is never achieved (in the French sense
of achiever, to complete or finish), but always in the proc-
ess of being forged.  And it is this that explains the proces-
sive repetition of claims for the unity of language and
nation in Britain during this period.  The specific character-
istics of a particular nationality are not immutably fixed but
historically viable, and thus the self-image of the English
people, and of course the very idea that there was ‘an
English people,’ would not have been the same in the
1650s and the 1850s. (Crowley 1989: 68)
After Chartism petered out in the late 1840s in Britain, domestic
economy and society became more stable in the 1850s when there
was a growing movement for the unification of the hitherto less
cohesive people through the standardization of the national lan-
guage (Crowley 1989: 53).  As Crowley further explains:
The concern for national and social unity centered around
a sense of unease about the contemporary political scene
together with reflections upon the national past.  The most
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striking example of this concern at this period was the set
of varying attempts to come to terms with the historical
writing of the national past and to evaluate the political and
cultural heritage of the nation.  The appearance of ‘the his-
tory of the language’ as an area of knowledge in the 1830s
and 1840s is one such attempt.  Another closely linked
attempt at ordering and evaluating the cultural heritage of
the nation was signaled by the appearance of appeals for
the institutionalized study of ‘English studies’ (or more usu-
ally ‘English language and literature’) in the 1850s.  
(Crowley 1989: 83)
An important point to emphasize here is that “English studies” was
institutionalized in the 1850s so as to unify the nation in concur-
rence with the movement for national language reform.  One of
the salient features of the mid-nineteenth-century national lan-
guage movement lies in the rediscovery of the ethnic continuity in
the history of one common language.  And the image of the nation
had to be one that constitutes an ethnic community that continues
to evolve in the historical time and space, as can be seen in the fol-
lowing quotation.
For many of the mid-nineteenth-century historians of the
language its unbroken existence was undoubted and that in
turn therefore entailed that the English nation had itself
been a long-standing, continuously evolving entity.
(Crowley 1989: 46)
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The same view on language and history can be found in Alford’s
discourse which says:
The national mind is reflected in the national speech….  Every
important feature in a people’s language is reflected in its
character and history. (Alford 1864: 13; my emphasis)
It is clear from the above that Alford viewed the strength of the
people as deriving from the national speech and mirrored in its
“character and history.”  Indeed, as Crowley (1989: 66–68) de-
scribes, it was generally believed among many English intellectu-
als in the 1860s that the national character was reflected in the his-
tory of the language of England.  What we have here is the emer-
gence in Britain of “cultural and linguistic nationalism” that can
also be seen in modern Japan (see Sakai 1997).
Let us devote a little more space to examining how their
English studies was conducted in the context of such cultural and
linguistic nationalism.  In mid-nineteen-century Britain, many
British scholars of English attempted to secure the source of politi-
co-cultural demand for a unified nation-state by looking at the his-
tory of language in two ways: internal and external.  The internal
history focuses on the inner structure of language (such as gram-
mar) that remains static in the course of historical and social
events, while the external centers on the study of the outer milieus
of language (such as usage and inflow of foreign words) that are
subject to changing circumstances.  Crowley summarizes the dual
features of English studies as follows:
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the ‘essence’ of the language and nation (the internal),
remains always organically ordered in terms of its develop-
ment and only ‘accidental’ features of language and nation
(the external or historical), are constantly open to change.
(Crowley 1989: 47)
This passage reveals that there was a mystical interpretation in
Britain of the strength of the national language as deriving from its
historical continuity and change.  Before moving on to the next
argument, I would like to give an overview of how such a mystical
view of language developed in Britain.
The roots of National Learning or the studies of national lan-
guage that underpinned linguistic nationalism in Britain go back to
the early sixteenth century when the Reformation took place.  The
people who spearheaded the movement were the clergymen who
belonged to the Church of England.  Among the leading figures
was Matthew Parker (1504–75), Archbishop of Canterbury
(Watanabe 1990).  It must be noted here that Henry Alford (1810–
71), an advocate of the Queen’s English was also a clergyman who
served as the Dean of Canterbury and belonged to the same cleri-
cal community as Archbishop Parker.  Furthermore, there was
another churchman who had the same (or greater) impact on
National Learning in Britain as those two figures mentioned above.
His name is Richard Chenevix Trench (1807–86) who assumed the
position of the Dean of Westminster (later the Archbishop of
Dublin).  Trench was probably the most influential scholar who
played a vital role in advancing the Victorian movement for
National Learning or the studies of the English language in the
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1850s in Britain (Crowley 1989: 51–90).  So it is not surprising that
like Alford, Archbishop Trench was of the belief that “a language
has within itself the history of a nation.”
Linguistic nationalism directs patriotism toward an “imagined
language” which distinguishes between Us and Them.  Conse-
quently, the “national language” must be purified by getting rid of
“Their” language within “Our” language so that the nation will be
unified through the same language.  As Crowley quotes Trench as
saying of the national unification in relation to language that:
Whenever political and cultural crisis threatened the
English language was offered as evidence of the underlin-
ing or unconscious unity that held all together despite
superficial differences.  In this sense language became the
political unconscious of the nation since if nothing else
there could at least be agreement that ‘we’ (the unifying
pronoun) all speak ‘the same language’ and therefore all
share ‘the same background’ historically and culturally.
(Crowley 1989: 70)
Indeed, Trench’s philosophy that focuses on “the vast community
of the speakers of one and the same language” was a major theo-
retical tenet of historical linguistics in which Max Müller (1823–
1900) played a crucial role in the nineteenth-century.  Like Trench,
Müller regarded English as “the living and speaking witness of the
whole history of our race” (Müller 1862: 27).  Here we find com-
monality between these leading Western students of language—
Moon, Alford, Trench, and Müller; these people sought authentici-
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ty, legitimation, and continuity in the internal history of their
national language, namely, English.
As for the external history of national language, let us turn our
attention to Alford’s statements highlighting the needs for the
unification of the nation through the institutionalization and stan-
dardization of the Queen’s English.  To this end, Alford was keen
on purifying English and preventing it from deterioration by stick-
ing less to grammatical rules that might go against the trend of the
times.
He argues:
It expresses … what every one who values our native tongue
in its purity must feel: that most of the grammars, and rules,
and applications of rules, now so commonly made for our
language, are in reality not contributions towards its purity, but
main instruments of its deterioration.
(Alford 1864: 9–10; my emphasis)
In spite of methodological differences, Moon, who criticized
severely Alford’s the Dean’s English, shared his Teutonic philosophy
of cultural superiority that extols the beauty of the Anglo-Saxon
language (This can be seen as a form of cultural revivalism/
nativism against the influence of Latin from the European
Continent).  Both were concerned about the deterioration of the
Queen’s English, and so firmly believed in the purification and
rebuilding of the national language.  As we have seen, the purpose
of the national language movement in 1850s Britain was twofold:
one is to unify the mainland nation; the other to govern the British
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Commonwealth of Nations with the Queen reigning at the top of
the Empire.  As far as the reformation and realignment of what
Robert Phillipson (1992) terms “English linguistic imperialism” is
concerned, such rising Teutonic movement in the mid-and late-
nineteenth century was to gather momentum in the decades that
followed, laying the groundwork for the development of ELT
(English Language Teaching) professionalism in the early twentieth
century.
In this connection, it is worth noting that in 1873, the book
called The Sources of Standard English by T. L. Kington-Oliphant
was published.  In it, the author details how the Teutonic revival-
ism was emerging as a countermovement against the “fashionable”
prevalence of Latin particularly among the English middle class,
and in so doing defines Good English as based on a “sound
Teutonic style, and Bad English as characterized by the “long
Latinized words” (1873: 322).
He finds it disconcerting that many middle-class people, whose
English provided a base for developing the Queen’s English into a
centripetal and unifying force, were badly affected by gross
Latinization to the point where it further influenced the people in
the lower class.45 He states:
Our middle class (we beheld something of this kind in the
Thirteenth Century) has an amazing love of cumbrous
Latin words, which have not long been in vogue … the off-
spring of our shopkeepers are taught bad French and worse
Lain….  The books used in our National schools show a
lofty disdain for homespun English….  The corruption is
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now spreading downward to the lower class. 
(Kington-Oliphant 1873: 323)
Furthermore, Kington-Oliphant sardonically castigates “penny-
a-liners” in the newspaper trade for setting a bad example for the
middle class who tend to speak and write in bad English reveling
in Latin.  Kington-Oliphant deplores the sorry linguistic situation
as follows:
After all, it is rather hard to grudge him his chance of show-
ing off that he learned Latin in youth.  One of this breed, in
the last years of the French Empire, was never tired of
telling us in a queer Anglo-Gallic Jargon what he ate and
drank at Paris, and what Dukes and Marquesses he slapped
on the back.  Such stuff could not have been served up, day
by day, if it had not hit the taste of the English middle class,
a taste thoroughly corrupt.  A writer of this kind must have
readers like minded with himself.  (ibid.: 328–329)
Here we find that in the 1870’s many a “penny-a-liner” was depict-
ed as reveling in the “corrupt” practice of recalling their good old
days in France, boastfully employing Latin or “queer Anglo-Gallic
Jargon” in their writings.  What has to be noticed here is that
Kington-Oliphant regards such ultra-Latinized writers as a bad
influence on the middle class culture in Britain.  The reason
Kington-Oliphant expressed concern over the overuse of Latin in
the English language has to do not so much with his personal aca-
demic interest in the linguistic aspects of the situation, but rather
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with his general observation on the cultural politics of English as
against French at the time.  With the public awareness of the
Queen’s English (= national language) growing in Britain,
Kington-Oliphant realized the need to de-Latinize English and
thereby redefine the identity of the nation as well as strengthening
the unity of the peoples in the British Empire.
As has been pointed out, the National Learning or the historical
study of English in Britain can be traced back to the Reformation
period in the sixteenth century when Johannes Goropius Becanus
(1518–1572), a Dutch physician-linguist, expounded his theory
about German (not Hebrew) as the protolanguage of the world.
And his view on the superiority of German over Latin on the
Continent came to exert so strong an influence on British linguists
that “almost all of the seventeenth-century English grammarians
were the followers of Johannes Goropius Becanus” (Watanabe
1973: 7–19).  It is worth noting that behind such Teutonic view of
language lies the rivalry between Protestant nations whose lan-
guage is of German origin, and Catholic nations whose language is
of Latin origin.  The emergence of the former as a new political
and cultural force against the latter led to the concomitant cultural
politics of reactionary religio-linguistic reformation in Europe.
Relevant to this is that in The Sources of Standard English, Kington-
Oliphant cites a typical example of how Protestantism and Cathol-
icism clashed over the cultural politics of English (German-deriva-
tive) and Latin in the realm of Christianity; in an Irish (Catholic)
church, there was once a heated dispute over a conversion of
“English” appellation of “our grand old Teutonic name” (for The
Third Person of the Trinity) into Latin one.  As for the stupidity of
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such religio-linguistic aberration, Kington-Oliphant remarks, “It is
needless to say what a reception this piece of unwisdom met with
from a scholar like Archbishop Trench.  No vulgar hands should
be laid on the Ark” (ibid.: 328).  Kington-Oliphant, however,
holds the Anglican church people in general equally responsible
for the propagation of “bad English” that latinizes.  He comments:
If we wish to know the cause of the bad style employed in
preaching by too many of the Anglican clergy, we must ask
how they have been taught at our Schools and Universities.
Much heed is there bestowed on Latin and Greek, but
none on English.  (ibid.: 335)
What we find here is the religio-linguistic implications of good
English as deriving from the Teutonic/Anglo-Saxon-Protestant cul-
ture, and of bad English as coming from the Latin/Gallic-Catholic.
Kington-Oliphant’s perception of proper English in the 1870’s
reflects the growing religio-linguistic sentiment for the purification
(= de-Latinization) of national language.  Related to the cultural
politics of English is the fact that Darwin’s On the Origin of Species
was published in 1859 and prevailing in the very fabric of society
in the 1860s when Mori was studying in London.
Moreover, I want to argue that it was Herbert Spencer’s idea of
social Darwinism that played a critical role in propelling the move-
ment for the building of the Queen’s English in Britain (It is well
known that Mori’s worldview was significantly influenced by
Spencer’s political and cultural thought). Indeed, social Darwinism
was being applied to the science of language in the 1860s.  As
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Tanaka Katsuhiko (1993: 46–47) explains, this Darwinian view of
the evolution of language is most exemplified in August Schleicher
(1821–1868)’s Linguistic and Evolutionary Theory (1863, 1865, 1869)
and Darwinism Tested by the Science of Language (1863, 1869, 1873).
Max Müller, Mori’s mentor, who lectured on Mr Darwin’s
Philosophy of Language (1873) was a confirmed believer in socio-lin-
guistic Darwinism; he declared that “language is meant as an
instrument of communication, and that, in the struggle for life, the
most efficient instrument of communication must certainly carry
the day, as long as natural selection, or, as we formerly called it, reason,
rules the world ” (1876: 207; my emphasis).  When Mori was study-
ing Western technology and philosophy in English, such a
Darwinian philosophy of language evolution as Schleicher’s and
Müller’s permeated the social and cultural fabric of society in
Britain.
There is one further point that we must not ignore.  Apart from
seeking advice on language reform in Japan from U.S. linguist
William Whitney in the 1870s, Mori also consulted with German-
born British linguist Max Müller about the problems of language
and religion in Japan.46 Both Whitney and Müller were leading
linguists who looked at language and religion from a Darwinian
perspective.  It is in this social and historical context that Moon
and Alford engaged in a controversy over the Dean’s and Queen’s
English in the 1860s.
Taken all together, it is reasonable to suppose that Mori’s think-
ing on language in society was affected by what might be called
“socio-linguistic Darwinism.”  Indeed, in an interview held in
London in 1884.  Mori disclosed the fact that he was educated on
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social Darwinism when he said of the commercial competition:
I am taught that the progress of the race is by the survival of the
fittest and the elimination of the weak by a process of natural
selection; and the commercial competition is one form by which
superior organisms triumph over the lower.  In that competition
I hope Japan will now take a much prominent part than she
has hitherto done.
(SMAZ, Vol. 1: 438; my emphasis)
The point to observe is that he was taught by someone about the
progressive perspective on the world.  Given the circumstantial
evidence cited above, it is obvious that he learned the “law of the
jungle” from Western thinkers such Spencer and Müller, whom he
solicited advice from in person in the 1870s.  It follows from what
has been said that Mori not only learned social Darwinism in
Britain but also applied the philosophy of socio-linguistic Darwin-
ism to the language reform in Japan.  In his letter to William
Whitney, he explicitly linked his logic behind the proposal for the
adoption of English in Japan to the commercial competition dri-
ven by the law of the jungle as follows:
If we would keep pace with the age, we must adopt a copi-
ous and expanding European language.  The necessity for
this arises mainly out of the fact that Japan is a commercial
nation; and also that, if we do not adopt a language like
that of the English, which is quite predominant in Asia, as
well as elsewhere in the commercial world, the progress of
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Japanese civilization is evidently impossible. 
(SMAZ, Vol. 2: 51–52)
Here we find Mori speaking revealingly about his rationale behind
the introduction of English into Japan: for the sake of the progress
of Japanese civilization in the international commercial competi-
tion.  It is important to note that Mori understood the “survival of
the fittest” principle as operating in the geo-cultural politics of the
language of Japanese civilization.  It was not merely because of the
commercial advantage but because it was part of a larger question
of the clashes of civilization between East and West: the hegemony
of language in the international competition.  Indeed, for Mori, it
all came down to “a question concerning the competition for
supremacy between the races and the religion as well as for intelli-
gence, power and wealth between two of the great divisions of the
world” (SMAZ, Vol. 1: 379).  “In that competition,” Mori declared,
“I hope Japan will now take a much prominent part than she has
hitherto done.”
From his English discourse we can understand his conviction
that in the same way that the Japanese Empire once competed
with the Chinese Empire that had long symbolized Eastern civi-
lization, she would be ready to take on the British Empire that rep-
resented Western civilization.  In 1873 Mori published Education in
Japan as a form of an official declaration that the new Japan would
break away from the Chinese Empire’s sphere of influence and
join in the new civilizational contest.  As we have seen, in the pref-
ace to the booklet was revealed Mori’s comprehensive views of
history, language, and religion.  Apparently his thinking on lan-
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guage in history was very much influenced by British linguistic
nationalism and social Darwinism.  In the subsequent discussion,
we shall not only look at how the image of the British imperial lan-
guage emerged as the Queen’s English, but also examine the par-
allel aspects of Mori’s scheme for the imperial Japanese language.
The Queen’s English vs The Emperor’s Japanese
The important point to observe before moving on to the main task
in Part II is the epigraph and quotation that appear on the facing
pages of and in the preface to The Dean’s English (the fourth 1865
edition) by George W. Moon.  The epigraph was extracted from a
magazine called The Reader, which says:
He who cannot express his thoughts correctly in his own language,
is not likely to obtain credit for much knowledge of any other; nor
will an ill-spelt, ungrammatical letter impress anyone with
the idea that the writer of it is an ‘educated’ man; while, on
the other hand, the Englishman whose linguistic acquire-
ments do not extend beyond the language of Shakespeare, but
who knows that thoroughly and can wield it well, possesses an
instrument with which he may fight his way to almost any posi-
tion he may choose to aspire to, whether he turn his thoughts to
poetry or to politics, to literature or to commerce. —The Reader,
January 28, 1865.  (my emphasis)
What Moon emphasized by quoting the above passage was that
the true national strengths of England could and should emanate
from the history of the English language.  Here Moon refers to the
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language of Shakespeare as the symbolic and cultural capital of
England which made it possible for the Anglo-Saxon race to gain
linguistic independence from Latin (or French).  Clearly, Moon
lets the epigraph speak for itself; he believed in making England
an independent nation-state by capitalizing on the strengths of
their own language.  In the same way, Moon further quotes in the
preface to The Dean’s English German poet August Wilhelm von
Schlegel (1767–1845), who was famous for his excellent translation
of Shakespeare, explaining why he wrote the book in the first
place as follows:
The care of the national language I consider at all times a
sacred trust, and a most important privilege of the higher
orders of society.  Every man of education should make it
the object of his unceasing concern to preserve his language
pure and entire, and to speak it, so far as is in his power, in all its
beauty and perfection.47 (my emphasis)
It is highly probable that after reading The Dean’s English, Mori,
as stated in the above passage, came to understand the “care of
national language” as a “sacred trust and a most important privi-
lege of the higher orders of society.”  For the Japanese to preserve
their native language “pure and entire” and to speak it “in all its
beauty and perfection,” Mori must have conceived a similar idea
for language reform as the cornerstone of education in Japan.
If we assume that Mori intended to conserve the Japanese lan-
guage “pure and entire,” we need to examine more closely his
English introduction to Education in Japan in a bid to unravel the
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complex webs of his motives behind the text; his long introductory
essay on the outline of Japanese history in the book can be seen as
disclosing his Weltanschauung that might give us an important
clue as to how his discourse on language and religion is connected
with his overall strategy of educational reform.  As shown in the
quote above, Mori devoted much space to tracing the beginning of
Japanese Empire to remote antiquity.  What is significant here is
his historical view of the origin of the Japanese language as going
back to the mythical age when the Japanese Empire began.
In the age of spirits there can be found nothing that will excite our
curiosity, except the language.  Its structure is similar to the mod-
ern Japanese, though the considerable difference in the manner of
expression and in pronunciation makes its acquirement difficult.
Its origin, as well as that of our race, is not yet determined.
(SMAZ, Vol. 5: 134; my emphasis)
The passage above speaks volumes about what Mori really
thought about the native language in Japan; it provides a conclu-
sive clue to unlock the secret behind Mori’s language reform dis-
course.  Here we have his mystical and mythological view of the
origin of the Japanese indigenous language as driving from the
“age of spirits.”  Related to this point is the fact that, Max Müller,
from whom Mori earnestly sought advice on the issues of national
language and state religion, also disclosed the similar view in his
Lectures on the Science of Language Delivered at the Royal Institute of
Great Britain in 1861 when he said that language is “the living and
speaking witness of the whole history of our nation” (Müller 1862:
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27).  It is obvious that Mori shared Müller’s view on language and
history.  Given that Mori publicized his mythological view on lan-
guage in the book entitled Education in Japan, it is plain to see that
he wanted not only to establish the imperial legitimacy of the
Japanese language but also to emphasize the potential strength of
the mother tongue that could fully develop into a modern lan-
guage.
Then, how is Mori’s view of the imperial history of Japan
linked with the language of Japan?  The evidence shows that he
“discovered” the meaning of the time-honored structure of the
Japanese language in the ancient history of the imperial nation.
The history of the language of Japan, Mori remarks, can be traced
to the beginning of the Japanese Empire in the mythological age.
It is important to note here that the structure of the Japanese lan-
guage that stood the test of time is characterized as having an
unchanging and ever-lasting historical continuity.  Mori thus dis-
cusses the language problem in Japan towards the end of the intro-
duction to Educaition in Japan; Mori reiterates the point that the lin-
guistic foundation, whether of the spoken language or the written,
remains in essence unchanged since the founding of the Empire.
These facts should strengthen our hypothesis that Mori’s recog-
nition of the Imperial Japanese language is grounded in the histori-
cal continuity represented by the genealogy of the Emperors in
Japan.  Since this has much to do with cultural eclecticism Mori
employed to realize his ultimate goals in many other fields, it
seems reasonable to suppose that he must have considered using
the traditional language structure as a medium that would help
incorporate a phonetic alphabet and simplified English into the
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vernacular language of Japan, thereby creating a new Japan’s
Imperial language.  Indeed, Mori looked at the historical develop-
ment of the imperial Japanese language in terms of its internal
(grammatical) and external (phraseological and phonetical) charac-
teristics.  Let us look at Mori’s reference to the oldest Japanese
chronicle that purports to warrant the authenticity and legitimacy
of the native language in Japan.
According to the record of Koziki [sic], which was written
[in Japanese] 1,160 years ago, and is one of the oldest, the
traditions of our country exhibit the creation in evolu-
tion….  (ibid.: 134–135)
Kojiki (Records of Ancient Matters) is well known in Japan as the
first national record written in the style of the native language, not
the Chinese which, up to that point, had long functioned as the
formal written language in Japan.  Recall here Schlegel’s rhetorical
statement quoted in Moon’s The Dean’s English that refers to the
language of Shakespeare as symbolizing the national strength of
England.  Considered in this light, we can better understand why
Mori cited Kojiki as the “sacred text” legitimating the history of the
imperial Japanese language” (see Koyasu 2003: 44–48).  In doing
so he was implying that Japan is perhaps one of the oldest imperial
nations which has the official record bearing witness to not only
the historical continuity but also the authenticity and legitimacy of
the Empire and the native language; therefore, imperial Japan and
her language could stand up to those in the West.  In other words,
the logic of his mytholodical-hystorical narrative implies that it
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was the structural continuity of the internal matrix of the Japanese
language that established and solidified the cultural integrity of the
imperial nation.  What is interesting is that the same can be said of
the history of the British Empire and the English language.  As
Crowley writes regarding the relation between the durability of the
national language and the unification of the nation:
In concentrating upon the formal continuities of the lan-
guage (the internal history), ‘the history of the language’
successfully portrayed its object as having a complex but
unified pattern of evolution. (Crowley 1989: 47; my emphasis)
Meanwhile, under the influence of the Romantic and mystic
aspects of nineteenth-century historical linguistics, Mori expound-
ed on the internal history of the national language of Japan.
Furthermore, he looked at the external history of the Japanese lan-
guage from a rational and scientific point of view.  Indeed, inspired
by the works of Max Müller and William Whitney, Mori saw lan-
guage and religion as the object of scientific study.  Unlike today’s
scientific study of language, however, their scientific views of lan-
guage were based on Spencerian and Hegelian philosophies in
which the world would continue to evolve and progress as a result
of enlightenment and civilization.  Consequently, such moral and
social imperatives at the time led Mori toward a revamping of the
external—variable and seemingly retrogressing—functions of the
Japanese language; it was not the internal continuity of the struc-
ture of the Japanese language, but rather its external system of
notation that governs expression and pronunciation.  In the 1870s,
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the biggest problem with the language of Japan was to do with the
clear separation or linguistic conflict between the spoken and the
written language due to the conventional Chinese character-based
ideogramic writing system.  This necessitated establishing a new
standard written Japanese that would reconcile the separation
between the spoken and the written so as to unify the nation.
Interestingly, Britain had the same problem for the same rea-
son in the mid-and late-nineteenth century.  Alford’s The Queen’s
English, with its subtitle “Notes on Speaking and Spelling,” clearly
shows that there was an urgent need to rebuild the nation by uni-
fying the spoken and written English in Britain.  The Queen’s
English, with middle-class English as its matrix, was beginning to
emerge as the model of the standard spoken language in the
1860s.  Similarly, in the same period, the Tokyo dialect standard
was being accepted as the spoken standard language that was to
lay the foundation for building a new standard written language
that would help solidify national unity (Sanada 1991: 70–72).  In
other words, just as the creation of the larger imperial language in
Britain required building the standard English, spoken and written,
and elevating it into the Queen’s English, so the creation of the
imperial language in the new Japan necessitated a radical transfor-
mation of the standard spoken into the full-fledged written lan-
guages.  Viewed in this light, we can better understand why Mori
began his letter to Whitney by first broaching the issue of stan-
dardization of the spoken language of Japan as follows:
The spoken language of Japan being inadequate to the growing
necessities of the people of that Empire, and too poor to be
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made, by a phonetic alphabet, sufficiently useful as a writ-
ten language … the progress of Japanese civilization is evi-
dently impossible.  Indeed a new language is demanded by
the whole Empire. (SMAZ, Vol. 2: 51–52; my emphasis)
Moreover, Mori goes on to argue for the need to build a new writ-
ten language based on the spoken language of Japan:
The only course to be taken, to secure the desired end, is to
start anew, by first turning the spoken language into a properly
written form, based on a pure phonetic principle.
(ibid.; my emphasis)
What Mori refers to as the “spoken language of Japan” here is
nothing short of the indigenous language of Japan.  He then con-
tinues to suggest that Japanese and English should have the same
power at both spoken and written level:
It is very important that the alphabets of the two languages
under consideration—Japanese and English—be as nearly
alike as possible, in sound and powers of the letters. (ibid.)
The significance of this statement cannot be overemphasized pre-
cisely because this very sentence attests to Mori’s ultimate agenda
for inter-civilizational competition in which he attempted to create
the Emperor’s Japanese as a counter imperial language of the East
against that of the West, namely, the Queen’s English.  Then he
goes on to suggest that there is a serious problem calling for imme-
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diate solutions.
It may be added, in this connection, that the written language
now in use in Japan, has little or no relation to the spoken lan-
guage, but is mainly hieroglyphic—a deranged Chinese, blended
in Japanese, all the letters of which are themselves of Chinese ori-
gin. (ibid.; my emphasis)
Here he insinuates that the Chinese characters constitute the extra-
neous element that governs the external structure of the Imperial
Japanese language.  The same idea can also be found in his state-
ment in Education in Japan:
In the style of expression, the spoken language of Japan dif-
fers considerably from the written, though in their structure
they are both mainly the same … the vowel-sounds are
each defined and all short.  The style of the written lan-
guage is like the Chinese.  In all our institutions of learning
the Chinese classics have been used.  There are four differ-
ent methods of writing a character, and all of them are of
Chinese origin…. (SMAZ, Vol. 5: 185)
As for the problem of foreign language interference in national
education in Japan, Mori thus singles out Chinese characters for
preventing the progress of the native language.  Mori adds:
All the schools the Empire has had, for many centuries,
have been Chinese; and, strange to state, we have had no
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schools nor books, in our own language for educational
purposes.  These Chinese schools, being now regarded not
only as useless, but as a great drawback to our progress, are in the
steady progress of extinction. (SMAZ, Vol. 2: 52; my emphasis)
Here we must draw attention to the words Mori employs to
describe the “progress” of Japanese and Chinese by comparison
and contrast.  Obviously, Mori saw the language of China as dete-
riorating progressively toward extinction.  In the same period, con-
cerning the issue of national language education, such similar dis-
course inspired by social Darwinism can be found in Britain.  As
Alford says of the Anglo-Saxon English as against Latin as follows:
The language [English] … is undergoing a sad and rapid
process of deterioration.  Its fine manly Saxon is getting diluted
into long Latin words not carrying half the meaning….  
(Alford 1864: 145; my emphasis)
In 1873, Kington-Oliphant similarly criticizes the schools in Britain
for taking light of the linguistic situation in which the students too
often overuse foreign (Latin) words in place of Anglo-Saxon
English:
we must ask how they have been taught at our Schools and
Universities.  Much heed is there bestowed on Latin and
Greek, but none on English (Kingston-Oliphant 1873: 335)
The above descriptions suggest that there had been a striking simi-
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larity in national linguistic awareness between Japan and Britain in
the 1860s–70s: linguistic-cultural nationalism; there was a high
degree of commonality in the nature of the problems surrounding
public education and national language-building between the two
nations (see also Seeley 1867 and Newman 1877).  From this we
can conjecture that Mori learned about national language reform
in Britain while he studied there in 1865–66, and later developed
an idea for the revamping of the language of Japan.  Indeed, when
Mori made a tentative proposal for national language reform in
1872, he focused on our (native/Japanese) language in contraposi-
tion to their (foreign/Chinese) language, in analogy with Britain’s
language reform movement in which the central problem was the
internal linguistic conflict between Anglo-Saxon and Latin/French
words in the English language.  Just as Anglo-Saxon words were
seen by many purists and reformers as superior to Latin/French
archaic words, so Mori saw Japanese as authentic and Chinese as
“useless” because he believed that by the laws of nature and
progress the language of China was to follow a course of extinction
in the future.  This is why Mori’s proposal included “doing away
with Chinese characters” which had long been embedded in the
national language of Japan.
How did Mori look at the language of China?  This question
has a great deal to do with how Westerners viewed the Chinese
language.  Referring to leading linguists such as August Schleicher
(1821–68) and Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767–1835), Tanaka (1989:
152–170) points out, it was generally believed by Westerners that it
is chiefly because of their ideogramic characters that prevented the
language of China from flourishing as the counterparts of Western
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countries did.  It must be noted that Mori shared such a typical
Western view of the Chinese language as doomed to decline
because of the very nature of its ideogramic characters.  Tanaka
goes on to comment on Schleicher’s philosophy of language by
focusing on his idea of phonocentrim in which one’s thought is
brought into being by its sounds; to put it the other way around,
language gets more complete and advanced when there is less
incongruity between its sound and letters.  There is a similar logic
behind Mori’s discourse on language reform in Japan in which he
regards Chinese characters as governing the written language of
Japan and thus preventing the Japanese spoken language from
developing into a modern written language.  In this way, Mori’s
view of language was obviously influenced by the then prevailing
Western philosophy of social Darwinism that dictated the survival
of the fittest and natural selection.
Relevant to this point is the fact that Whitney’s statement about
the Darwinian prospect of Chinese significantly matches Mori’s
opinion on the language of China.  In reply to Mori’ letter,
Whitney suggests:
This last matter, the writing of Japanese for the use of its
own people in a phonetic mode, with the European alpha-
bet, appears to me the first and most important of possible
reforms.  I am told, by those who know your language
much better than I, that the task would be one of no partic-
ular difficulty; and, knowing what great and insuperable
obstacles have been found in other parts of the East, in the
way of carrying our a substitution of the European for the
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native code of writing, the utmost I have ventured to hope
has been that the Japanese would signalize themselves,
showing their superior independence and freedom from prejudice,
by making this reform. (SMAZ, Vol. 5: 339; my emphasis)
Apparently Whitney not only sees the adoption of the European
alphabets in Japan as “the first and most important of possible
reforms,” but also as a means to “signalize” the Japanese “showing
their superior independence and freedom from prejudice.”  It is
worth recalling here that Mori believed in “cleansing himself of
old values and norms deriving from Chinese style feudalistic con-
ventions in Japan” (Inuzuka 1986: 39–42).  For Mori, the Europe-
an alphabet was a medium for de-Sinicizing Japan and outstrip-
ping China in civilization and modernization.  Apparently,
Whitney shared Mori’s view of the European alphabet as liberat-
ing the Japanese people from the shackles of the language of
China.  Whitney states:
There can be no question that, whatever benefits Japan
may have derived in the past from China, nothing of value
can any longer be hoped for thence; that the pupils have
outgrown their old teachers, and are ready to surpass them.
Nor can it be doubted, I think that the influence of the
Chinese language on the Japanese has always been a harm-
ful and a regrettable one, and that complete emancipation from it
would be exceedingly advantageous to Japan.  And it is, in great
measure, as a furtherance to this emancipation that I desire to
see Japanese written in European characters. 
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(ibid.: 339–340; my emphasis)
In the passage above we find Whitney not only having no doubt
that Japan had “outgrown” China and “ready to surpass them,”
but also going so far as to say that European characters should be
adopted in Japan only in the interest of “complete emancipation”
from the “harmful and regrettable” influence of the Chinese lan-
guage on the Japanese.  Clearly, Whitney’s view of Chinese as
inferior to European languages because of the linguistic notation
system, accords with Mori’s perception of the language of China as
“useless and a “drawback” to the progress of Japan.  Like Müller,
Whitney who was Mori’s adviser on language reform was also a
Darwinian.
Thus, influenced by Western intellectuals who advocated socio-
linguistic Darwinism, Mori began to consider abandoning declin-
ing linguistic symbols (the Chinese characters) in favor of progres-
sive ones (the Roman alphabet and English vocabulary).  As we
shall see in Part II, what he was aiming at in emulating the
Queen’s English was creating a new national language by purify-
ing the imperial Japanese language of the Chinese elements, as
well as by rationalizing it with the aid of European elements.
Hence, his radical triple schemes: abolition of Chinese, romaniza-
tion of Japanese, and simplification of English.  Mori was keen on
building what might be called “the Emperor’s language”48 for the
Japanese Empire that would enable the new Japan to stand on an
equal footing with the British Empire.  In short, the model of the
imperial Japanese that attracted his attention in forming his idea
for national language reform was the Queen’s English, arguably
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the most powerful imperial language in the West.
Having established a new theoretical and interpretive frame-
work for understanding within Mori’s Weltanschauung the
“method and intention” of his linguistic attitude and performance,
in what follows, we may now conduct an in-depth textual criticism
of his language reform discourse in juxtaposition with other related
discourses in an attempt to find more evidence that corroborates
our working hypothesis.
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These were not for him, and ought not to be for us, incon-
sistent positions.  Truth is rich and complex enough to
accommodate both the abstract and the concrete, the tem-
poral and the eternal, the general and the specific, the
absolute and the relative, the probable and the certain.
(Weiss 1940: 254)
[T]he people of the Japanese Empire, aspire to attain the
highest degree of civilization, but are unprovided with that
great essential to their individual as well as national prog-
ress, —a good language—.
(Mori Arinori 1872: SMAZ, Vol. 2: 56)
1.  The polysemy of “a new language”: A means and an end
Mori’s idea of “the desired end” in language reform
It was in 1872 that Mori Arinori wrote a personal letter to U.S. lin-
guist William D. Whitney asking for advice on the adoption of
Roman letters (a phonetic alphabet) and a “simplified English.”  At
that point in time, exactly what kind of idea did he entertain of
Japan’s language policy?  To trace his train of thought on the issue,
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PART II  TEXTUAL CRITICISM
Mori’s Hidden Agenda: The Creation 
of a New Language49 for a New Imperial Nation
we will begin by examining this letter closely:
Dear Sir:
The fact that a high rank is awarded to you in the fields of
Science and Literature has induced me respectfully to
request your opinion on a project I have in contemplation,
connected with the introduction of the English language
into the Japanese Empire.  The spoken language of Japan
being inadequate to the growing necessities of the people to
be made, by a phonetic alphabet, sufficiently useful as a
written language, the idea prevails among us that, if we
would keep pace with the age, we must adopt a copious
and expanding European language.  The necessity for this
arises mainly out of the fact that Japan is a commercial
nation; and also that, if we do not adopt a language like
that of the English, which is quite predominant in Asia, as
well as elsewhere in the commercial world, the progress of
Japanese civilization is evidently impossible.  Indeed a new
language is demanded by the whole Empire.
(SMAZ, Vol. 2: 51–52)
What linguistic situation does he have in mind when he says “the
introduction of the English language into the Japanese Empire”
and “adopt a language like that of the English” here?  What is his
ultimate goal of the proposal?  How does he see the relation
between Japanese and English, and the problem of the spoken and
the written languages of Japan?  Why does he only mention the
spoken language, excluding the existing written language as part of
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the project?  What does the conversion by a phonetic alphabet of
the spoken language of Japan into a written language have to do
with the adoption of the English language?  If he ever talks about
language reform, why not romanize both the spoken and the writ-
ten?  He appears to discount the written right from the beginning.
Here we need to consider its implications for his whole idea of lan-
guage policy in Japan, for it is generally believed that he proposed
to abolish Japanese by adopting English as a new language in
Japan.  If the truth accords with the established idea, then why
does he have to refer, from the outset, to the spoken language of
Japan and a phonetic alphabet at the same time when he wants to do
away with Japanese by introducing English into Japan?  To under-
stand his true intentions, we need to keep looking for the clues in
the letter.  Concerning “a new language” in Japan, Mori continues
as follows:
It having been found that the Japanese language is insuf-
ficient even for the wants of the Japanese themselves, the
demand for the new language is irresistibly imperative, in
view of our rapidly increasing intercourse with the world at
large.  All the schools the Empire has had, for many cen-
turies, have been Chinese; and, strange to state, we have
had no schools nor books, in our own language for educa-
tional purposes.  These Chinese schools, being now regard-
ed not only as useless, but as a great drawback to our
progress, are in the steady progress of extinction.  Schools
for the Japanese language are found to be greatly needed,
and yet there are neither teachers nor books for them.  The
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only course to be taken, to secure the desired end, is to start
anew, by first turning the spoken language into a properly
written form, based on a pure phonetic principle.  It is con-
templated that Roman letters should be adopted.  Under
such circumstances, it is very important that the alphabets
of the two languages under consideration–Japanese and
English–be as nearly alike as possible, in sound and pow-
ers of the letters. (ibid.)
The first question to be raised here is whether Mori views English
itself (a language belonging to a different language family) as an
ideal and sufficient language that would serve as “a possible future
language of the Japanese Empire” or as the national language.  It
follows from the popular discourse about Mori’s language policy
that English is being referred to here as a “substitution” for the lan-
guage of Japan.  We can safely state here that English, as Mori
himself makes clear later in the passage, is regarded as a new lan-
guage in Japan.  Yet there is no mention in the text of the English
language being the best possible future language of the Japanese
Empire.
While it is true that English is the language he intends to intro-
duce into Japan, it is not yet clear whether he equates the adoption
of a new language with the abolition of an old one.  If we assume
that his aim is to replace the old with the new, it will then be
difficult to understand his logic when he says that “the only course
to be taken, to secure the desired end, is to start anew, by first
turning the spoken language into a properly written form, based
on a pure phonetic form.”  And he goes on to suggest that it is
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imperative that the spoken language of Japan be romanized in
order for both Japanese and English to become equal in sound and
powers of letters.  If Mori truly believes in abolishing the Japanese
language, it would seem so strange to argue for the importance of
establishing “schools for the Japanese language” where students
can study in their own vernacular instead of a foreign language.
Apparently there is a contradiction between what the popular
belief says about Mori’s language reform and what he actually says
in the letter.  Pointing out the inconsistencies in his statement, Ivan
Hall (2004: 215–218) observes that Mori contradicts himself when
he first stresses the need for a new language due to the incomplete
function of the romanized spoken language as a sufficient written
language, and then restates his belief that the spoken language of
Japan should be written in Roman letters.  Hall goes on to say that
“it is not unreasonable to assume that Mori had half a mind to pre-
serve the Japanese language when he wrote the letter to Whitney,
and saw the whole idea of introducing a phonetic alphabet into
Japan as a process of the proposed adoption of English.”  Thus
Hall puts forward the hypothesis that Mori must have imagined a
new linguistic situation: Like India, Pakistan, and Wales in which
“diglossia” would be a way of life; the Japanese people would use
English as a host language in the field of science and technology,
politics, trade, and education, while they speak their vernacular
( Japanese) in daily conversation at home.
What was the real objective that he was trying to achieve?  Did
he not realize that he was contradicting himself in his argument?
If he really had known what he was talking about, then how would
he have reconciled the romanization of the spoken language of
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Japan with the introduction of English?  Or did he suppose that
diglossia would be the answer to the problem?  The key to unlock-
ing the mysteries of his proposal lies in his phrase “to secure the
desired end.”  In order to understand what he means by this
expression, it is very important to reexamine the import of the pas-
sage that follows.  If we pay close attention to the context and read
more carefully through the letter in order to reorganize the process
of his language reform, we can see that his objective was not to
replace Japanese by English but:
1) To utilize Roman letters (phonogram) in order to unify
the spoken and written styles of the language of Japan,
thereby establishing a base for a new Japanese that is “as
nearly alike as possible, in sound and powers of the let-
ters” when compared to English.
2) To abolish Chinese characters (ideogram) at the same
time as the introduction of a phonetic alphabet (phono-
gram).
3) To introduce a new English (a simplified English) into
Japan with a view to incorporating the vocabulary of
Western civilization into a new Japanese.50
With this in mind, we need to go over what he has to say about the
introduction of English in Japan and how he says it in the letter.
Following the logical thread of Mori’s argument, we find that he
begins his argument by pointing out the Japanese spoken language’s
insufficient conditions for a (new) written language and then
emphasizing the urgent need for the introduction of an European
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language or a new language in the Japanese Empire.  The discussion
to be followed is about the futility of Chinese characters as the
written language of Japan.  He sees the Chinese language not only
as “useless” but also as being “a great drawback to our progress”
and “in the steady progression of extinction.”  It is after he refers
to the Chinese schools that he insists on founding schools for the
Japanese language and yet has to admit that there have been no
foundations for the Japanese language-based educational system in
Japan.  What has to be noticed here is that Mori talks about his
“desired end” and “the only course to be taken” in connection
with the abolition of the conventional Chinese institutions and the
creation of the Japanese ones.
Indeed, Mori says in the letter that to achieve his goals it is
necessary to “start anew by first turning the spoken language into a
properly written form, based on a pure phonetic principle.”  What
this sentence shows is that he intends to remove the conventional
written language of Japan (Chinese-based ideogram) by expressing
the spoken language in a phonetic alphabet as a new written lan-
guage.  If we assume this is his true intention, then we can under-
stand why he does not have to mention at the beginning the “old”
written language of Japan (Chinese) as a crucial part of his plan for
language reform.  It is clear that he does not consider romanizing
the “old” written language on a pure ideogramic principle in the
first place.  This is chiefly because of his firm belief in “progress”
and denial of the feudalistic ethos permeated in Chinese charac-
ters.  Thus Mori’s conception of the development of Japanese sug-
gests that he sees the introduction of a progressive and “copious”
European language as indispensable for a new Japanese written
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language; his language reform is to be carried out by revamping
the foundations of the whole text written in the language of Japan.
Here I would like to focus attention on the operative word in
the passage quoted above that might give us a clue as to Mori’s
“desired end.”  We should not overlook the fact that he employed
the adverb “first” as he begins to unfold his plan for language
reform.  This clearly indicates that romanization of the spoken lan-
guage of Japan constitutes only phase one of his scheme where a
Japanese vernacular-based written language should be made on a
“pure phonetic principle” with sound and powers of the letters
equal to English.  However, as already referred to in Part I, he
pointed out the major obstacle as follows:
the written language now in use in Japan, has little or no
relation to the spoken language, but is mainly hiero-
glyphic—a deranged Chinese, blended in Japanese, all the
letters of which are themselves of Chinese origin. (ibid.)
Judging from the logical progression, it could be argued that what
Mori was aiming at in the first phase was to abolish Chinese charac-
ters with the introduction of Roman letters and thus lay the foun-
dation for the next stage.  The point to observe here is that Mori
evidently views the introduction of a phonetic alphabet as a pre-
requisite for ridding Japan of the characters “of Chinese origin.”
As for the first phase in his plan, corroborative evidence can be
found in his definite statement in the preface to Education in Japan:
most of them are of Chinese origin.  There are some efforts
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being made to do away with the use of Chinese characters
by reducing them into simple phonetics.  
(SMAZ, Vol. 5: 185: my emphasis)
Having got this point firmly established, we get nearer to the next
phase that Mori was contemplating.  Soon after the discussion of
the distinction between the spoken and written language of Japan,
he then goes on to talk about the introduction of a “simplified
English” into Japan.  Yet he does not explicitly mention that it is
the second phase to be followed by the adoption of Roman letters
in the first phase.  By his line of reasoning, however, it seems rea-
sonable to suppose that he thinks of the adoption of simplified
English as the next phase of his proposed draft.  Assuming that it is
the second part of “the desired end,” we may say that Mori was
making a consistent argument all along; Hall’s view that Mori
makes a contradictory statement in the letter is unsound here
(Unger 1996: 5).  The reason why Mori states at the beginning that
the spoken language of Japan is “too poor to be made by a phonet-
ic alphabet, sufficiently useful as a written language” and then
maintains that the spoken language needs to be romanized is that
his “desired end” in his language reform is to be implemented by a
two-stage procedure: first, the introduction of Roman letters; sec-
ond, the adoption of simplified English.  When he argues that the
spoken language of Japan could not be made by Roman letters
into a sufficiently useful written language, he implies that it is not
enough just to use a phonetic alphabet to create a new written language
of Japan because it still lacks vocabulary necessary for education in
the new Japan; in addition to the introduction of Roman letters, a
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“copious and expanding European language” also needs to be
adopted as a lexical supplement.  There is much justice in this
interpretation, for it accounts well for “the desired end” Mori had
in mind, which we shall be discussing further in the later sections.
What must be noted here is that his logic says that the whole pro-
ject requires not only one thing but also something else; it never says
that one thing is quite sufficient; therefore it should be replaced or
abolished with the introduction of another.  While Mori considers
“introducing into all schools of the Empire, and gradually into gen-
eral a ‘simplified English’,” it does not necessarily follow that he
intended to substitute English for Japanese.  Here we should be
extra careful in interpreting his “desired end” behind his state-
ment; otherwise we would fall into the trap of accepting the popu-
lar belief that Mori was a keen proponent of the abolition of Japa-
nese and the adoption of English.  What Mori is attempting to do
here is to fill the gap between the spoken and written language of
Japan in terms of notational system, and to build up the lexis of
the Japanese language.  This idea is far from replacing Japanese by
a foreign language.  In sum, his language reform plan is twofold:
Phase One involves romanizing the spoken language of Japan;
Phase Two adopting a simplified English as a means of enriching
the new (romanized) Japanese.  If we take into consideration all
other evidence relating to his linguistic strategy, it is highly proba-
ble that Mori is aiming for a “revamped” language along the lines
of the two-stage plan.
The new English for building an “imperial language”
Let us examine further Mori’s ultimate goal of the phased lan-
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guage reform by illustrating the point that we have been consider-
ing.  Based on our analysis, we can posit the following hypothesis:
What Mori is aiming at here is creating koukoku-gengo or a new lan-
guage of the Japanese Empire that could hold its ground against,
and in the ultimate sense, surpass the two big imperial languages:
Chinese and English.  We have good grounds for thinking that this
may be the case, for there are many examples where Mori has
made statements which support this view.  As we have already
seen in Part I, the key word that best characterizes his “geo-cultur-
al strategy” and fully explains what his “desired end” was all about
and how it was to be done, is eclecticism which he regarded as a
highly effective traditional method for producing something new
in Japan.  Since ancient times, eclecticism has long been viewed as
a strategic or compromising integration of “heterogeneous cultural
elements” in Japan.  This is none other than what Meiji Japan
embodied in its national constitution; indeed, Meiji Restoration in
1868 means restoring the old (cultural matrix) on which the new
must build.  This idea of eclecticism can be interpreted as what
Bourdieu (1991) terms “cultural capital,” which the Meiji govern-
ment was ready to exploit.
As we have seen in Part I, there is strong evidence showing
that Mori apparently strategically used Japan’s cultural capital
(time-tested eclecticism) as a way of obtaining a wealth of knowl-
edge from Western civilization.  Mori placed eclecticism in its his-
torical and cultural context and talked about the role of Japan’s
cultural capital in developing a higher culture of its own and “sur-
pass the state of civilization” reached by “her Asiatic neighbors”
(China and Korea).  The most important part of this statement is
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the motive behind his pronouncement on Japan’s eclectic tradi-
tion.  We can be fairly certain that Mori had a keen sense of rivalry
with the countries which were doing better than Japan.  While
Mori spoke of the cultural significance of the political engraftment
in the context above, it would be logical, given his spirit of emula-
tion, to assume that he found it imperative that the Japanese lan-
guage should be more competitive with those of advanced coun-
tries.  In my understanding, it is Mori’s competitive spirit that
served as a driving force behind his strategic use of traditional
eclecticism to create a better language in Japan.  It should be clear
that he hoped to develop and perfect a new language of the Japa-
nese Empire as compared to any of the European languages.  This
explains why he advanced the idea of introducing a “simplified
(improved) English,” not the conventional English full of ortho-
graphic defects (irregular spellings).  The new English would have
to be adopted as a (perfectly modified therefore) better language
than the “old” English being used in the world.  He was acutely
aware that Japan could not afford to introduce any European lan-
guage if it was imperfect precisely because it would not give Japan
a competitive edge over her rivals at all.  What needs to be em-
phasized is that it is only by looking at his “desired end” in terms
of cultural eclecticism that we can understand how he planed to
carry out his language reform.  To repeat the major point, he views
the introduction of the Roman alphabet and a simplified English
not so much as an end in itself but rather as a process of creating a
new imperial Japanese language.
A point to note concerning his language strategy is that Mori
insists on revamping both Japanese and English at the same time; he
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states, as we have seen in the letter, that it is significant that the
two languages be made equal “in sound and powers of the letters”
based on a “pure phonetic principle.”  His intention is to adopt the
Roman alphabet that consists of 26 letters by which to convert the
Chinese-hieroglyph-ridden written language of Japan into the pho-
netic-based one.  This idea is tantamount to the abolition of
Chinese in Japan.  Furthermore, he argues, concurrently, for the
improvement in English orthography which is full of irregularities.
He asserts:
the world at large, would be greatly benefited by a through
recast of English orthography, –making the language actu-
ally what it claims to be phonetic instead of hieroglyphic
on a phonetic basis, which is what it now really is.  
(SMAZ, Vol. 2: 56)
Thus Mori considers modifying not only Japanese but also English
in terms of orthography.  No matter how you look at it, this is far
from putting English in place of Japanese as the new language of
Japan.
The second point that requires clarification is that Mori
qualifies his statement by stressing that his proposal for a simpli-
fied English is intended only for the use of the Japanese people.
He writes:
many of the reasons which might make Americans and
Englishmen hesitate to attempt radical changes in their lan-
guage for their own people, do not apply to the case under
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consideration, which is the adaptation of the English lan-
guage to the necessities of a foreign nation of forty millions
of souls, separated by thousands of miles from the English-
speaking nations, and which affords an entirely free field,
for the introduction of a new language; there being no ob-
stacle whatsoever within the Empire itself.
(ibid.; underline in the original)
Here Mori specifically explains his intention of the introduction of
English into Japan; he intends to adapt the simplified English to the
necessities of Japanese without imposing it on the English-speaking
people.  This statement above clearly demonstrates that the prima-
ry purpose of his proposal to implement the use of English in his
country is not to substitute (simplified) English for Japanese, but
rather to make it suitable for the needs of the Japanese people.  In
other words, Mori regards it not as a replacement for Japanese but
as an “auxiliary language” required for the creation of the Imperial
Japanese language.  Apparently, what he is trying to do is to incor-
porate a new vocabulary of Western civilization into Japanese by
virtue of a pure phonetic.
However, Whitney, responding to Mori’s letter, disapproved of
his idea for a simplified English on the grounds of intelligibility as
follows:
And I think that any alteration, in the process of adoption,
of the essential structure of English, would constitute an
interference.  You cannot join the community of English
speakers without frankly accepting English speech as they
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have made it, and now use it.  All change of that speech,
such as you propose, would be a barrier between the Japa-
nese and English speaker of English, and would shut out
the former from access to the English literature.  
(SMAZ, Vol. 5: 336)
As a native speaker of English, Whitney does not shy away from
revealing his sentiments as to Mori’s “provocative” scheme.
Further he adds:
The new English (such is the power of prejudice) would seem
laughable and absurd to the speakers of the old, and those
who used it would be visited with the contempt of the lat-
ter.  Nor do I think there would be any appreciable gain to
set off against this loss … to regulate them would be to give
the whole language a new and strange aspect, offensive to
those whom it now belongs. (ibid.: my emphasis)
Indeed, Mori’s proposal is radical in that in improving the English
language he not merely tries to correct its “fantastic” orthography
which is not based on a pure phonetic principle but goes so far as
to change the “essential structure of English” such as the rules of
conjugation of verbs and irregular forms of nouns: just to give a
few examples of verbs, Seed for saw; Speaked for spoke and spo-
ken; Bited for bit and bitten; Thinked for thought (SMAZ, Vol. 2:
54).  Notwithstanding possible difficulties in communication with
the English-speaking peoples, Mori gives his plan a serious
thought.  What is clearly shown is that the whole idea of the adop-
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tion of English in Japan is meant for an extensive improvement on
the language of Japan.  Here we find disagreement between Mori’s
intention and Whitney’s interpretation; Mori wants to adopt a
modified English as a means of developing Japanese into a lan-
guage comparable or superior to European languages, while
Whitney would like to see the Japanese people “make themselves
a part of those (Anglo-Saxon) races” by coming to accept and use
English as it is.  It is neither assimilation into the English-speaking
community nor the abolition of Japanese, but the development of
Japanese as a strong and independent language, that Mori is really
aiming for.  Obviously, he gives priority to national interests here.
This is why Mori maintains that it is primarily for the benefit of the
Japanese people and that he would never force the simplified Eng-
lish on the English-speaking peoples.
Furthermore, another significant point as regards his imperial
language creation scheme is that Mori declares that it would be
“nearly useless to make an effort in that direction” and that “it
might be quite impossible to force upon them the language in its
present form.”  As to the estimated amount of time required for
the study of the new language, he goes on to suggest:
Indeed, I could not conscientiously recommend my coun-
trymen, to cause their children to devote six or seven years
of their lives to learning a language so replete with the
interchange of thought and acquisition of knowledge are
rendered so difficult by a fantastic orthography—years
which should be devoted to the study of numerous branch-
es of human development. (SMAZ, Vol. 2: 57)
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The statement above would not make sense if we assumed that
Mori’s intention was to abolish Japanese.  It is unreasonable to
think that one can expect a people to learn a foreign language so
as to do away with their native language in “six or seven years.”
Mori also makes it clear that he could not and would not adopt
English (unless it is modified) for two reasons.  First, he finds it eco-
nomically unfeasible to introduce an “imperfect” English into
Japan.  Second, he believes it is morally wrong to waste people’s
precious time on the acquisition of a foreign and cumbersome lan-
guage.51 All this reminds us of Gandhi who “also held English
responsible for distorting education, where because of the time
spent learning English the standard reached in other subjects was
‘pitifully inadequate’ (cited in Phillipson 1990: 35–36).”
There is a further point which needs to be clarified: How did
Mori think the language of the Japanese Empire was to be legit-
imized as a “imperial” language (so as not to be outdone by
English, arguably the largest imperial language in the world)?  All
this has to do with the question of imperial linguistic legitimacy.  If
it is an imperial language that Mori endeavored to construct, then
it must be connected with some features that constitute an imperial
power.  The best account for this could be found in the “history of
the Japanese Empire.”  Facing the impending national crisis
caused by the Western imperial powers, most intellectuals in Meiji
Japan would draw on the history of Japan as “symbolic capital” in
justifying their claim that Japan is a true empire: an unconquered
nation with an unbroken line of Emperors.  This is the popular
rationale behind the Meiji government’s empire building.  Mori
was no exception.  As has been noted, he views Japan as a legiti-
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mate empire on the grounds of the long history of the unbroken
imperial dynasty.  Mori’s perception of Japan as a long-standing
empire is based on the “great constitution and authority” of the
Japanese Emperor.  The point I wish to emphasize here is that
Mori believes it is by becoming united as one legitimate imperial
nation that Japan can “stand on equal footing with other imperial
nations.”  It is clear that for Mori, the Japanese Empire was
embodied in a nation with the emperor as a cultural matrix.
Having got this point made, we are now able to see what Mori
means by “securing the desired end” in his language reform.
Before we move on to the next section, I would like to extend our
observation into a little more comprehensive theory that better
illustrates the point that we have been considering.  As has been
suggested, “a new language” is referred to in Mori’s letter as a sim-
plified English–a “new English.”  But at the same time Mori also
sets out to convert the spoken language of Japan into a whole new
written language–a “new Japanese”–by adopting a phonetic or
Roman letters for the purpose of creating the Imperial Japanese
language–the “new language for the Japanese Empire.”  All this
can be summarized in the following formula: (1) a new Japanese +
(2) a new English = (3) the new language for the Japanese Empire
[(1) and (2) are a means; (3) is an end].
What is shown here is that there are three different new lan-
guages involved in his language reform plan.  A significant point
to emphasize is the process of (1) and (2) that is exactly where
eclecticism comes into play; (2) [a new English] can be regarded as
a means of strengthening (1) [a new Japanese] in terms of enrich-
ing its vocabulary.  In other words, a simplified English is to be
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introduced into Japan as a new language that can be defined as a
means to an end; in this sense, (1) [a new Japanese] constitutes
another means.  And the end (what Mori calls the “desired end”) is
(3) [the new language for the Japanese Empire].  This triple formu-
la indicates that the meaning of what Mori implies by “a new lan-
guage” can be interpreted as being threefold.  In Mori’s letter,
however, only (2) [a simplified English as a means] is discussed
and called “a new language.”  Of course, (1) [a romanized Japa-
nese] is also mentioned but not expressed as a new language that
comes with (2).  Summing up, since (3) [Mori’s desired end = his
linguistic strategy] is not explicitly mentioned in the letter, (1) and
(2) [means] are liable to be misinterpreted by many scholars as an
end in it self or Mori’s ultimate goal.
Another important aspect of Mori’s polysemous words “a new
language” is that, as we shall see later, it is closely intertwined with
his political thought that is best characterized as what I call “tran-
scendental imperialism.”  This notion offers the key to an under-
standing of what motivated Mori to revamp the language of Japan.
By transcendental imperialism I mean that when faced with the
Empires of the East and the West (China and the Britain/the U.S.),
Mori tried to introduce the knowledge and technology of Western
civilization into Japan in order for the new Japanese not only to
catch up and stand on an equal footing with Westerners but even-
tually to “beat them at their own game.”  From this perspective, it
could be argued that Mori sees the images of a new language as
follows: (1) a new Japanese (a romanized spoken language of
Japan) would make it possible for the Japanese people to break
away from the “fetters” of the old civilization’s legacy (= compli-
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cated Chinese hieroglyphics).  (2) a new English (simplified
English) would allow the Japanese to compensate for lack of
vocabulary in a new Japanese.  (3) the new language for the
Japanese Empire would enable Japan to educate the people with
the best possible language in the world.
We can attribute these images of a new language to the geo-
culural and political idea of datsua nyuou (“Leave Asia, Enter
Europe [the West]) in which Yukichi Fukuzawa encapsulated the
then popular political thought in Japan (Fukuzawa uses the
umbrella word “Asia” to mean the “uncivilized” countries in the
East, which he specifically refered to as China and its vassal state,
Korea).  Similarly, Mori’s image of Asia that represents the repre-
sentative civilization in East Asia was China, and in Europe Britain
and its off-shoot America.  Mori’s political thought was more
ambitious than Fukuzawa’s idea of datsua nyuou.  He carried the
idea one step further, which is best described as datsua nyuou
chouou (Leave Asia, Enter and Transcend Europe [the West]); his
strategy is not simply to copy a higher civilization but even to rise
above it.  Mori wanted Japan to be modeled on countries that
enjoyed the highest civilization in the world, for he believed that
Japan would never be the best if she started aiming lower from the
beginning.  Therein lies the secret of Mori’s idea for a new lan-
guage in Japan.  The following is a summary of the above reifica-
tion of his explicit and implicit images, means, and purposes of
realizing a new language (Table 1).
It should be concluded, from what has been observed so far,
that Mori’s discourse on language reform should be regarded as a
plan for the creation of the imperial Japanese language, not as
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what is commonly known as a “wild view on the adoption of
English and the abolition of Japanese.”  In the next section, we
shall continue to examine how Mori would pursue the problem of
the language of Japan as he became more cognizant of the difficul-
ties in implementing the proposed reform, and what caused his
discourse to be wrongly construed as an “irrational statement.”
Taking into consideration these observations, it seems more
reasonable to assume that what Mori was trying to achieve was not
to introduce the simplified English as an end itself, but to use it as
a means of translating into reality his idea for the new imperial lan-
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Images Tactics (Means) Strategy (Ends)
(1) a new Japanese The adoption of





(2) a new English The adoption of a
simplified English





(3) the new language
for the Japanese
Empire
All of the above Transcend the im-
perial Others
Table 1.  reification of Mori’s hidden agenda
guage of the Japanese Empire.
2.  The semantics of “the language of Japan” and “its disuse”
As we saw earlier, the full import of Mori’s letter to Whitney is
understood as being implicitly expressed in his linguistic strategy
to construct a basis for the new imperial language in Japan.  This
drives us to the question whether he had an alternative option if
his plan turned out to be impossible to carry out; his failure to
adopt Roman letters and a simplified English in Japan meant
either choosing another option of trying the second best European
language along the same line as the original plan, or accepting
“English as it is written” with the Chinese hieroglyphics intact in
the language of Japan.  It can arguably be imagined that Mori was
well aware that the only choice left in dealing with the problem
would be “translation”—the conventional means of incorporating
the best elements of foreign languages into Japan.
Nevertheless, at the time of asking Whitney for advice, Mori
viewed the translation method as inadequate in terms of his
“desired end”; with the traditional approach the new Japan would
not be able to unify the spoken and written language; nor would it
be possible to transcend China and Europe by creating the best
language in the world.  Added to this, because of his belief in
socio-linguistic revolution, he feared that choosing the option cer-
tainly involved putting the fate of Japanese in with that of Chinese
which is, to use Mori’s own term, “in the steady progress of extinc-
tion.”  It is for this reason that Mori was trying hard to find ways to
preserve Japanese in an unconventional way.  For him it is about a
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“requisite of the maintenance of national independence in the
international community.”
Yet it was not long before Mori had to admit at the end of the
introduction to Education in Japan, that his language reform plan
reached an impasse when the romanization of the language of
Japan was blocked by the intractable problem of Chinese hiero-
glyphics.  And due to his “suggestive” expressions in the state-
ment, this confession of his abandonment of the idea has long
been used by many scholars as a major premise on which they
argue that Mori “recklessly” decided to “abandon” the Japanese
language by adopting English instead as the national language.
But this leaves room for further investigation.  In order to illumi-
nate how Mori was going to engage with the language problem in
Japan, we need to re-examine the original text more closely.
In discussing the introduction of English into Japan, Mori
begins to talk about the language situation in Japan by giving a
brief account of the difference in the style of expression between
the spoken and the written language of Japan.  And he goes on to
suggest that it is extremely difficult to do away with complex
Chinese hieroglyphics even by employing a phonetic alphabet.
The reason is:
The words familiar through the organ of the eye are so
many, that to change them into those of the ear would
cause too great an inconvenience, and be quite impractica-
ble.  Without the aid of the Chinese, our language has
never been taught or used for any purpose of communica-
tion.  This shows its poverty. (SMAZ, Vol. 5: 185–186)
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Here he realizes the technical difficulties in removing Chinese
characters.  Since most Chinese characters have visual meanings
resulting in a number of homonyms, Mori finds it “impractical,” if
not impossible, to implement the script reform in Japan.  In his let-
ter to Whiney, however, he had stated that “the written language
of Japan now in use has little or no relation to the spoken lan-
guage,” thereby implying that his language reform should and could
separate Chinese (characters) from the Japanese vernacular.  This
suggests that he had not yet been cognizant of the intractability of
sound and letters mostly dictated by Chinese that defines the
integrity of the language of Japan.  In other words, it is by attempt-
ing to carry out such drastic language reforms that Mori came to
grapple with the hard fact that Japanese had long being governed
by Chinese in Japan.  Over the last few hundred years, the pre-
dominance of Chinese over Japanese had already been discussed
by many scholars of language.  It is said to be first taken up in Toga
(a Japanese etymological dictionary published in 1717) by Arai
Hakuseki (1657–1725), a distinguished scholar of Western Learning
in the mid-Edo period.  Arai writes:
Since time immemorial our language ( Japanese) had been
predominant in our country with foreign languages being
only of secondary importance.  However, as the Chinese
characters began to prevail against our language, there was
virtually nothing that could escape from their domination.
As a result, the newcomer ended up becoming the prede-
cessor’s master; the one-time chief turned into the servant
of the foreign agent. (Cited in Irie Takanori 1990: 297)
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It is clear that Mori shared Arai’s view of Chinese as ruling the
written language of Japan when he said that “Without the aid of
the Chinese, our language has never been taught or used for any
purpose of communication.”  This is why Mori was forced to
reconsider his original plan; cancellation of the first stage of the
proposed reform—romanization of the spoken language of
Japan—automatically meant withdrawing from the introduction of
a simplified English in the second phase (It would not be practical
politics without a common notational system (a phonetic alphabet)
that facilitates the integration of Japanese and English).  It is highly
likely that this unanticipated setback made Mori realize why
Whitney disapproved of a simplified English as a “new English.”
Interestingly enough, Whitney refused to give his approval to
Mori’s idea for exactly the same reason that Mori decided to pre-
serve the spoken language of Japan by all means: the conservative
nature of language.  Mori attempted to devise a plan for maintain-
ing the Japanese vernacular by means of an alphabet but did not
succeed in implementing the language reform owing to the funda-
mental character of the language that repels artificial change in the
orthography.  By the same token, Whitney sees Mori’s idea of sim-
plifying English as too radical and reckless in light of historical and
cultural binding that comes into play when a language is forced to
change.  Furthermore, dealing with the conservative nature of lan-
guage, Mori arrived at the conclusion that the proposed introduc-
tion of a phonetic alphabet in Japan would “cause too great an
inconvenience and be quite impracticable.”  Likewise, regarding
the possible outcome of the change in the essential structure of
English, Whitney reached a similar conclusion.  Many scholars
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argue that Mori got the message from Whitney’s negative response
to his idea and was “dissuaded from carrying out his wild plan.”
Yet, as observed already, that was not really the case.  It should be
emphasized that Mori and Whitney both had their own reasons
for making their cases and that they ended up arriving at the con-
clusions on their own.  It is reasonable to suppose, then, that Mori,
after deliberating on his proposal on its own merits, decided that it
was not viable.
At the same time this means that when Mori wrote to Whitney
he had not thought it over well enough to see how it would turn
out in reality.  All this explains why Mori did not take into consid-
eration in the letter both the prospects of the conventional
Chinese-based written language of Japan.  Consequently, it was
only a matter of time before he had to accept the fact that the spo-
ken language of Japan would be hard to become independent of
the written language.  With regard to the inseparability of Japanese
phonological system from Chinese hieroglyphic space, Mori sums
it up by saying “this shows its (= Japanese) poverty.”  Moreover,
now that failure in this respect dashed his hope of enriching the
Japanese vocabulary with the simplified new English, he called the
language of Japan a “meager” and “weak and uncertain medium of
communication.  Nevertheless it would be fallacious to say that
Mori was ready to “abandon” the language of Japan simply
because he felt at the end of his tether concerning his original
scheme.  In order to develop a better understanding of Mori’s lin-
guistic strategy, it is essential to see that his seemingly pessimistic
statements pertaining to the future of the Japanese language are no
more than an objective (and tentative) assessment of the possibility
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of linguistic independence, which is only based on a hypothetical
assumption.
Then, what leads most scholars to believe that Mori was deter-
mined to abolish Japanese in favor of English?  The cause of the
misinterpretation lies in the following statement made by Mori in
the preface to Education in Japan, where he refers to the language
problem and makes a “tentative” judgment on the then linguistic
situation.
The laws of state can never be preserved in the language of
Japan.  All reasons suggest its disuse. (SMAZ, Vol. 5: 186)
The established theory of “Mori’s abolition of Japanese and intro-
duction of English in Japan” comes from the ambiguous interpre-
tations of the key phrases in the above quotation: “language of
Japan,” “suggest,” and “its disuse.”  Do these phrases really mean
Mori’s determination to abrogate Japanese?  According to the gen-
erally accepted theory, “the language of Japan” refers to the so
called the native language.  As for the vague and ill-defined
expression, Lee argues that the word is used so ambiguously that it
is not to be equated with “Japanese” without reservation; she sees
it rather as a concept of “Japanese and Chinese in a chaotic state.”
Following Hall’s (1973) interpretation of the term, however, Lee
(1996) also cautiously defines the word Japanese as Japan’s indige-
nous vernacular, an entity separated from Chinese elements.  Does
this equivocal interpretation do justice to Mori’s understanding of
the language of Japan?  A closer examination of the usage of the
word in its particular context shows that it fails to delineate the
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denotation in the strict sense.  For Mori clearly uses the term in
question to mean “Japanese” as opposed to “Chinese,” represent-
ing the homey language in Japan as Japanese when it is contrasted
with Chinese as the language of China.  Furthermore, the word
“Japanese” signifies the spoken language of Japan, while “Chinese”
means the written language of Japan.  Thus, the language of Japan
is Japanese or the spoken language of Japan.  This specific usage
can be found in both Mori’s letter to Whitney and the preface to
Education in Japan.  If we look at it from the standpoint of datsua
(de-Sinicization), which was the spirit of the times in the late nine-
teenth century, we can develop a better understanding of what
Mori means by “our (own) language.”  In the aforementioned pref-
ace, Mori speaks of the inadequacy of the language of Japan as he
calls it “our meager language (= Japanese)” and “a weak and
uncertain medium of communication.”  Here we must pay atten-
tion to the word “our” because it holds the key to Mori’s language
attitude to Chinese.  For Mori, the concept of Japanese is not so
ambiguous as Lee suggests it is.  On the contrary, Mori even sees
the origins of the two languages as deriving from different cultures.
He made an attempt to “rediscover” the Japanese language which
had long been overshadowed by Chinese in Japan.  It is indeed
precisely because of the rise of nationalism in early Meiji Japan
that influenced people to redefine their national identity.
As Pennycook (1998: 173) observes, what we find here is the
“processes of dichotomizing between ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ and essen-
tializing the resultant Other (the ‘Chinese’).”  This construction of
Self and Other helped to “produce images not only of Us and
Them” but also of “Our language and culture and Theirs”
― 166―
(Pennycook 1998: 30).  It is important, therefore, to observe that
from this new perspective Mori considers Japanese in contraposi-
tion to Chinese: he looks upon Japanese (= the spoken language of
Japan) as Our language, while he sees Chinese (= the written lan-
guage of Japan) as Their language.  What Mori attempted to do is
the reversal of the ethno-cultural politics of Chinese and Japanese
with the latter under the domination of the former in Japan.
Lee argues that “Mori did not have a clear-cut image of Japa-
nese.  For him, it was an obscure entity” (1996: 12).  Following
Hall’s (1973) comment on the usage of the key words (“Japanese”
and “Chinese”), Lee only ends up endorsing the view that states
the obvious and thus fails to get to the heart of Mori’s language
attitude; her assumption prevents her from understanding his
ethno-cultural and political thought that dictated the usage of his
words.  One must not confuse the fact that historically the lan-
guage of Japan had been a mixture of Japanese and Chinese with
the fact that from a theoretical if not practical perspective Mori
makes conscious efforts to dissociate Japanese from Chinese.
Apparently he tried to distinguish between Our Language and
Theirs instead of obfuscating them.
The primary purpose of the romanization of the spoken lan-
guage of Japan was to turn the indigenous Japanese language into
a new written national language which would be free from the
Chinese characters.In order to understand the logic behind Mori’s
language reform, we need to recognize the patent fact that like
many other samurai intellectuals, he equated the indigenous lan-
guage with the spoken language of Japan.  Indeed, a careful analy-
sis of the text of Mori’s letter to Whitney and his other English dis-
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courses demonstrates convincingly that for Mori, the “spoken lan-
guage of Japan” refers to the “Japanese language” or “our own lan-
guage,” as opposed to the Chinese language (characters) or the
written language of Japan.  Let us look at the following examples:
a) The spoken language of Japan being inadequate to the grow-
ing necessities of the people of that Empire, and too poor
to be made, by a phonetic alphabet, sufficiently useful as
a written language. (SMAZ, Vol. 2: 51: my emphasis)
b) It having been found that the Japanese language is
insufficient even for the wants of the Japanese them-
selves, the demand for the new language is irresistibly
imperative. (ibid.: 52; my emphasis)
c) All the schools of the Empire have had, for many cen-
turies, have been Chinese; and, strange to state, we have
had no schools nor books, in our own language for educa-
tional purposes.  These Chinese schools, being now regard-
ed not only as useless, but as a great drawback to our
progress, are in the steady progress of extinction.
Schools for the Japanese language are found to be greatly
needed.
(ibid.; my emphasis)
Given that the above passages (a) and (b) appear in the same con-
text of the same paragraph in Mori’s letter to Whitney, it may be
safely inferred that the phrases “the spoken language of Japan”
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and “the Japanese language” are being used interchangeably.  This
is also confirmed by the sentence (c) following the paragraph that
refers to the Japanese language as opposed to the Chinese lan-
guage.  As already quoted and discussed, obviously Mori viewed
the spoken language of Japan as different in origin from the writ-
ten.  For the sake of clarification, let us once again take a closer
look at the pertinent evidence in succession below.
d) It may be well to add, in this connection, that the written
language now in use in Japan, has little or no relation to
the spoken language, but mainly hieroglyphic—a deranged
Chinese, blended in Japanese, all the letters of which are
themselves of Chinese origin. (ibid.; my emphasis)
e) An allusion to the subject of the Japanese language bears a
most direct relation to the contents of this book.  In the
style of expression, the spoken language of Japan differs
considerably from the written, though in their structure
they are both mainly the same….  The style of the written
language is like the Chinese … and all of them are of
Chinese origin. (SMAZ, Vol. 5: 185; emphasis added)
Taken together, we can see that Mori regarded the spoken lan-
guage of Japan as symbolizing the indigenous Japanese language,
while looking upon the written language of Japan as governed by
the foreign (Chinese) language.  Thus Mori calls the spoken lan-
guage of Japan (the Japanese language) “our own language” (as
against “their language”).  Based on this interpretation, it becomes
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easier to clarify what Mori implied by the following statement:
f) Without the aid of Chinese, our language has never been
taught or used for any purpose of communication.  This
shows its poverty. (ibid.: 186; my emphasis)
As has been noted, it is obvious that the “spoken language of
Japan” (the indigenous Japanese language) is referred to as “our
language” here in contrast to the Chinese characters that predomi-
nantly constituted the written.  Therefore it is reasonable to sup-
pose that “its poverty” implies the inadequacy of the spoken lan-
guage of Japan (the indigenous Japanese language), not the other
entity—the Chinese-governed written language.  Again, this can
be further corroborated by the foregoing sentence (a) that says that
“the spoken language of Japan being inadequate to the growing
necessities of the people of that Empire, and too poor to be made,
by a phonetic alphabet, sufficiently useful as a written language.”
The same interpretation applies to the passage below.
g) Under the circumstances, our meager language, which can
never be of any use outside of our islands, is doomed to
yield to the domination of the English language.  
(ibid.; my emphasis)
It is clear by now that as in the case of (c) and (f) “our meager lan-
guage” in contrast to their declining language (Chinese) means
none other than the indigenous spoken language of Japan.  The
same can also be said of the following passage:
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h) Our intelligent race, eager in the pursuit of knowledge,
cannot depend upon a weak and uncertain medium of com-
munication in its endeavor to grasp the principal truths
from the precious treasury of Western science and art
and religion.  The laws of state can never be preserved
in the language of Japan.  All reasons suggest its disuse.
(ibid.; my emphasis)
Here Mori uses the phrase “a weak and uncertain mediums of
communication” to mean “our meager language.”  As evidenced
in the passages quoted above, Mori used the “language of Japan”
in contrast with Chinese characters that were perceived as the
“language of China.”  In short, for Mori, “our own language,” and
the “Japanese language” were a parallel expression of “the (spo-
ken) language of Japan.”  And there is further evidence to suggest
that several years before Mori’s discourse on language reform was
made in 1872–73, he had already perceived the native language as
a different entity from the Chinese language.  In his diary that con-
tained a short account of his travel to Russia (1866), Mori touched
upon the potential for the native language of Japan made by quot-
ing a conversation he had with Russians who were fluent in
Japanese.
So I asked them this question “What do you think about
wago (the indigenous Japanese language)?  It seems to me
that foreigners may find it very difficult to master wago
where there are no dictionaries or reference books.”  Then
they replied with one voice, “Not necessarily so.  If the text
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was ever written all in wago it would be much easier for us
to learn.  Not only that.  Wago is a very elegant language.
To our regret, however, it is always being used with kango
(the Chinese characters), which we think makes the lan-
guage system more complex than it has to be.  These days,
things are getting worse when the people overuse kango
instead of wago, which really troubles us foreigners.”
(SMAZ, Vol. 3: 28)
All this goes to show that Mori recognized wago as a different enti-
ty within the kango-dominated language system in Japan.  Mori
called the former “Our ( Japanese) language” as against the latter
“Their (Chinese) language.”  Thus, Mori’s language recognition, as
I suggested above, is manifest in his Us/Them binary thinking
which frequently appeared in his English discourses in exactly the
same fashion.
Turning to another keyword “suggest” in his statement in ques-
tion, most scholars have misconstrued what he meant by the word
“suggest” as making a proposal, not as making a forecast.  Accord-
ing to Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary (1996), the meaning
of the verb “to suggest” can vary depending on the subject of the
sentence.  If it takes a person as its subject, then, the verb means
“to put sth/sb forward as an idea or a candidate to be considered
or “to propose sth/sb.”  And if an inanimate subject is used instead
of a person, the verb is taken to mean “to put an idea, etc into sb’s
mind.”  Clearly Mori meant the latter when he used the word,
since the verb in the sentence in question takes “all reasons” as its
subject.  It follows from this that he was making a forecast, not a
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proposal.  The next logical question we have to ask, then, is what
was he making a forecast about?
Which leads us to the other controversial term “disuse” that
Mori used in closing his statement regarding the linguistic situation
in Japan.  As the earlier discussion made clear, what Mori wanted
to abolish was Chinese characters governing the written language
of Japan, not along with the Japanese vernacular.  So Swale (2000:
64–65) is wrong when he says that “Perhaps one of the most radi-
cal elements among Mori’s views on education at the time was his
kokugo haishiron, the proposal that the Japanese language ought to
be replaced by English as the main official medium of communi-
cation.  Mori was later to regret his rather bold rejection of the
Chinese literary legacy and within a fairly short time completely
abandoned the idea.”  On the contrary, Chino Tomoko (1992) is
right in pointing out that the major reason why Mori’s discourse
on language reform in Japan has been liable to cause misunder-
standing has a great deal to do with the ambiguous usage of the
term “disuse” in his statement.  The import of this word can
change depending on whether it is used as a noun or a verb.  As
Chino argues, while it is possible to interpret it, if employed as a
verb, to mean “to abolish,” the word “disuse” in his sentence is
used as a noun meaning the “a situation in which sth is no longer
being used” (Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary 2005).  Con-
sequently, what Mori was saying was that he was making a forecast
about the linguistic situation in Japan in which the language of
Japan (= Japanese as against Chinese) would cease to be used; he
was making no proposal whatsoever to abolish the language of
Japan altogether.
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Furthermore, in interpreting accurately the meaning of the sen-
tence in question, we should not overlook a group of preceding
sentences that qualify the expression (“suggest its disuse”).  The
important point to note is that those qualifying statements start
with the sentence with the clause of condition as follows:
Under the circumstances, our meager language … is doomed to
yield to the domination of the English language….  Our
intelligence race … cannot depend upon a weak and uncertain
medium of communication….  The laws of state can never be
preserved in the language of Japan.  All reasons suggest its
disuse.  (SMAZ, Vol. 5: 186: my emphasis)
A careful reading of the context suggests that the phrase “under
the circumstances” modifies all the main verbs that follow: “is
doomed to yeild,” “cannot depend upon,” and “can never be pre-
served.”  Mori, then, groups them together as reasons for forecast-
ing the future of the language of Japan.  It is important to consider
that all this seemingly pessimistic view of the linguistic situation in
Japan was mentioned in the introduction to Education in Japan,
which was published with the intention of seeking advice from
“many leading minds of the United States” on the critical issues
including language and religion in the Japanese Empire.  As Mori
writes in Education in Japan:
One of the difficult problems for our solution is the
restraint of our youths, so that their little knowledge will
not prove a danger, but will become, in its maturity, a pow-
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erful weapon of defense, and a beneficent influence in the
grand advance of our nation.  Wise advice from abroad on this
vital question is called for.  Education has become imperative.
Schools are happily being established on an extensive scale
throughout the empire….  The many radical changes that
are and have been in operation in Japan have produced a
transition period, for which allowance, sympathy, and assistance
are solicited. (ibid.: 182–183; emphasis added)
In light of what Mori was meaning to accomplish with the publica-
tion of Education in Japan in the U.S., we have every reason to
believe that Mori was afraid that “under the circumstances” in
which there is a paucity of knowledge coming from the advanced
language of Western civilization, the “absolute necessity of master-
ing the English language is thus forced upon us” (SMAZ, Vol. 5:
186).  But again, we should be careful not to jump to the conclu-
sion that by that he intended to abolish the language of Japan in
favor of English.
In spite of the ambiguity in the statement, we need to read
carefully his hidden agenda behind this discourse.  As we have
seen, what he was aiming at was creating a new imperial language
that would catch up with, stand on an equal footing with, and sur-
pass the significant Others in the contest for superiority between
the East and the West.  A strategic diplomat, Mori was negotiating
in the game of cultural diplomacy for “wise advice,” soliciting
“allowance, sympathy, and assistance” from abroad in order to
achieve what he thought was “the desired end” in his educational
reform in Japan.
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These observations lead to the conclusion that in his long-
range “forecasts” Mori understood “the language of Japan” as the
spoken Japanese carrying the potential for its “disuse” in Japan
“under the circumstances” while at the same time showing poten-
tial for its development into a new imperial language with the
appropriate solutions implemented at the right time.  Having
made this distinction, we may further examine in the following
section how Mori’s new national linguistic awareness was to be
misunderstood, distorted, and stigmatized as unpatriotic and reck-
less.
3.  Intertextual misinterpretation and fraternal perpetuation
Whitney’s scholarly response to Mori’s proposal
As discussed earlier, the creation of the Imperial Japanese lan-
guage was the ultimate goal of Mori’s language reform plan.  To
this end, he had come up with a two-stage project: the adoption of
an European phonetic (= the romanization of the spoken language
of Japan) and the adoption of a simplified English.  As time
passed, however, his discourse came to be interpreted to mean the
introduction of English and the abolition of Japanese; the second
stage is highlighted with the first dropped.  And it can be argued
that the beginning of this misinterpretation can be traced back to
the Whitney’s reply to Mori’s inquiry.  We can see that it all began
because of Whitney’s interpretation which was to be later referred
to by many as the most authoritative and legitimate source of
information regarding the import of Mori’s proposals disclosed in
his personal letter to Whitney.  Although Whitney was careful
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enough not to misread Mori’s intent, his interpretation and
rhetoric were to trigger a public outcry against Mori’s “foolhardy
scheme” in Japan.
After brief introductory remarks in his reply, Whitney begins
his argument with the following hypothetical inference:
Were the Japanese merely seeking a best language to put in place of
their own, they would want to look carefully through the
world, ancient as well as modern, and choose, after a
mature weighing of the merits of many dialects.  The histo-
ry of languages, also, shows this consideration to be of
minor consequence.  There have been many instances in
the world of a people’s abandoning its ancestral speech and
adopting another; but so far as I know, it has always been
under the influence of the superiority in culture of the
speakers of the other language—usually, indeed, aided also
by political supremacy or social preponderance.  The peo-
ple in question has, as it were, by adoption of another lan-
guage, joined itself on to another community, linking its
cultural progress with that of the latter.  So I imagine it
would be with the Japanese….  
(SMAZ, Vol. 5: 335; my emphasis)
The question we must ask here is why Whitney had to use the sub-
junctive mood in responding to Mori’s proposal.  The major rea-
son is that as shown in the preceding sections, Mori did not clarify
his “desired end” as he tried to justify introducing simplified
English as “a means to an end.”  As a consequence, Whitney was
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working on the assumption that Mori intends to “abandon the
ancestral speech” and instead adopt simplified English as the new
language.  The important point to note is that Whitney understood
what Mori intended by the word “adoption” to mean “put a for-
eign language in place of their own” or “abandon its ancestral
speech and adopt another.”  Evidence for this can be found in the
repetition of the synonym “substitution” that he uses to refer to his
major premise (hypothetical assumption) throughout the letter
(ibid.: 334–343).  Whitney apparently misinterpreted Mori’s idea
when he talked about “the substitution that you propose”; while
Mori did propose “introducing” or “adopting” an European lan-
guage in his letter to Whitney, he never said a word to the effect
that Japanese vernacular should be “abandoned.”  On the con-
trary, he even suggested that Japanese language schools and teach-
ers were greatly needed.
Nevertheless, while Whitney failed to figure out Mori’s true
intention with good reason, Mori himself employed each of the
two misleading terms (“abandon” and “substitute”) once in the let-
ter.  Here is the passage where the word “abandon” appears:
In spelling, I propose merely to complete what all English
and American lexicographers, from Dr. Samuel Johnson,
down to the authors of the changes, contained in the latest
editions of Walker’s, Webster’s and Worcester’s Diction-
aries, all commenced, but timidly abandoned.  
(SMAZ, Vol. 2: 54; emphasis added)
In this context, it is clear that “abandon” means to “give up,”
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which has nothing to do with the abolition of “the ancestral
speech.”  And the following is the sentence in which the word
“substitute” appears:
I propose, for example, to substitute Seed for saw and
seen…. (ibid.; my emphasis)
This context, too, is so unambiguous that it admits of no other
interpretation.  Despite the specified usage of those two words,
however, Whitney employs them outside the contextual domains,
thus creating a completely different site where misinterpretation is
inevitable (or possible).  This is obviously a question of semantics;
within any text there is always a possibility of a word generating a
number of connotations and polysemic images which give rise to
“intertextuality”52 leading to a misunderstanding (see Tsuchida et
al. 1998: 171).  The point I wish to emphasize is that Whitney’s
frame of mind operates within this hypothetical setting of his own
device.  And it is this site that provides a conceptual basis for the
beginning of misinterpretation of Mori’s idea for language reform.
The notion of intertextuality helps us to better understand how
Whitney’s interpretation took place.  At the time when Whitney
first read the letter from Mori, he might have already heard about
Mori’s idea from Joseph Henry in advance53; then he must have
had the preconceived idea that Mori had a radical language
reform in mind.  It is reasonable to assume that after examining
the project Mori had in contemplation Whitney automatically
interpreted the operative words in the “pre-arranged” semantic
field wherein intertextuality automatically led him to associate
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Mori’s proposal for “the adoption of the English language in
Japan” with the “abolition of the Japanese language”; this infer-
ence naturally occurred because of the semantic combination of
Whitney’s preconception and the equivocality which the above-
mentioned “abandon” and “substitute” induce.
Since the logical connection between the romanization of the
spoken language of Japan and the introduction of simplified
English was not made clear, Whitney had no other choice but to
make a reasonable inference regarding Mori’s true intention by
considering all the possibilities that he could think of.  Conse-
quently, he candidly gives Mori some advice on language policy in
Japan.  What is significant in our observation is that his whole
argument is predicated on the assumption that Mori is willing to
substitute English for Japanese; all the other specific points are
being made on this hypothesis which he carefully builds up using a
conditional sentence at the beginning.  These specifics can be sum-
marized as follows:
1) His objection to the idea for a simplified English
2) His approval of the romanization of Japanese
3) The primary importance of the vernacular in Japan
4) The secondary role of English as the classical language
So far as his arguments are concerned, Whitney seems to
understand what Mori was aiming at.  And yet there is no mention
in his text of the possibility of “eclectically” integrating simplified
English and romanized spoken language of Japan into a new, sin-
gle entity.  This indicates that Whitney, after all, was not able to
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fathom out the motives behind his proposal.  The reason why even
the leading light in linguistics in America could only give a plausi-
ble conjecture on what Mori was really trying to do is not merely
because his idea was way ahead of his time,54 but also because the
nature of his language strategy was best characterized by its
overdetermined triple aspects of his geo-political and cultural
thought datsua nyuou chouou (“Leave Asia, Enter and Trancsend
Europe [the West]).
Furthermore, Mori’s discourse can also be viewed as challeng-
ing English hegemony in the world.  As Hall points out, Mori
devoted two-thirds space in his letter to the question of simplified
English (SMAZ, Supplementary Vol. 2; 216).  Indeed, it appears at
first sight that his intention was not so much to ask for advice on
language reform in Japan but rather to mildly criticize Western
scholars of English for failing to deal with the reform of English
successfully.  So it is only natural that Whitney should find it
“offensive” when Mori declared resolutely that he would “com-
plete what all English and American Lexicographers commenced,
but timidly abandoned.”  Not surprisingly, in his reply to Mori,
Whitney objected in principle to the reform of English oprthogra-
phy, though he expressed his approval of the introduction of the
Roman alphabet in Japan.
After discussing (1) and (2), Whitney goes on to (3) and (4)
commenting that it is essential that the vernacular should be
employed as the first language for education in Japan.  Interest-
ingly, Mori and Whitney coincide in opinion on maintaining the
native speech.  Just as Mori states that there is a desperate need for
“schools for the Japanese language,” so Whitney argues for the
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“ennobling and enriching of the native speech.”  Mori, as we saw
in the previous section, was contemplating introducing the English
language (in simplified form) into Japan essentially because he
knew it was most urgent that a new vocabulary of Western civiliza-
tion be added to the Japanese language through the common sym-
bols (= the Roman alphabet).  Nevertheless, Whitney does not
seem to notice the common ground between them; as a result,
Whitney wound up advising Mori on what he had been already
well aware of.  We can recognize from this that Whitney came to
the “right” conclusion on the “wrong” assumption that Mori advo-
cated abolishing Japanese in favor of English.
A more important point is the implications and ramifications of
the publication of Whitney’s letter in Education in Japan (1873),
which was supervised by Mori himself, served to complicate mat-
ters futher.  In the preface to the book Mori used the controversial
term “disuse” with respect to the future of the language of Japan.
Taken together, the word was not employed in his letter to
Whitney.  It is in this newly-emerged semantic field that once
again triggered “intertextual effects,” thereby obscuring and con-
fusing Mori’s original intention.  While Whitney’s interpretation
has contributed enormously to the established theory about Mori’s
radical language reform, it may be too much to say that Whitney is
the first to label him as an irrational abolitionist of the national lan-
guage in Japan.  For Whitney’s letter is couched in scholarly yet
sincere terms.  Be that as it may, it will be useful to keep in mind
that his (mis)understanding of Mori’s language reform was to be
treated by later Japanese scholars as an authoritative basis for their
arguments, which only serve to perpetuate the commonly-held
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view of Mori’s enterprise as abrogating the native language.
Something else to be born in mind here is that by the time
Whitney’s letter was published in 1873, Mori’s original plan to cre-
ate a new language in an eclectic matter had already broken down
for technical reasons.  Most importantly, Mori’s letter to Whitney
(written in 1872) was not printed together with Whitney’s in
Education in Japan.  A set of the letters exchanged between Mori
and Whitney was not made available to the general public; it
turned out that only Whitney’s reply became partially highlighted
with Mori’s letter of inquiry out of sight in the book.
Baba’s brotherly response to Mori’s proposal
Although it was Mori’s own choice, he did not seem to be able to
anticipate that Whitney’s “inducements” in the letter would arouse
a tidal wave of protests against him.  Among the strong antagonists
was Baba Tatsui (1850–1888), a fellow countryman in London,
who was to misinterpret and condemn Mori’s idea as irrational
and absurd in his An Elementary Grammar of the Japanese Language,
with Easy Progressive Exercises. It is highly probable that Baba had a
chance to read Education in Japan soon after it was published in
New York in 1873, and he came to grips with what Mori appeared
to have in mind concerning Japan’s language policy through
Whitney’s letter and Mori’s controversial statement about the “dis-
use” of the national language.  Outraged by Mori’s purported pro-
posal for the adoption of English and the abolition of Japanese,
Baba, as a rebuttal, wrote in English the book entitled An Elementary
Grammar of the Japanese Language, and published it in London in
autumn of 1873.  In the preface to this grammar book (henceforth
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referred to as EGJL), he tried to refute Mori on five counts.
(1) The purpose of this Japanese grammar book
(2) A balanced perspective on the Japanese language:
its structure and vocabulary
(3) The efficiency of foreign language learning
(4) The polarization of the society: English divide
(5) The importance of the vernacular as an educational lan-
guage
In order to demonstrate (5), Baba begins with (1) and gets down
into specifics [(2)(3)(4)].  What I’m interested in showing here is
how he reproduces and perpetuates Whitney’s interpretation in his
argument.  Let us now consider Baba’s line of reasoning in detail.
First of all, we will focus our attention on the beginning of
EGJL which reads:
We have two objects in publishing this book-the first, to
give a general idea of the Japanese language as it is spoken;
and the second, to protest against a prevalent opinion
entertained by many of our countrymen, as well as foreign-
ers who take some interest in our country, and to show the
reasons why we do so.  It is affirmed that our language is so
imperfect that we cannot establish a regular and systematical
course of education by means of it ; and that the best way is to
exterminate the Japanese language altogether, and to substitute the
English language for it. (SMAZ, Vol. 2: 58; my emphasis)
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Baba says that he wrote the book because he wanted to prove by
analyzing the structural and lexical aspects of the spoken language
of Japan that it is possible to educate the Japanese people by
means of the vernacular, thus bringing forward a counterargument
to Mori’s purported proposal for the introduction of English in
Japan.  Thus he denounces the proposal as an ill-advised attempt
to “exterminate the Japanese language altogether” and “substitute
the English language for it.”  What we should notice here is that he
uses rather strong verbs such as “exterminate” and “substitute” to
express his understanding of the “prevalent opinion” that he
protests against.  In his later arguments Baba paraphrases the word
“exterminate” by using such synonyms as “supplant,” “give up,”
and “discard”—these words Mori never employed in his letter.  In
this connection, we may recall here that Whitney understood what
is meant in Mori’s letter by “introduction” and “adoption” to mean
“abandon,” “substitute” or “put in place of one’s own.”  And
Baba’s statement is being couched in much stronger (and more
accusatory) terms than Whitney’s.  Furthermore, the word “substi-
tute,” as in the case of Whitney’s letter, is repeatedly used in his
text.
All this suggests that despite the fact that it was not “our lan-
guage” ( Japanese/the spoken language of Japan) but “Chinese”
(the written language of Japan) that Mori was trying to abrogate,
Baba did not have sufficiet information to puzzle out what Mori’s
“desired end” was really about.  The following remark attests to
his misinterpretation:
Mr. Mori says, “All reasons suggest its disuse,” referring to
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our language.  We are very sorry to say that he does not
enumerate all the reasons which suggest the disuse of the
Japanese, which perhaps would have enlightened our
minds. (ibid.: 63)
What is immediately apparent in this passage is Baba’s under-
standing of the implication of the operative words “suggest its dis-
use.”  As discussed earlier, it means a prediction that the spoken
language of Japan will cease to be used in the future, not a sugges-
tion that the vernacular in Japan should be abolished or aban-
doned.  Yet he obviously takes the latter view and goes on to say
Although we admit many advantages of supplanting our lan-
guage by the English tongue, yet at the same time we cannot
help thinking that there are many reasons for preserving the
Japanese in our country as the medium of education….  Even
when one nation was forced to introduce a language by the
superior power of the conqueror, the former did not give up
their native tongue which they had been accustomed to speak
for hundreds of years, and which was consequently most
convenient to them….  Hence it will be seen that there is a
great difficulty in the way of this proposed substitution.  
(ibid.: 63–64; my emphasis)
The question now arises: Why did Baba have to jump to the con-
clusion so rashly?  The main reason is that he did not get to read
Mori’s private letter to Whitney, since it was not readily available.
Consequently he had no clue as to exactly what Mori was really
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contemplating as his hidden agenda.  Thus, he had no other alter-
native but to refer to the third party’s interpretation to find out
about his idea for language reform.  In fact, there were three
sources of information on the matter available to Baba.
(a) hearsay55
(b) newspapers
(c) Education in Japan
There must have been some rumors circulating about Mori’s lan-
guage reform at that time.  But a close study of hearsay evidence is
not necessary for our purpose.  So, we are not concerned here with
(a).  Our immediate concern is to look at (b) and (c) in a new light.
Let us first discuss (b) in detail.  Given that Baba published his
grammar book in the autumn of the same year Mori’s Education in
Japan came out, it is not unreasonable to think that Baba learned
about the U.S. newspaper Tribune (1873; the specific date
unknown) carrying an article on Mori’s inquiry letter to Whitney
of 1872.  The problem with the report, however, is that based on
the editor’s interpretation, it was severely edited to such an extent
that Mori’s original message was distorted.  It reads:
[I]f we keep pace with the age, we must adopt some copi-
ous, expansible and expanding European language, print
out laws and transact all public business in it, as soon as
possible, and have it taught in our schools as the future lan-
guage of the country, to the gradual exclusion of our present
language, spoken and written. (1873; my emphasis)
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Although Mori did argue in his letter to Whiney for the “introduc-
tion of a simplified English into all the schools of the Empire, and
gradually into general use,” he never mentioned that the idea was
to phase out the “present language, spoken and written” by replac-
ing it with the new.  Here we can say with fair certainty that Mori’s
language reform was reported by the press in English-speaking
countries as the “proposal for the abolition of the Japanese lan-
guage.”  For lack of conclusive evidence, however, it cannot be
proved that Baba read this article before writing his grammar book
(EGJL).  Consequently, We must narrow the above list of collateral
evidence down to the last one.
With respect to (c), there is a more important point that I wish
to stress.  What deserves explicit emphasis is that Mori’s 1872
inquiry letter to Whitney, as observed ealier, was not printed in
Education in Japan.  That is to say, Baba only had access to the fol-
lowing documents.
I.  Mori’s “controversial” statement in the preface to
Education in Japan regarding the problem of the
national language
II.  Whitney’s letter (in reply to Mori’s inquiry letter
of 1872)
We are justified in assuming from the above that chiefly because of
the unavailability of Mori’s letter to Whitney, Baba was not able to
examine in detail what Mori was attempting to do with the
“desired end” in mind in 1872.  Consequently, it emerges that
what Baba saw in Education in Japan was an exchange of opinions
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between Mori and Whitney (I and II); the former “suggests the
disuse of the language of Japan”; the latter recommends the ver-
nacular-based education as a better alternative.  We have to bear
in mind that these were two separate conclusions drawn by Mori
and Whitney from different standpoints; Whitney’s discussion of
the point at issue was all based on Mori’s preceding 1872 letter of
inquiry regarding his proposed language reform.
Meanwhile, the different picture emerged before Baba.  First,
he saw Mori’s (tentative) conclusion as an “assertion” that Japanese
should be abrogated.  And then, he viewed Whitney’s conclusion
as an “objection” to Mori’s proposal for the introduction of English
into Japan.  Thus, he concludes that Whitney is right when he dis-
approves of Mori’s seemingly irrational and impractical sugges-
tion.  The important point to note here is that Baba is doubly mis-
led about his interpretation of Mori’s suggestion.  For one thing, he
misread the meaning of what Mori understood by “suggests the
disuse”; for another, as we shall see later on, he depended on
Whitney’s conclusion so as to confirm him in his understanding of
Mori’s intentions behind the proposal.  And the reason is in the
first place because he was not familiar with all of what Mori said in
his letter to Whitney, and in the second place because the juxtapo-
sition of Mori’s and Whitney’s conclusions that appeared in the
same book gave rise to a new semantic field of interpretation, pro-
jecting an image of Whitney objecting to Mori’s assertion.
Now that we have got this point firmly established, we are in a
better position to suppose that Baba bases his rebuttal on
Whitney’s interpretation.  Such a hypothesis helps to better
explain why Baba’s argument is similar to Whitney’s in many
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respects.  Beyond that, Baba himself goes so far as to “affirm”
Whitney’s hypothetical assumption that Mori intends to substitute
English for Japanese largely because of the poverty of the language
of Japan; Baba uses Whitney’s carefully couched supposition as a
basis for his own criticism when he predicates that “it is affirmed
that our language is so imperfect … and that the best way is to
exterminate the Japanese language altogether, and to substitute the
English language for it.”  In the immediate context, of course, this
refers to a “prevalent opinion entertained by many of our country-
men, as well as foreigners who take some interest in our country.”
Clearly, the person Baba singles out for criticism here is Mori
Arinori.  And in my understanding, by treating Whitney’s assump-
tion as the rationale for his counterargument to Mori’s idea, Baba
created a renewed semantic field that would in turn tempt him to
think that Mori was the keenest proponents of the abolition of
Japanese.  Then, it is feasible to speculate that Baba is the first to
turn the hitherto assumption into a fait accompli.  This point
deserves special emphasis.
Similarities and differences in language attitude between Baba
and Mori
There is another significant aspect of Baba’s argument that needs
to be considered.  It is the fact that the specific points Baba dis-
cussed in his refutation were already taken up by Mori in his pri-
vate letter to Whitney.  In this section, we shall be examining in
greater depth how their views of language coincide and differ.  To
begin with, it is interesting to note that Baba defines “our lan-
guage” as the spoken language of Japan or Japanese.  He writes:
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Before the introduction of Chinese we must have had some
sort of language which served as a means of communication.
Since we introduced the Chinese classics, literature, &c., we
have been obliged to use Chinese words or phrases which we
could not express in Japanese, and so it became necessary to
teach our language with the aid of Chinese.
(SMAZ, Vol. 2: 59; my emphasis)
In this passage Baba contrasts Chinese with what he calls “some
sort of language” in ancient Japan, “that is,” our language.  “As
stated earlier, the aim of Baba’s grammar book, is to demonstrate
the adequacy of the structure of the Japanese language as it is spo-
ken.”  This suggests that Baba’s language awareness, like Mori’s,
was obviously dictated by datsua shiso (the political thought of de-
Sinicization).  With the national language movement growing at
the time, Mori was aiming to separate Japanese from Chinese.
Similarly, compared to the traditional written language of Japan (=
Chinese), Baba emphasizes that the grammatical structure of the
spoken language of Japan (= Japanese) is sufficient enough to work
as the written.
As we have seen, the purpose of Baba’s writing the book is to
demonstrate that the grammatical structure of the spoken Japanese
would function as a sufficient basis for establishing a new educa-
tion in Japan.  However, not knowing what Mori was aiming at, he
called the spoken Japanese “our language” as opposed to the
Chinese characters as the written Japanese.  And he goes on to
argue that the grammar and syntax of the spoken language of
Japan functions well enough to serve as the written language.
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It is sufficiently perfect to teach the elements of common edu-
cation so far as grammar itself is concerned….  We think that
our language is sufficiently systematical to accomplish these
ends with certain exceptions.
(SMAZ, Vol. 2: 61; my emphasis)
Even though he was convinced of the stability of grammatical
structure of the Japanese language, he had to admit its lexical inad-
equacy.  He therefore comes to the conclusion that a new vocabu-
lary should be added to the spoken language of Japan (presumably
through translating foreign languages) while preserving the gram-
matical structure of the native language in Japan.  Relevant to this
point is his following remark:
We think, also, that it is more desirable to try to enrich and
complete that which we have already, and which is, consequent-
ly, familiar to us all, than to discard it and substitute, at a great
risk, that which is entirely different and necessarily strange
to us. (SMAZ, Vol. 2: 66; my emphasis)
This is what he has to say about the vocabulary problem.  The
observant reader will notice that his argument parallels closely
with the larger point made by Mori about the Japanese versus
English issue.  As I suggested elsewhere, Mori considered compen-
sating for the insufficiency of Japanese vocabulary by means of
“simplified English” while at the same time preserving the core
grammatical structure of the spoken language of Japan for legiti-
mate and practical reasons.  A closer look at Mori’s discourse on
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the Japanese language reform would reveal that he appears to
have regarded the Japanese grammar and syntax as the time-tested
cultural matrix of the native language of the Japanese Empire
whose history is as long as that of the Japanese imperial dynasty.
Accordingly, it can be argued that he believed in the strengths of
the “imperial language” of Japan so long as it could maintain the
integrity of the Japanese based on the cultural matrix preserved in
the grammar of the native language.  Thus the imperial language,
he hoped, would stand on an equal footing with Western counter-
parts.
This is one of the major points that Mori wanted to make in
the introduction to Education in Japan.  This is why he had to men-
tion the compatibility between the written and spoken languages
of Japan in spite of the difference in the style of expression.  Mori
writes:
An allusion to the subject of the Japanese language bears a
most direct relation to the contents of this book.  In the style
of expression, the spoken language of Japan differs considerably
from the written, though in their structure they are both mainly the
same. (SMAZ, Vol. 5: 185; my emphasis)
Then he goes on to argue that it is not the Japanese grammar and
syntax that he intended to abolish, but the ideogramic Chinese
characters that he strove to “get rid of” all together primarily
because they prevented the “language of Japan” from making
progress in accordance with the law of social evolution.  As a mat-
ter of fact, what he was attempting in his language reform scheme
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was to unify the spoken and written language of Japan by means of
phonogramic English alphabets: thus, his unofficial and tentative
proposal for the romanizing of the spoken Japanese and the adop-
tion of simplified “written” English.  It should be noted that this is
where Baba failed to understand Mori.
If we take a closer look at Baba’s argument, we will realize that
there is another significant parallel with the premises offered in
Mori’s letter to Whitney.  The same logic can be found in Baba’s
critical analysis of the defective aspects of the English language as
well as the Japanese language.  What is surprising is that Baba is
criticizing orthographical and phonetic irregularities of the English
language.  This should be said with some emphasis, for Baba
unknowingly makes exactly the same argument as Mori’s about
the defects in English in comparison with the language of Japan.
Baba writes:
We admit that in several respects the English is far superior
to the Japanese, but at the same time, we think in many
respects the latter excels the former.  For instance, generally
speaking, English has the advantage of brevity of expres-
sion….  On the other hand, we have a regular orthography
and more uniform pronunciations in the Japanese, while it is
generally admitted that the English language in both these
respects is very defective.  Thus, after a careful examination, it
will be found that there are perfections and imperfections
in both languages. (SMAZ, Vol. 2: 62; my emphasis)
What the above passage makes clear at once is that Baba rela-
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tivizes the English language in relation to the Japanese and thus
sees the latter as superior to the former in terms of orthography
and pronunciation.  The point I wish to stress is that in doing so he
points out that English is no better than Japanese except for the
richness of vocabulary.  It is important to bear in mind that this is
the very issue Mori was tackling when he proposed an English lan-
guage reform—simplified English—as part of the reform of the
language of Japan (Mori saw the Japanese language reform as
simultaneously embracing the solution to the problems with
English).
One further point that we must draw attention to is that Baba,
looking at the national language issue in Japan, also refers to social
polarization as seen in the case of India.  In this respect, as Lee
(1996: 16–17) explains, Baba’s view on linguistic relativity and
“language in society” (Romaine 1997) shows “sociolinguistic fore-
sight.”  However, let me stress again that every point Baba makes
about the language of Japan had already been made in Mori’s let-
ter to Whitney (SMAZ, Vol. V: 340–341).  It is not surprising that
Baba’s argument seems to be almost identical to Mori’s in these
respects, for the former could have gained from the latter’s pub-
lished letter to Whitney his sociolinguistic perspective on linguistic
relativity that the idea for simplified English and romanized
Japanese is based upon.
Thus, it can be argued that it was not Baba, but Mori who was
the first to bring up the question of linguistic relativity and social
polarization in connection with the issue of national language
reform in Japan; it turned out that Baba responded indirectly to
the issues in the same way after Mori started the discussion with
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Whitney.  Like Baba, Mori showed foresight in his proposal for a
“dual” reform of Japanese and English.  If it had not been for his
deeper insight into linguistic relativity and sociological perspective
on language, Mori would have never suggested reforming English
and Japanese in terms of orthography and pronunciation at the
same time.  The idea was to create a new language of Japan—
which was supposed to be better than any other language in the
world—by conflating reformed English and reformed Japanese as
efficiently as possible.  Thus it was all about the rational if not
practical unification of the spoken and written languages of Eng-
lish and Japanese.
In this regard, Tanaka (1989: 33) is right in pointing out that
“although ever since Mori has often been considered to be a trai-
tor, in fairness we must not overlook the fact that he intended to
accept English as an element of a new language in Japan only if
and when the international language was to be improved (in such
a way as to make it easier for all the learners, native or non-native,
to acquire it).”  Tanaka goes on to say: “Fifteen years before
Esperanto, the first artificial international language, was devised in
1887 by Lazarus Ludwig Zamenhof (1859–1917), a proposal for a
“language for all” was put forth by Mori, a man from a non-
English speaking nation, and I would like to see it as his interna-
tional spirit of innovation at the time.  Tanaka’s observation is very
much to the point: indeed, Mori had originality and insight in that
he had realized the need for a radical reform of English as well as
Japanese: hence, the idea of simplified English.
According to Tanaka’s interpretation, it is reasonable to sup-
pose that Mori shared the same view on the issue of social polar-
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ization as Baba’s.  In fact, Mori himself acutely points out in his
letter to Whitney that the problem of orthographic and conjuga-
tional irregularity of the English language might result in polariz-
ing the whole society and dividing the people into two groups: the
learned class and the unlearned class.  Mori goes on to argue that
this would be a serious social problem not only for foreign learners
of English but also for English-speaking people:
In other words, I propose to banish from the English lan-
guage, for the use of the Japanese nation, all or most of the
exceptions, which render English so difficult of acquisition
by English-speaking people, and which discourage most
foreigners, who have the hardihood to attempt to master it,
from persevering to success. (SMAZ, Vol. 2: 53–54)
not only English speaking people, but the world at large,
would be greatly benefited by a through re-cast of English
orthography. (ibid.: 56)
These above comments suggest that it is only the wealthy who
have more time than the poor that can devote themselves to mas-
tering a “language made up of many irregularities and exceptions.”
This is all the more reason for Mori to make a proposal to simplify
English in order to reduce the amount of time required of not only
non-native speakers of English but also English-speaking peoples,
thus preventing socio-linguistic polarization and unnecessary waste
of time.  If Mori had not taken such a stance on the issue, he
would not have said:
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It might be quite impossible to force upon them the lan-
guage its present form.  Indeed, I could not conscientiously
recommend my countrymen to cause their children to
devote six or seven years of their lives to learning a lan-
guage so replete with unnecessary irregularities, and in
which the interchange of thought and acquisition of knowl-
edge are rendered so difficult by a fantastic orthography—
years which should be devoted to the study of numerous
branches of human development. (ibid.; 57)
Notwithstanding, Baba leveled his criticism at Mori on those two
accounts: socio-linguistic/racial polarization and time-consuming
acquisition of foreign language as a native language.  Baba’s argu-
ment concerns the economics of learning such a new foreign lan-
guage of different origin as English that entails more time and
energy than necessary; this would inevitably lead to the “English
divide” between the learned and the unlearned.  Baba observes:
The English language, which is one of the most difficult of
modern languages, and entirely different from our own, will
require a very long time to be mastered by so many peo-
ple, so that much precious time will be thrown away.  It is
quite a different case from that which Mr. Mori and others propose
to do in Japan….  This will be seen amongst the Welsh, Irish,
and Scotch, who, in fact, are learning two languages at pre-
sent, and throwing away the time which is precious to us
all. (ibid.: 63–64; my emphasis)
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It must be noted here that Baba reaches practically the same con-
clusion as Mori’s; the English language is difficult for the non-
English speaking peoples to acquire, and learners, if forced upon
them, would find it so time-consuming that they end up wasting
more time than necessary in life (SMAZ, Vol. 2: 340) (The obser-
vant reader would notice the striking similarity between Baba’s
logic and Whitney’s regarding the problem of efficiency in foreign
language learning).  An important point to note is that like Baba,
Mori had made much the same argument about the efficiency of a
second language acquisition on the same ground that Japanese and
English are “entirely different” in language system.
As we have seen, Mori intended to preserve the whole system
of the indigenous (spoken) language of Japan only by replacing
long-embedded Chinese characters with the Roman alphabet.
The idea was to maintain the syntactic matrix of the language of
Japan by modifying its notional and phonetic system, rather than its
grammatical one.  This explains why Mori stressed in Whitney’s
letter that “it is important that the alphabets of the two languages
under consideration—English and Japanese—be as nearly alike
as possible, in sound and powers of the letters.”  It is apparent that
Mori’s concern was not with the replacement of the grammatical
structure of Japanese with that of English.  Rather, as he explicitly
stated, his interest was in making Japanese compatible with Eng-
lish in “sound and powers of the letters,” not in grammatical sys-
tem.  Never did he mention that there was a need to abolish the
Japanese syntactic matrix (= the grammar) in favor of the English
one.
Furthermore, Mori goes so far as to suggest that it might be
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quite impractical to adopt the English language in Japan if and
when the problem of efficiency in English Learning remained
unsolved.  Mori believed that adopting English in Japan at the
expense of the indigenous syntactic/grammatical matrix would be
a mistake on the ground of both cultural legitimacy and practical
efficiency.  Never did he say one word about making English as the
new language of Japan.  Mori’s “desired end” in language reform
was to utilize English as an efficient way of building a new “imperi-
al language” of modern Japan.  It appears natural to assume that
Mori knew that a new imperial Japanese language would be
morally impossible without the time-tested grammatical matrix as
linguo-cultural legitimacy that goes hand in hand with the history
of the imperial dynasty.
Nonetheless, Baba presumed and stated that Mori was deter-
mined to “exterminate the Japanese language altogether, and to
substitute the English language for it.”  It is no wonder that Baba
could not understand at all why Mori wished to simplify English
before adopting it in the country (Indeed, there is no mention of
Mori’s idea for simplified English in Baba’s argument).  Whereas
the two Japanese were both well aware of the risks involved in
English language acquisition, the only difference between their
arguments was that Baba compared and contrasted the two lan-
guages trying to highlight the syntactic strength of Japanese, while
Mori similarly took a critical look at those languages by focusing
the notational/phonetic strength of English.
Here we can see how Baba and Mori were talking at cross-pur-
poses on the issue of the economics of language learning.  It is
clear that Baba makes the right argument for the wrong reasons.
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Misunderstanding arose when Baba interpreted Whitney’s infer-
ence as a fait accompli that Mori was “presumed guilty.”  The
same can be said of the issue of socio-linguistic polarization.  Baba
goes on to argue:
Naturally the wealthier classes of people can be free from
the daily occupation to which the poorer classes are con-
stantly subjected, and consequently the former can devote
more time for learning the language than the latter.  If
affairs of state, and all affairs of social intercourse are to be
transacted through the English language, the lower classes will
be shut out from the important questions which concern
the whole nation…; the consequence being that there will
be an entire separation between the higher class and the
lower, and no common sympathies between them….
These evils appear to be felt in India … a deep gulf there
separates the higher and educated from the lower portion
of society. (ibid.: 64–65; my emphasis)
As has been noted, the question of social polarization was already
raised by Whitney in his letter to Mori.  Then it would appear that
just as Baba touched upon the question of the efficiency of foreign
language learning, he repeated another issue Whitney had ad-
dressed earlier (SMAZ, Vol. 5: 340–341).  If we assume that Baba
himself took up the question of national language building in con-
nection with Mori’s proposal for the adoption of a “simplified”
English in Japan only after reading Whitney’s argument as well as
other related newspaper articles, it would all make sense; despite
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the fact that Mori’s scheme for language reform was arguably
intended to deal with the issues of the efficiency of foreign lan-
guage learning and socio-linguistic polarization, Baba overplayed
his hand as he jumped to the hasty conclusion that Mori was con-
sidering abandoning the native language of Japan in favor of
English, and thus ended up criticizing him for his allegedly “unpa-
triotic” enterprise (ibid.: 56–57).  Conversely, if Baba had had a
chance to read an unedited version of Mori’s letter to Whitney in
addition to Whitney’s letter to Mori, he would have reacted differ-
ently.
It turned out, however, that there was no way Baba could have
surmised Mori’s “desired end” in his new language creation plan:
the romanization of the spoken language of Japan for the abolition
of the Chinese characters, and the adoption of simplified English
for the enrichment of the native language.  As a result, Baba failed
to understand what Mori meant in the introduction to Education in
Japan by “This shows its poverty” when he clearly referred to the
paucity of Japanese vocabulary, not the inadequacy of the system
(grammatical structure) of the language of Japan.  Baba did not
realize that Mori was talking about the same problem from a dif-
ferent and larger perspective.  Unlike Baba, what Mori was tack-
ling was not only the problem of the discrepancy between the spo-
ken and written language of Japan, but also the socio-linguistic
question of Chinese characters involved in the process of modern-
ization (Lee 1996: 22).  Just as Baba advocated enriching the vo-
cabulary of the native Japanese based on the conventional gram-
matical structure, Mori also sought to achieve the goal by adding
into the romanized (= rationalized) spoken language of Japan the
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new vocabulary through the simplified (or rationalized) English.
Thus, they only differed in their approaches to developing the
native language into an independent national language.  While
Mori regarded the Roman alphabet and simplified English as a
means of obtaining a new vocabulary, Baba rather found a better
solution in translation.  As Baba remarks:
In case we have to translate English, Roman, or any other
laws into Japanese, of course we shall find many words
which cannot be answered in the Japanese language, this
owing to the difference in customs and ideas; but we can
retain them with explanations. (ibid.: 63; my emphasis)
It is worth noting, in passing, that Baba was one of Fukuzawa
Yukichi’s pupils.  Fukuzawa, a leading intellectual and prominent
figure outside government, preached about the importance of
translation as the only means to develop the Japanese language
into a full-fledged, independent modern language.56 It is no won-
der that Baba’s basic approach to improving the vocabulary of the
native language parallels Fukuzawa’s.
Yet there is one big difference between their approaches to the
development of Japanese.  Baba, who was not good at writing kanji
(Chinese characters), considered using English alphabets as a
means of better interpreting and developing the spoken language
of Japan, while Fukuzawa saw kanji as a medium of translation
from European languages into Japanese.  Baba, on the one hand,
is adamant that Japanese grammatical structure is sufficient to pro-
vide a basis for the development of spoken Japanese.  On the
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other, he begs the question of the prospects of Chinese characters
in the language of Japan, which Mori problematizes in his scheme
for the reform of the spoken language of Japan.  In fact, as Lee
(1996: 22) points out, Baba was unable to express himself suffi-
ciently well in Chinese characters and so had to employ English
instead when writing; he had long been “expelled from the realm
of the written language of Japan” when he attempted to counter
Mori’s argument in his work.
Consequently, he ended up rushing to a hasty conclusion with-
out focusing on the other half of the problem: the Chinese-bound
written language of Japan that prevented the spoken from being
represented with the Roman alphabet.  Note that it was for this
very reason why, like Baba, Mori also considered expelling
Chinese characters from the written language of Japan once and
for all, which is what Baba should have argued as a matter of
course.  Although in his grammar book (EGJL), Baba focused on
the prospects of the Japanese language, he never said a word about
the issues of adopting the Roman alphabet and simplified English
(Lee 1996: 14–15).  It is clear that Baba failed to fully understand
what Mori’s “desired end” was about and how he set out to a-
chieve it.  To reiterate the major reasons, the only available materi-
als Baba could avail himself of in constructing his argument was a
few of what was published in Education in Japan: (1) Mori’s brief
statement about the prospects of the language of Japan and (2)
Whitney’s reply to Mori’s letter.  As we have seen, Mori’s letter to
Whitney—what would have become the primary source for
Baba’s counterargument—was not included in Education in Japan;
Baba did not have a chance to read exactly what was said in the
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letter.  As a result, as he surmised Mori’s motive, Baba had to base
his refutation upon Mori’s seemingly extreme and pessimistic
rhetoric in his assessment of the future of Japanese, in addition to
Whitney’s comments in reply to Mori’s letter.  As mentioned earli-
er, Whitney failed to understand the hidden agenda behind Mori’s
letter.  And Baba shared Whitney’s view on Mori’s grand design of
language reform.  All this may alone be enough to explain why
Baba was bound to misunderstand Mori.
Quoting Whitney in his grammar book (EGJL), Baba empha-
sizes the importance of preserving the vernacular language in
Japan by making the most of its time-tested grammatical structure
as well as enriching its vocabulary by means of explanatory trans-
lation.  With his basic argument based on Whitney’s assumptive
remark about Mori’s idea for the introduction of English in Japan,
Baba understood Mori’s motive for language reform as unreason-
able and unpatriotic.57 Thus, taking Whitney’s assumption as a
fact, Baba pressed his argument as if Mori was a traitor to his
country.
In this light, we may say that Mori was one step ahead of the
Japanese language reform: Baba only talked in English about the
possibilities of the Japanese language but the problem of Chinese
characters.  He never discussed the possibilities of adopting the
Roman alphabet and simplifying English for the benefit of the
Japanese.  Meanwhile, Mori not only looked upon Chinese charac-
ters as the root problem in language reform but also upon the
adoption of the Roman alphabet and the introduction of simplified
English as its ideal solutions.
It should be concluded, from what has been said above, that
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Baba was too rash in turning Whitney’s argument to his advantage
so as to disapprove Mori’s supposed renunciation of the language
of Japan in favor of English, and that Baba thus misunderstood
Mori’s “desired end” in his language reform, perpetuating his own
misinterpretation.
4.  David Murray Report: Translation and compilation
The next question we have to ask is whether Mori ever found any
solution to the pending problem after failing to follow through
with his initial linguistic reform plan.  Despite the unexpected set-
back, he continued to look for ways to achieve his goal.  And it
was in David Murray’s version of what the Japanese should do
with educational reform that Mori finally found the answer.  In the
same year (1873) when Mori’s Education in Japan was published in
New York, an American scholar was purportedly recommended
by Mori as the chief advisor at the Ministry of Education in Japan.
Murray was to take charge of working out an educational policy
for the new Japan.  This indicates that Mori agreed with Murray’s
philosophy of education; Murray argued for the importance of
building on the native language in improving national education,
stressing that the most effective way to realize the untapped poten-
tial of the Japanese people is by resorting to the conventional
translation method.  His educational and linguistic reform propos-
al is known as David Murray Report of 1873.  He had a high opin-
ion of Japan’s education because of the level it had already
achieved up to that time: the literacy rate in the country was rela-
tively high when compared with those in Western countries.
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Taking into account this remarkable aspect of Japanese culture,
Murray suggests how foreign language education should be placed
in the existing educational system.
It would be wrong to jump to the conclusion that the Japa-
nese are not an educated people ( just because Japan is
behind Western countries in “modernization”).  In fact, we
may even say that in education Japan is on the same level
as the best in Europe.  For there are very few people who
are unable to read and write in this country.  I heard this
from an educated Japanese.  If this is true, then the Japa-
nese can rightly take pride in the conventional education
which can be comparable to that of Europe and the U.S.  I
have been told that even the poorest of the poor are able to
read and write regular kana characters, and moreover some
women are better than men.  I find it amazing that good
bureaucratic education made it possible for Japan to con-
trol the government in a consistent and stable way for the
past two thousand years.  At the popular level, however, it
was not as effective as it was with the bureaucrats due to
some defect in the system.  As a result, there has been little
progress in the concepts of individualism and self-responsi-
bility.  And yet it is fair to say that because of the traditional
education people have always had enough vitality with
which the government can maintain the whole system.
Viewed in this light, we may say that the traditional educa-
tion in Japan has already laid the groundwork for the future
education of the nation.
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and
Thus, further progress should be made gradually based on
the existing foundations; it would be unwise to abolish the
long-established and effective enough system and start over
in laying out a plan for the new one.  For successful educa-
tion is always to be provided step by step and to be geared
to the needs and disposition of the people in a particular
age and in a particular place.  There are things that should
be changed and things that should not.  As for the national
language, it is too important a means of education to be
artificially changed under no circumstances.  Education is
bound to fail unless it is conducted through the “national”
language in Japan.  While it is extremely difficult, at this
point in time, to teach Western subjects in Japanese, there is
no country in the world that could realize general educa-
tion without using its most common popular language.
Hence one can say that employing Western languages in
the present situation should be considered as the only avail-
able temporary measure, and that Japan is going through
the same phase as seen in the medieval Europe where
Latin was used as the universal language in education.
Since there is now only a limited number of people who
receive education in European languages such as English,
French, and German, these students are expected to be
able to teach Western subjects in Japanese in due course of
time … the building of foreign language schools is a matter
of the greatest urgency in Education Order of 1872; it is
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therefore very important for the government to provide
sufficient support for increasing the number of the schools.
But at the same time one should bear in mind that the mere
size of the Education Ministry controlling these national
institutions will not help in establishing an educational sys-
tem of its own.
and
The purpose of the whole project is twofold; the first is to
compile textbooks in Japanese that cover various fields of
Western arts and science.  Work on translation and compila-
tion has already begun with the necessary equipment
installed … the second is to turn out teachers and instruc-
tors … it would be only possible to provide and receive
Western progressive education at teacher’s college ... where
the students have an opportunity to form a close relation-
ship with and study hard under foreign teachers, and they
are thus expected to become good teachers themselves
after graduation and contribute to the betterment of the
Japanese people.  
(Meiji Bunka Kenkyukai 1967: 127–128; my emphasis)
Here Murray concludes that since, on the whole, traditional educa-
tion in Japan had worked well enough to compete with Western
countries, it would be inadvisable to completely deny the past and
start anew.  He views foreign language education as the expedient
of complementing the language of Japan, and so insists that foreign
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language should be considered in terms of national language edu-
cation.  The purpose of promoting foreign language education, he
says, is twofold: first, there is an urgent need to produce by transla-
tion and compilation Japanese textbooks that deal with practically
all the fields in Western studies; second, a number of teachers
should be trained to teach every subject in Japanese.  Thus,
Murray finds it most effective to take temporary measures to rein-
force or enrich the language of Japan by making the most of for-
eign languages.  Taking into account Murray’s position on lan-
guage policy and the fact that Mori recommended him as adviser
to the Ministry of Education in Japan, it is entirely fair to say that
Mori finally found in Murray’s idea of “translation and compila-
tion” the solution to the language problem in Japan.
What has to be noticed here is that Mori’s accepting Murray’s
proposal does not necessarily mean that Mori backed down on his
own original proposal; although Mori’s initial tactics was different
from Murray’s, they both had practically the same goal: the cre-
ation of an independent and strong national language.  When
Mori already knew that his two-stage tactics was no longer viable,
Murray provided him with a more realistic and pragmatic
approach to building a new language.  Then Mori began to recon-
sider the possibility of translation, which had been excluded from
his original method for “securing the desired end.”
But now that his original plan is aborted, he comes to realize
the fact that the relatively high level of education in Japan has
been made possible only by virtue of what Ishikawa (1999) calls
“dual medium” as an eclectic entity which consists of both kango
(Chinese) and wago ( Japanese).  Thus, Mori sees the language of
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Japan in a fresh light: kango acts as an agent that helps in interpret-
ing Western ideas and creating new words; it therefore lays the
groundwork for further development of the Japanese language.
Upon returning from a tour of inspection of schools in Japan,
Murray put forth another report of 1874 on the gradual improve-
ment in the language situation.  It says that “with the help of for-
eign teachers along with the on-going translation work, there have
been a number of students who seek to study only in Japanese.
And now we have some schools where classes are all conducted in
Japanese.”  Murray writes at the end of the report:
In order for the Japanese-conducted education to make
steady progress, it is necessary to employ more advanced
textbooks than those published so far; the subjects that
need text revision are geography, algebra, geometry, and
natural history.  To this end it will not be enough just to
translate but further to compile the best Western textbooks for
a new version for the use of the Japanese people.
(ibid.: 138; my emphasis)
Here he stresses the need to speed up the translation and compila-
tion work in order to produce more of better textbooks in Japa-
nese.  It may safely be inferred from what is written in Murray
Reports that Mori, too, deepened his conviction with respect to the
translation approach that he once regarded as less desirable.  In
fact, Mori’s approach to language policy was to remain unchanged
until he died.  In 1888 (the year before he was assassinated), Mori,
in his capacity as Education Minister, gave a speech to the instruc-
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tors at the Japanese Imperial University in Tokyo, stating almost
the same thing as Murray’s language policy:
Today it is now quite common practice for most schools in
Japan, especially colleges, to provide tuition in foreign lan-
guages, which is inevitable under the present circum-
stances.  But this will not continue forever….  In connec-
tion with the language for teaching, I need to make a com-
ment on instruction in law.  It seems to me that there is
some misunderstanding on the part of the Ministry of
Education regarding the use of foreign languages in giving
classes in law.  I need to clarify the purpose here.  We must
be careful not to let employing foreign languages in teach-
ing law become an end in itself; the ultimate objective is
not to study British, American, French or German laws, but
to (be better able to) learn and teach Japanese laws….
Thus, utilizing foreign languages for the present should be
considered to be only a temporary expedient.  And when
Japanese laws are established, it will be necessary to trans-
late them into foreign languages.  In short, if there is some-
thing missing in the existing laws in Japan which need to be
further complemented, then it necessitates looking into
Western laws.  One must always bear in mind that foreign
languages are now being used in Japan in order to facilitate
the process of learning and teaching Japanese laws more
effectively; Western laws per se are only of secondary
importance here. (SMAZ, Vol. 2: 489–490)
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What is important here is how Mori views translation in the con-
text of foreign language education.  He maintains that the purpose
of the study of law in foreign languages is not so much to learn for-
eign laws themselves but rather to acquire knowledge of the laws
of state from Western civilization through translation and compila-
tion with a view to establishing our own legal system in Japanese
later.  Mori’s translation approach is best characterized by the
notion of eclecticism, which he believes is the key to the reform of
the country.  Concerning the importance of eclecticism in intro-
ducing the Western laws into Japan, Mori had in his younger days
written to his brother Yasutake as follows:
Unless we get well acquainted with our own political sys-
tem, it is difficult to compare it with those of other
(Western) countries.  Laws, if not implemented in accor-
dance with the mode of life of a given nation, will do more
harm than good.  Thus, knowing both our country and
other countries enables us to develop and integrate the best
elements into a new institution that will accommodate the
indigenous climate and environment.  This approach
makes for an ideal and fair institution that requires little
clarification.  All this, however, is impossible unless we
know what is necessary in the first place.  
(SMAZ, Vol. 3: 56)
Likewise, in the formal letter called gakusei katakoto of 1882, he
presented to Ito Hirobumi (1841–1909) who was later to become
the first prime minister, a suggestion as to the matter of education;
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in it he states that it is essential to utilize Japan’s cultural matrix as
a basis for a new educational system.  Mori writes:
With regard to education, we must first take into account
the disposition of the people and the conventional prac-
tices, and then scrutinize the old Education law in terms of
merits and demerits in order to judge how the system has
worked in Japan.  And when discussing the matter of edu-
cation there is one most important factor to be considered:
the national polity unique to our country. 
(SMAZ, Vol. 2: 141–142)
Here, we notice that Mori’s statement above is in complete agree-
ment with Murray’s aforementioned philosophy of education in
Japan:
[F]urther progress should be made gradually based on the
existing foundations; it would be unwise to abolish the
long-established and effective enough system and start over
in laying out a plan for the new one.  For successful educa-
tion is always to be provided step by step and to be geared
to the needs and disposition of the people in a particular
age and in a particular place.
What is especially important is that Mori sees “the disposition of
the people and the conventional practices” as coming from the
“the national polity unique to our country.”  In addition, the appli-
cation of eclecticism, as observed above, is characteristic of Mori’s
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approach to the nation’s progress in general: this is especially true
with the “translation and compilation” approach to the creation of
a new imperial language.
There is yet another point that we should consider regarding
the translation project in the field of law.  Mori says that it is not
enough to render the Western laws into Japanese, and once the
Japanese laws have been made, it is equally important to translate
them into English.  It will be clear from this that he looks upon
translation as an eclectic means of not only receiving information
from abroad but also sending out information abroad.  This lan-
guage attitude corresponds to the fact that he himself tried hard to
represent Japan abroad by speaking and writing in English about
the history of the Japanese and their way of thinking.  Thus, for
him, translation was the medium of selective integration of the old
with the new based on the national polity.
A telling example of his two-way translation strategy is the
English textbook English Readers, which Education Minister Mori
asked Walter Dening (1846–1913), a British scholar of Japanese
language and culture, to compile in 1887.  In those days, it was
quite common practice for oyatoi kyoshi or “hired foreigners” (see
Shimada and Hall, et al. 1987) to teach the Japanese in foreign lan-
guages.  And the oyatoi English teachers would write for the Japa-
nese students—from the standpoint of native speakers—such pop-
ular English textbooks as Sander’s Union Readers and Barn’s New
National Readers.  Although English Readers, like other “standard”
textbooks, were made by an Englishman, their contents were total-
ly different from the mainstream subject matter; they deal not only
with the history of Japan and China but also with the two coun-
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tries’legends, old tales, and anecdotes about famous historical char-
acters such as Toyotomi Hideyoshi, Tokugawa Ieyasu, Confucius,
Mencius, and others.  As to why such new English Readers were
needed, Dening explains in the preface:
the object of this Series of Readers is to express in the
English language ideas with which the Japanese are more
or less familiar.  The difficulty which the Japanese youth
finds in understanding Readers which have been complied
for the use of English or American scholars, is very consid-
erable.  This is attributed to the fact that not the ideas only,
but the modes of stating, explaining, and illustrating them
are entirely new, and, in many cases, out of harmony with
Japanese habits of thought. (Dening 1887)
Since the textbooks were compiled under the supervision of Mori,
his language attitude to English as well as his language policy was
obviously reflected in Dening’s statement above.  This suggests
that whether or not Dening was aware of the cultural politics of
English textbooks for non-native learners, Mori knew how impor-
tant it was to “negotiate voices in English” by making a “discursive
intervention” strategically so that people might not lose their cul-
tural identity completely when confronted with the Western values
(Pennycook 1994: 312–315; 324).  And it should be clear that by
translating Asian values into English Dening’s textbooks were
designed to enable students to express the ideas in harmony with
Japanese habits of thought.  It is worth noting, in passing, that we
can interpret Mori’s aggressive language behavior as a precursor of
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post-colonial language movement in the late twentieth century in
which people in “periphery-English countries” (Phillipson 1992)
started resisting the hegemony of the English language in the
world by writing and speaking back (to the core English-speaking
countries) in “World Englishes.”  In order to better understand
Mori’s dual language strategy, we need to look upon Dening’s
English textbooks as a clear example of how a site of political and
cultural struggle for equality and superiority comes into play in the
realm of discourse.  At any rate, what is clearly shown here is that
Mori’s approach to translation is marked by its aggressive lan-
guage attitude to English and Japanese; only by strategically (or
eclectically) translating what was needed into both languages was
it possible to create a new language for the Japanese Empire.  This
was Mori’s ultimate solution to the language problem in Japan.
And the above evidence suggests that despite technical setbacks in
tactics his strategy for language policy in essence remained
unchanged from beginning to end.
Pragmatism in Mori’s dual language policy
According to Kawasumi (1996: 32–33), he cites Yokoyama Kendo’s
The History of Japanese Education with Reviews by Education Minister
and Others (1914) and Sakurai Mamoru’s The History of English
Education in Japan (1936) as evidence to suggest that Mori was lean-
ing toward the Japanese-oriented education.  Kawasumi points out
that both books contain the same quotation from Mori’s speech in
which he says, “In foreign countries, we find no schools where
classes are conducted in foreign languages.  Similarly, in Japan, we
should be working toward the national language based education.
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Although we now have to employ foreign instructors temporarily
to teach Japanese new subjects in foreign languages, we should see
it as politically and culturally expedient.”  The source of this state-
ment, Kawasumi notes, is not identified in the above books and
nor can it be found in A New Complete Collection of Documents
Relating to Mori Arinori—the present writer also tried to locate the
original source but to no avail.  Yet, Mori’s above statement closely
accords with the import of the following passage in Murray’s
Report:
While it is extremely difficult, at this point in time, to teach
Western subjects in Japanese, there is no country in the
world that could realize general education without using its
most common popular language.  Hence one can say that
employing Western languages in the present situation
should be considered as the only available temporary mea-
sure, and that Japan is going through the same phase as
seen in the medieval Europe where Latin was used as the
universal language in education.  It is precisely because of
the nation’s urgent need to produce teachers who attain a
high level of scholarship.  And the whole idea is based on
“the principles of economy” in which time and energy
devoted to an enterprise should be measured according to
the results in terms of efficiency and effectiveness in order
to see if it really “pays.”  Thus, it is not necessary con-
cerned with the financial aspect of the project.  What is
important here is that when you consume goods, you
should expect them to generate enough utility.  
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(Meiji Bunka Kenkyukai 1967: 127–128)
Although Yokoyama and Sakurai do not indicate the sources for
their pertinent quotations, we can confirm the striking parallel
between these two citations, giving credence to the authenticity of
the possible common source.  Then it is reasonable to suppose that
Mori viewed education through foreign language as an expedient
measure for paving the way to education through the full-fledged
national language ( Japanese).  Indeed, what Mori had in mind was
the phasing out of foreign language-based education in Japan.
Citing his speech at Tokyo Imperial University, Kawasumi sug-
gests that Mori proposed teaching only one foreign language for
practical and economic reasons, while aiming at abolishing the use
of foreign languages as a means of teaching lessons at school.
Thus Kawasumi sees Mori’s later policy for foreign language con-
trol as shifting toward national language education.  If this is the
case, Kawasumi argues, then we should reconsider Sakurai’s gen-
erally accepted view that “it was Inoue Kowashi that reviewed
Mori’s policy for encouragement of foreign language education
and changed its course.”
What exactly did Mori hope to achieve in his “foreign lan-
guage incentive policy?”  Does it not conflict with what Kawasumi
terms “Mori’s later policy for foreign language control?”  It is true
that Mori’s “foreign language incentive policy” began with the
proclamation of the School Edict in 1886 when he was appointed
as Minister of Education by the first Ito Hirobumi government
(Sakurai 1936: 146–149).  It is worth noting that Mori issued the
“school textbook screening” edict, placing the compilation of ele-
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mentary and junior high school instructional books under his
charge; Mori was eager to solicit good materials from the private
sector with a view of producing inexpensive and practical school-
books written in simple, conversational Japanese (Inuzuka 1986:
272).  At the same time, it was under such circumstances that
Walter Dennig was requested by Mori to write unconventional
English Readers in which all the contents dealt with Asian stories,
not Western ones for the benefit of Japanese learners.  We should
notice that this has a great deal to do with what Mori attempted to
realize in his “desired end” in his national language reform plan in
the 1870s.  Thus, Mori’s education policy focused on foreign lan-
guage from the standpoint of national education.
This line of foreign language policy continued to February
1889 when Mori was assassinated.  However, we must not over-
look the fact that he advocated foreign language control in the
same period, and soon after Mori’s death, English curriculums
were to be slashed in favor of Japanese curriculums by a group of
proponents of national language education such as Inoue Kowashi
(1843–1895).  How did Mori ever reconcile these seemingly con-
flicting policies of foreign and national languages education?  As a
matter of fact, the established idea that Education Minister Mori
Arinori’s encouragement of foreign language learning was curbed
and reappraised by Inoue should be seen as half true and half
false.  The reason is semantic.  What Mori intended by “foreign
language control” meant the restriction on the use of foreign lan-
guage in teaching, not necessarily the reduction of the amount of
time required for foreign language teaching and learning.  A closer
look at Murray report corroborates this view; Murry report says
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“Therefore, in terms of the present school system, it is out of expe-
diency (not principle) that the schools which provide education
by/through foreign language have been approved by the govern-
ment and thus increased in number.  The education authorities,
however, deem it temporarily inevitable yet still reformable in
Japan.”
Another corroborating evidence in support of our view can be
found in Mori’s speech at Tokyo Imperial University, which says
that “Education through foreign language is inevitable at this point
time.  But this, of course, will not last forever.”  That is to say, he
was considering curbing the use of foreign languages as a means of
teaching (by “employed foreigners”), not necessarily the learning
of foreign languages by the Japanese students.  Obviously he
meant the latter when he advocated the policy of “encouraging
foreign language learning.”  His emphasis on national language,
which Kawasumi, Sakurai, and Yokoi highlighted in his education-
al policy, had much to do with the substitution of Japanese for for-
eign language as a means of teaching subjects in schools in Japan;
it was not intended to go so far as to discourage foreign language
learning because of Japanese language education.
Taken in this light, we can better understand why Mori had to
control foreign language teaching for politico-cultural reasons:
national/linguistic independence of the Japanese Empire from the
British- American English hegemony.  He positively states in
Education in Japan that “The absolute necessity of mastering the
English language is thus forced upon us.  It is a requisite of the
maintenance of our independence in the community of nations”
(SMAZ, Vol. 5: 186).  This resulted in his seeking outside help
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from David Murray who strongly recommended exploring the
possibilities of translation and compilation as an alternative to
building an independent national language.
Meanwhile, the reason why Mori encouraged English teaching
even after he became Education Minister in his later years is plau-
sibly because he hoped that they would be able to not only read
and absorb the essence of Western civilization through English but
also represent their own culture in English, only if in the future the
Japanese people reached the point where they could conduct
national education using their own textbooks compiled in their
own language.58 He believed in the future of foreign language
education in Japan which is evidenced by his own bilingual perfor-
mative acts in cross-cultural communication.  Since he believed in
reciprocal performance in the realm of national and foreign educa-
tion, he experimented with such an unprecedented English text-
book as Walter Dening’s whose content actively represents the
ethos of Asian cultures, not Western ones.  Mori believed in nur-
turing individuals with independent language attitude.  This
explains why he endorsed a proposal that “when laws are to be
enacted in Japan, they had to be translated into foreign language.”
Thus, he strategically continued to promote active foreign lan-
guage learning while simultaneously establishing a national lan-
guage-centered education.
Viewed in this light, Kawasumi seems to be only scratching the
surface of the established theory about Mori’s language attitude.
He suggests that in his later years Mori’s once ultra-Westernized
policy of language education in Japan shifted the emphasis from
foreign language (English) toward national language ( Japanese).
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As Sonoda (1993) argues, the underlying a priori assumption
behind such an argument derives from the conventional view of
Mori as converting from an ultra-Westernized liberalist/inter-
nationalist in his early life and to an ultra-nationalist/statist in his
last years.  Such a binary theoretical framework can only offer an
either-or interpretation, which compels us to regard Mori as a
“convert” one way or the other.  This automatically makes it diffi-
cult for us to explore other possibilities.  As a result, this line of
reasoning only allows us to interpret Mori either as a one-time fer-
vent advocate of the introduction of English and the abolition of
Japanese, or as a converted proponent of national language educa-
tion and foreign language control.
As the discourse analysis revealed so far, Mori recognized in
his letter to Whitney the importance of state education by national
(native) language.  It has generally been established that Mori’s
later conversion from English-oriented to Japanese-oriented educa-
tion and language policy was triggered by his reaction against his
personal ultra-Westernization in his earlier phases of educational
planning.  However, that is quite far from the truth.  On the con-
trary, it would appear that in 1872 Mori had already reached the
conclusion that the native language ( Japanese) was supposed to
develop further into the dominant language for national education
in the future.  Although at the time of his writing a letter to
Whitney Mori had not made clear the feasibility of translation and
compilation, he positively stated that there was an urgent need for
the schools and textbooks that could be taught “in our own lan-
guage for educational purposes.”  It was not until Mori read the
David Murray report on the need for the “national language” and
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strengths of the high literacy percentage in Japan that Mori real-
ized that the translation approach from English (to Chinese) to
Japanese would be more efficient and effective in terms of the eco-
nomics of education than the two-staged language reform he con-
trived in the original plan: the abolition of Chinese characters (the
adoption of the English alphabets = romanization of the spoken
language), and the introduction of simplified (reformed) English
vocabulary into the Japanese language.  The more rational and
economic approach to language convinced Mori of the procedural
convenience of translation in developing the native language into
the “national language” that would make it easier to produce not
only textbooks but also teachers who could teach in their own lan-
guage.  A strong advocate of “rational economization,” Mori
encouraged the people to do more with less in education so that
the Japanese might be able to catch up with the West as fast as
they could.  As Mori states in his following public speeches made
in 1887 to regional educational directors and school teachers:
What we are aiming at is nothing less than producing
teachers who can meet the needs of the state.  We will
attain this goal with the principles of economy by which we
measure how we spend time and energy on an enterprise,
and evaluate the performance and the end result in terms
of efficiency and effectiveness.  The principle of economy
means more than just taking into account the amount of
money and time spent; it involves ensuring that consump-
tion produces a good result and investment returns a good
profit. (SMAZ, Vol. 2: 413)
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Here Mori refers to the “principles of economy” not as narrow
economy that “merely takes into account the amount of money
and time spent,” but rather as broad economy that “organizes a
most rational system which maximizes returns on your investment
such as money, time, labor, and knowledge” (Inuzuka 1986: 281).
All this may alone be enough to explain why Mori clearly stated in
his letter to Whitney that he had no intention whatsoever of intro-
ducing the unreformed (therefore uneconomic) English language
into Japan unless it was made into a simplified (reformed therefore
economical) one that rids itself of grammatical and orthographical
irregularities, thus saving the Japanese more time and energy for
learning.  For the same reason he suggested in his speech at Tokyo
Imperial University that a single foreign language be used for aca-
demic instruction.  Thus, if we check his language reform dis-
course carefully against what is stated in the David Murray Report,
we can better recognize what he really intended by his “desired
end” as well as how he strived to achieve it.
Seen from this angle, we are now better able to see that Mori’s
hidden agenda for the new Japan’s language reform was to create
an imperial language or the Emperor’s Japanese in analogy with
the English language of the British Empire or the Queen’s English.
Again, we must not forget that for Mori, the Queen’s English was
not to be introduced into Japan as the imperial language.  English
was only meant to be a new (foreign) language that would help the
Japanese to develop their own imperial language: the Emperor’s
Japanese.  The original idea was to integrate the reformed therefore
new English (= simplified English) into the reformed therefore new
Japanese (= romanized spoken Japanese).
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However, it turned out that it was virtually impossible to
remove Chinese characters from the written language of Japan
even through romanization; Mori, following Murray’s advice on
the issue of national language, changed his tactics/means, not his
strategy/end, for he instead decided to employ the translation and
compilation method to syncretise the conventional (unreformed)
Japanese with the conventional (unreformed) English in order to
develop an independent language for education in Japan.  Let me
stress again that even though Mori tactically retracted his original
proposal, his strategy for creating a new independent imperial lan-
guage for the Japanese Empire remained unchanged.  His early
idea for language reform based on eclecticism and the “principles
of economy” can still be seen in his later educational policy.
It follows from what has been said that in his discourse on lan-
guage reform Mori did change his tactics, but not his strategy.
This explains why most scholars of Mori Arinori have ended up
mistaking his tactical move for his strategic one, thus misinterpret-
ing his true intentions.  In reading Mori’s unofficial letter of
inquiry to Whitney that was to be later published in English, many
scholars misunderstood his means (the adoption of simplified
English) as the ultimate end in his language reform.  Conse-
quently, they made a fatal mistake in reading the passage in ques-
tion (“All reasons suggest its disuse”) as Mori’s final judgment on
the issue of the national language of Japan.  The passage, however,
should be read in a much broader context.  We should be careful
not to jump to a conclusion without carefully placing it in a diplo-
matic context.  When Mori published the letter in Education in
Japan in his capacity as diplomat, the book itself was intended as a
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means to an end, not an end in itself.  In it he was just trying to
convey the seriousness and immediacy of the problems of the lan-
guage of Japan, and to seek advice from Anglo-Saxon intellectuals.
That is why Mori expressed the passage the way he did.  Although
the passage may sound too radical, it is not to be taken as his ulti-
mate end, for, if read in this light, one might be tempted to under-
stand it as meaning that he suggested the language of Japan be dis-
used.  Again, the book itself was published in a diplomatic context
and was aimed at seeking advice on a final solution to the prob-
lem.  Therefore, the passage from his treatise published in the
booklet should be interpreted as such.  If we place it in the context
of the geo-cultural politics of early Meiji Japan, we find that Mori
felt the urgency of the problem so much so that he was desperate
for advice on the solution.  From this viewpoint, it is more reason-
able to assume that Mori rhetorically expressed it in such a way as
to imply that something must be done about the language of Japan
before it was too late.
And his such efforts paid off.  Soon after the advice was pub-
licly sought in the booklet, he found the answer.  It would appear
that in the translation and compilation approach recommended in
the David Murray report did Mori find the final solution to the
issue of building an independent national language for imperial
Japan.  Propelled and characterized by his eigaku performance, the
interactive process of translation and compilation in Mori’s dual
foreign language policy was to allow for representing between
English and Japanese the imperial Self and the significant imperial
Others by way of discursive intervention at home and abroad.
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5.  Parallel “reformation” of religion and language
In this section, we will take a closer look at how Mori’s counter-
civilizational pragmatic language attitude is reflected in his English
discourses in cultural diplomacy.  By so doing, we will demon-
strate Mori’s mind-nature with respect to the representation of Self
and imperial Others in connection with his linguistic strategy.
As previously stated, in his capacity as a samurai-diplomat,
Mori developed his Weltanschauung in the context of the global
geo-cultural politics.  The key to understanding his world view and
his thinking on the language reform issue in Japan lies in analyzing
chronologically his English discourses in terms of noteworthy fac-
tors which he might have highlighted with specific purposes in
mind as he shifted his geo-cultural positions.  These major factors
to be used as explanatory variables here are gender and religion.
It is from these two perspectives that we want to examine Mori’s
other discourses made in English on his own initiative while he
was during his stay in America, China, and Britain (in this order)
from 1872 to 1884.  What we are concerned with here is Mori’s
English linguistic strategy for differentiating in terms of the two
variables mentioned above the image of the Self (the new Japan)
as a distinct (virtually and potentially superior) race from those of
Imperial Others (China/U.S./Britain).  The following are Mori’s
English discourses to be discussed here from chronological and
geo-cultural/political standpoints.
(1) Discourses made in English in America:
The Life and Resources in America (1871)
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The Religious Freedom in Japan (1872)
The Japanese in America (1872)
Education in Japan (1873)
(2) Discourse made in English in China:
The Interviews between Mori Arinori and Li
Hongzhang (1876)
(3) Discourse made in English in Britain:
An Interview with the Japanese Ambassador of
Public Affairs on his Departure from England
(1884)
It is important to bear in mind that all his English discourses were
put forth within the cultural geo-political context when Mori acted
as a diplomat between East (China) and West (Britain and
America).  One of the main reasons that his discourses were often
misconstrued was chiefly because of the nature of the diplomatic
documents that would involve a careful reading of the geo-cultural
politics of Japan in relation to the big powers of the East and the
West.  The texts of the documents were so political and diplomatic
that there were many different interpretations of his language
reform discourse as ambiguous, contradictory, and paradoxical.
The question we have to consider here is how Mori appeared to
have “changed his tune” in 1872–73.  It has been generally accept-
ed that ultra-Westernized Mori’s “radical” proposal for language
reform in Japan was sheer nonsense, and he was chided by U.S.
linguist William Whitney into retracting his audacious plan.
But evidence shows that his scheme was not irrational at all in
light of the fact that he learned about the Moon-Alford controver-
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sy in Britain when he studied there in the late 1860s, which gave
him a chance to develop his idea for creating an imperial language
of Japan.  Then it seems more reasonable to think of his idea dis-
closed in his 1872 letter to Whitney as his tactical (not strategic)
plan.
That said, the fact remains that he made a statement that could
be taken to mean that he intends to “abolish” Japanese in favor of
English as a new national language.  Did he literally mean what he
said and say what he really meant regarding the language reform
issue?  Was it his tactics or strategy for the grand design for the
new Japan that he seemed to have abandoned after receiving
advice from Whitney?  To solve this mystery, we first need to find
out exactly when his apparent “conversion” took place and what
other geo-political and cultural factors came into play.
It was May 21st, 1872 that Mori wrote to Whitney asking for
advice.  In it, Mori tried to sound him out about the two-tier lan-
guage reform plan for creating a new imperial language in Japan:
the Japanese reform (romanized Japanese) and the English reform
(simplified English).  In other words, what he wanted was jyunsei
nihongo (pure Japanese) and jyunsei eigo (pure English) combined
into one (Kobayashi 2001).  At the end of the letter, Mori plainly
states that “It might be quite impossible to force upon them (the
Japanese people) the language in its present form.”  In reply to
Mori’s inquiry, Whitney wrote him back a month later when he
endorsed the idea of the romanization of the spoken Japanese but
politely yet adamantly opposed the simplification of the written
English; he instead recommended adopting conventional English
as a classical language like Greek or Latin.  The point to observe
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here is that six months later, he seems to have changed his point of
view concerning the adoption of both romanized spoken Japanese
and simplified written English when he comments in the introduc-
tion to Education in Japan as follows:
There are some efforts being made to do away with the use
of Chinese characters by reducing them to simple phonet-
ics, but the words familiar through the organ of the eye are
so many, that to change them into those of the ear would
cause too great an inconvenience, and be quite impractica-
ble. (SMAZ, Vol. 5: 185–186)
Mori further adds that “the absolute necessity of mastering the
English language is thus forced upon us.”  This comment is
sharply contrasted with the one he made six months earlier that “it
might be quite impossible to force upon them the language
(English) in its present form,” and that “I could not conscientiously
recommend my country men, to cause their children to devote six
or seven years of their lives to learning a language so replete with
unnecessary irregularities.”  Thus he abandoned the original idea
of simplified (purified) English for unavoidable technical reasons.
As to his abandonment of the initial plan, three months after Mori
wrote to Whitney, Mori made a remark to the same effect in his
speech at the Twelfth Annual Meeting of the National Educational
Association Session held in Boston:
Our language is poor, and is limited within ourselves, because
we have no occasion to use it for higher purposes: and it
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became very short….  As I said, our language is so very poor
that it will become useless very soon. I expect that when for-
eign schools are established throughout our country, the
English language will become predominant, and our own lan-
guage will be very much diminished, and finally a kind of
curiosity; and what I say now is in the part of that curiosity.
[Laughter and applause.]
(Mori 1873: 105–107; my emphasis)
This statement accords with what Mori declares at the end of the
introduction to Education in Japan (1873).
Without the aid of the Chinese, our language has never
been taught or used for any purpose of communication.
This shows its poverty … the English language … suppress-
es the use of both Japanese and Chinese….  Under the cir-
cumstance, our meager language, which can never be of any use
outside of our islands, is doomed to yield to the domination of the
English tongue … the laws of state can never be preserved in the
language of Japan.  All reasons suggest its disuse.
(SMAZ, Vol. 5: 186; my emphasis)
It has been widely accepted that Mori converted from progressive
(liberal) to conservative.  As we have seen in the section on socio-
linguistic Darwinism, the assumption behind the established fact is
based on Mori’s famous discourse that just as Chinese was becom-
ing “useless” and “extinct,” so the spoken language of Japan would
become as useless as Chinese and disused in the future.
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The question we must consider here is at what point in 1872 he
decided to change his mind about his case.  The key to identifying
the time is in the public speech he made at the Twelfth Annual
Meeting of the National Educational Association Session held in
Boston on the sixth of August, 1872.  On the third day of the pro-
ceedings—soon after the Iwakuwa Mission left America for
Europe—Mori spoke in public of the future of education in Japan,
commenting on the urgent need for national language reform.
Seeking for professional advice, Mori wrote to Whitney on the 21st
of May, 1872, and Whitey wrote back on the 20th of June, 1872.  It
follows from this that it was sometime between September and
August that Mori must have had second thoughts about his “hid-
den agenda” for the coalescing of reformed Japanese and reformed
English.
Did Mori really change his mind by following Whitey’s
advice?  A closer examination of Mori’s discourse on the issue
shows that it was not really the case.  Whereas evidence suggests
that after reading Whitney’s feedback Mori did have a rethink of
his tactics to improve the language of Japan, he never went so far
as to abandon his strategy.  It is generally believed that Mori gave
up his plan on Whitney’s advice, which has in fact distorted the
truth.  Mori backed off his plan for simplified English which was
one of his tactics to achieve his “desired end,” not because
Whitney opposed it but because at his own discretion Mori found
it “practically impossible” to implement the other tactics—the
romanization of the spoken language of Japan—which was to set
the stage for the former (Kobayashi 2001: 62–78).  As we have
seen, his “desired end” in his language reform plan was not merely
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to abandon Japanese in favor of English, but to create a new impe-
rial language of Japan by attempting to coalesce reformed
Japanese (romanized spoken Japanese) and reformed English (sim-
plified written English) into one integrated whole.  Thus, it would
be a mistake to think that Mori gave up his whole plan to build a
new imperial language that could beat all the Western languages
just because its tactics were jettisoned for practical reasons in 1872.
More important is the fact that Mori’s discourse on language
reform played a significant role in projecting the new Japan’s
image in cultural diplomacy.  Although often misconstrued and
dismissed as an irrational personal scheme, his English discourse
on language reform should be interpreted rather in the form of
diplomatic correspondence.  If we treat it as an unofficial yet
diplomatic document, then we are better able to understand diplo-
matic rhetoric Mori strategically employed in English to secure
national interests in the game of international power game.  It is of
great significance to consider how Mori tried to negotiate the new
Japanese voice in the matter of education in Japan at home and
abroad in English as well as in Japanese while actively engaging in
cultural diplomacy.  In dealing with Mori’s English discourses on
Japan, it should be kept in mind that Mori not only represented
his country in English abroad by giving a detailed account of the
history of Japanese politics, society, and culture, but also played a
crucial role in producing the first “comprehensive account of
American politics, society, and culture written (in English) by a
Japanese” (Van Sant 2004: x).  It should be noted that much of his
discourse on language reform that stirred a controversy at home
was made abroad in English, not in Japanese.  What does this tell
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us about the implications and ramifications of the globetrotter’s
language behavior?  We are misled if we do not understand why
and how he had to perform mostly in English in representing
Japanese and Western (especially Anglo-American) civilizations
abroad; it is difficult to get to the heart of the matter if we swallow
the established theory without placing his English discourse on
language reform in the proper context.
Considered in this light, it would emerge that there are three
aspects of his diplomatic discourse on language reform operating
simultaneously in the polico-cultural context of the time.
(1) Mori’s cultural diplomacy and his 1872–73 politi-
cal maneuvering for the revision of unequal
treaties
(2) Mori’s belief in socio-linguistic Darwinism
(3) Mori’s confidence in the Japanese cross-cultural
eclectic and creative adaptation to a higher civi-
lization
It goes without saying that in all ages, one would disclose his
tactics/means in the process of international politico-cultural diplo-
macy, but rarely reveal his hidden agenda.  Therefore, it is wrong
to think that there are no politically charged terms and rhetoric
used in Mori’s English diplomatic discourses, and that there was
no ulterior motive behind his discursive maneuvering.  In analyz-
ing his English discourse in terms of the three aspects above, we
need to understand the logic behind the text operating in the
power game.  Accordingly, all his English discourses including
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Whitney’s letter to Mori, his introduction to Education in Japan, his
speech at the Twelfth Annual Meeting of the National Educational
Association Session in Boston must be seen as working toward the
one objective: Japan’s national interest.  The period beween 1872
and 1873 saw the new Japan launching out into the international
community; the Iwakuwa Mission traveled to America and Eu-
rope in the hope of observing and discovering the secret of
progress of Western civilization as well as laying the ground for the
revision of unequal treaties.  As Ivan Hall (2003: 15–20) explains,
in 1872 Mori was doing just that in America on behalf of the
Iwakura Mission.  It is also important to note that the “Iwakuwa
Mission’s greatest contribution to the new Japan was manifest in
the cultural rather than political aspect of its activities,” and that
“there was no one else who was fitter and capable enough to
become an intermediary in cultural diplomacy.”  Indeed, Mori
acted as a first-class cultural attaché and spokesman for the new
Japan; he was able to see Japan from a global perspective and talk
about the problems of its education, religion, language, political
system, and modernization in a larger context.
As Irie Akira remarks in his foreword to Vant Sant’s Mori
Arinori’s Life and Resources in America that at the time when he
served as Japanese ambassador to the U.S., the “nation was rapidly
transforming itself, in the process of redefining its identity” after
the Civil War, and that “Reconstruction (although the term is not
used) of America may have reminded him of ‘restoration’ in the
name of which his compatriots back home were trying to trans-
form their society” (Vant Sant 2004: xi).  Obviously Mori believed
that in order for the Japanese society to successfully transform into
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a modern nation, the foundations of the new Japan’s national inde-
pendence must be firmly based on quality education among other
things.  Thus he considered the problems of language and religion
as part and parcel of educational reform in Japan as well as the
revision of unequal treaties.
Using English or the “language of Christianity” fluently and
diplomatically, Mori publicized in America as well as in Britain
the Japanese opinion and stance on religion (Christianity) and lan-
guage (English) in connection with education in Japan.  There are
two major reasons for this.  First, given the political conditions at
the time, Mori had keenly realized the need to let Western (partic-
ularly Anglo-American/English-speaking) Christian nations know
that the new Japan was ready to assimilate into the Anglo-
American communities.  Mori recognized the fact that the interna-
tional laws of the time virtually applied only to “civilized” (read
Christian) nations, although it was an unwritten code (Nishikawa
and Matsumiya 1995: 28).  “Civilized” nations were synonymous
with Christian peoples.  This is why Mori found it urgent that he
write in English Religious Freedom in Japan; as he personally
believed in freedom of faith, he published it in Washington, the
center of diplomacy in America, primarily for diplomatic purpos-
es; he did so in order to urge the Japanese government to put an
end to the great persecutions of Christians in Nagasaki (1868–
1873) before the Iwakuwa Mission visited America and Europe; he
knew that such anti-Christian stance of the government would cer-
tainly work against the preliminary negotiations with the civilized
(Christian) nations.
A second reason is practical.  The English language held hege-
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mony over the realm of religion (Christianity) as much of the
knowledge of science and art.  Mori regarded English as the lan-
guage of religion and science.  This is why Mori stated in his letter
to Whitney (and in Education in Japan) that it is imperative that the
Japanese learn English “to grasp the principle truths from precious
treasury of Western science and art and religion.”  Thus he
believed that the “laws of state” was well preserved in the language
of “science and art and religion,” namely, English.  And he was
convinced that the laws of modern nation-state must be “preserved
in the language of Japan” some way or the other.
Here we can see Mori’s language thought unfolding that the
key to the advance of a nation can be found in the evolution of
language.  This idea of national language can be seen in what
might be called the socio-linguistic Darwinism.  As we have seen,
Mori was studying in Britain in the mid-1860s when there was a
national language movement growing in which many scholars and
priests (such as Max Müller and Trench) associated religion
(Christianity) with the English language and saw in the history of
language the strength of a nation.  As I have argued, Mori’s lan-
guage thought was profoundly influenced by the English religio-
linguistic paradigm in which language and religion are inextricably
linked.  Thus, Mori set out to get at the essence of Western civiliza-
tion embodied in their religion (Christianity) and language
(English) in his grand design for the building of a new language of
an imperial nation.  Seen from this angle, we can understand why
he found it politically and culturally important to publicize the
new Japan’s stance on Western religion and language abroad as
the Japanese ventured at home to incorporate some elements of
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both Christianity and English into the fabric of Japanese society in
the same period (1872–73).
In reading Mori’s diplomatic English discourses we must take
into account the political context of the revision of unequal treaties
and his strategy for his “public relations” activities at home and
abroad.  Citing his Religious Freedom in Japan as a case in point,
Ivan Hall points out:
In the pamphlet Mori argued that modernization necessi-
tates religious liberalization, assuring Americans of the
prospect of religious reform in Japan.  This tract was also
sent to Sanjyo Sanetomi, but was never translated into
Japanese.  Yoshino Sakuzo, a philosopher and scholar in
the Taisho period, interpreted Mori’s argument as a form of
public relations in his cultural diplomacy, I concur with
Yoshino in this respect. (Hall 2003: 20)
Trying to place Mori’s discourse in the context of international cul-
tural diplomacy, Hall also qualifies Yoshino’s opinion:
Then again, I think Yoshino’s interpretation does not fully
explain where Mori stood on the religious issue.  In spite of
his diplomatic rhetoric, Mori himself really believed in the
freedom of conscience and religion.  This is why he did not
approve any religion as the state religion. (ibid.)
According to Hall’s view, Mori’s Religious Freedom in Japan was a
very political discourse.  It was not so much the issue of religion,
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but rather as a question of raising the level of national status by
revising unequal treaties; it was intended to assure Western
(Christian) nations of the new Japan’s unwavering resolve to lift
the ban on Christianity at home and thereby become a “civilized”
country.  (Indeed, the following year, February in 1873, the new
Japan opened its door to Christianity.  As Hall remarks, Mori was
reluctant to accept any particular beliefs as a state religion presum-
ably because he was attempting to establish a new education in
Japan by seeking a new model for a new Japanese civilization
which was neither to belong to Eastern (Chinese therefore
Confucian) civilization nor to follow the path of Western
(Christian) civilization.  Mori was looking to find a way to dissoci-
ate a new education in Japan from any religious doctrines, thus
emulating the conventional hegemonic religious ethos at the same
time for a more liberal and therefore higher civilization
(Kobayashi 2004).  Hall further explains:
Mori’s political and cultural thought was influenced by
American intellectuals of the time, but also inspired by
British philosopher Herbert Spencer.  Indeed, Mori looked
at state education from a Spencerian point of view in the
belief that while the government is responsible for educa-
tional administration, religion (including Buddhism,
Shintoism, and Christianity) should be excluded from the
system.  Instead, Mori was searching for alternative nation-
al ethics that would replace conventional Confucian ethics.
(Hall 2003: 20)
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As I have already suggested, Mori’s outlook on life was greatly
influenced by Spencer’s theory of social Darwinism.  Mori himself
disclosed his view on religion as follows.
All those doctrines (Buddhism, Confucianism, and Shin-
toism in Japan) are now suffering a decline and are ebbing
away before the new lights of science and art, which are
being introduced from Europe and America.
(SMAZ, Vol. 5: 184)
Here we should not fail to notice that although Mori predicts the
gradual declines of Japanese religions due to the law of social evo-
lution propelled by the advancement of science and technology,
he never intends to adopt Christianity instead of old Japanese reli-
gious doctrines.  On the contrary, he levels his criticism at Christi-
anity.  The following statement he made in Life and Resources in
America (1871) in the previous year proves the point.
That while Christians claimed to have the only true religion
and pretended to be better than all other men, they did not,
in that particular, differ from the Chinese or Japanese, who
assert the same claims for their religions….  It would be a
wonderful thing, should the time ever arrive, when the so-
called Christians, who profess the faith, but do not live up
to it, shall cease to boast of the superiority of their religion,
and regard themselves as worse than all other people,
because of their guilt in making insincere professions.  True
Christians may not be considered as identical with the gen-
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eral sense of civilization—in which the good and the bad
participate, —but true philosophy would seem to teach
that it should be a leading element in such civilization.  
(SMAZ, Supplementary Vol. 1: 197–198)
Here Mori sees Christians for being no better than other religious
peoples in that they can become too dogmatic and self-righteous to
be called “believers in a true religion.”  He also comments that
Christianity should not be equated with civilization, although he
acknowledges the “true philosophy” of the religion as a legitimate
cause of Western civilization.
Given that Mori was very cautious about accepting the
Western religion as superior to other religions, it is not difficult to
understand that when he appealed for the lifting of the ban on the
Christianity in Japan, he was never an ardent advocate of the
introduction of the Western religion into the country as a state reli-
gion.  As Mori himself argues:
The department specially established for the administration
of our religious affairs, has indicated to the public as yet no
mark of its success in gaining the confidence of the people.
Far from it.  Its policy of combining the two antagonistic
faiths of Buddhism and Shintoism, which some time since
was inaugurated under its sway, has utterly failed to com-
mand our respect.  Its attempt to impose upon our people a
religion of its creation cannot receive too severe condemna-
tion, because such attempt not only disregards our sacred
liberty of conscience, but its effect is to crush the very soul
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of man. (SMAZ, Vol. 2: 68)
It is plain to see that what Mori is trying to say here is not that
Christianity is a better religion than Buddhism and Shintoism, but
rather that a state religion would neither guarantee the people’s
“liberty of conscience” nor protect the “very soul of man.”  Put
simply, he did not believe in any particular “religion” that catered
to the government’s interests at the expense of man’s moral sense
and dignity ( Just as Mori looked at the problem of religion in
Japan, so he took a critical look at Christianity).  However, be-
cause of his tract Religious Freedom in Japan, Mori wound up being
labeled by many nativists as an “abominable Christian” who had a
plot to abolish Shintoism.  The right-wing libelers would never
have thought that Mori bothered to write the pamphlet in English
with good cause; he did so in the diplomatic context with the view
of improving the image of the new Japanese and thus revising
unequal treaties for national independence.
Religio-linguistic reconfiguration in cultural diplomacy
It is clear that Mori’s English discourses produced in diplomatic
settings were intended to make a difference in the geo-cultural pol-
itics of the Japanese and other peoples.  I would like to lay special
emphasis on his discursive strategy in which Mori, on the one
hand, seeks to project a Christian-like image in the realm of
Chinese (Confucian/Buddhist) civilization, while he, on the other,
appears to attempt to create a non-Christian-like image in the
sphere of Western (Christian) civilization.  The point to observe is
that Mori almost always keeps the strengths and weaknesses of
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both civilizations in perspective.  The prime example can be found
in his interview with Li Hongzhang.  In the meeting conducted in
English and Chinese, Mori takes up the question of what is today
called the “gender” issue that he says hinders the progress of Asian
societies in a broader context of the clashes of the religious ethos
of Eastern and Western civilizations.
In the diplomatic meeting, Mori and Li first broach the sub-
jects of the rights and wrongs of discarding the old Asian ethnic
costumes for the new Western clothes.  Then Mori discusses its
advantages and disadvantages, not the rights or wrongs, of replac-
ing the old with the new, emphasizing the Japanese rational and
pragmatic attitude to the new civilization.  Obviously he is trying
to differentiate the Japanese (“Us”) from the Chinese (“Them”)
here.  Unable to understand why the Japanese are so eager to de-
Orientalize and Westernize themselves, Li asks him a general ques-
tion, “by the by what do you think upon the probable effect which
is to be seen the sooner or later of the intercourse now held
between Asia and Europe?  Mori remarks:
That is a very great question.  It is, I should say, a question
concerning the competition for supremacy between the
races and the religion as well as for intelligence, power, and
wealth between two of the great divisions of the world (=
Asia and Europe).  Though an Asiatic man, I must confess
that there will, in my humble opinion, be a very long time
or some centuries before Asia to become capable of com-
peting with Europe.  The Asiatics as a people, live so low
and degraded a life only little better than that of beasts.  
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(SMAZ, Vol. 1: 379)
This statement indicates that for Mori, the issue of women’s status
also has a great deal with the “competition for supremacy” be-
tween East and West.  When Mori said, “The Asiatics as a people,
live so low and degraded a life only little better than that of
beasts,” he obviously had the women issue in mind.  Puzzled by
Mori’s deprecating comment on the life of Asians, Li had to ask
him “How so?”  Mori answers as follows.
The position ordained for woman to occupy, is one of the
highest and most sacred ever created by the will of the
Supreme Being.  It is that of the mother of mankind in gen-
eral, and of a country and family in particular.  Now look at
the actual condition of the women everywhere in Asia, and
the position they occupy.  They are both regarded and
treated as little better than some other animals.  You will
see, without my telling any further, the truth of what [I] said
before respecting the low life of Asiatic people. (ibid.)
Surprised by Mori’s Christian-like view of women as well as his
use of the term “the Supreme Being,” Li uttered, “Do you belong
to the Christian religion?”  In response to his question, Mori
replies:
I profess none of those so called religions: the Christian, the
Buddhist, the Mohammedan or anything else. I am a plain man,
just as appearing now before you.  The aim of my life is
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simply to live an honest and harmless life.  I nevertheless
find it extremely difficult to so conduct myself, in conse-
quence of the constant interference of the same self of mine
against it. (ibid.: 380; my emphasis)
Li was so impressed by Mori’s religious and life philosophy that he
exclaimed, “What great wisdom in you!  Even the greatest Confu-
cius would like to attentively listen to such interesting a conversa-
tion like this.”
The questions we must consider here are, exactly what did
Mori mean when he said “created by the will of the Supreme
Being?”  Was he ever a true Christian?  Did he really understand
what God means in the Christian sense of the term?  Then why
did he positively state he had no faith whatsoever in “any of those
so-called religions?”  Did he not realize he was contradicting him-
self?  What is more, why did he bother to speak to Li in English
through a Chinese interpreter on the “gender” issue?  Why in
English?  Why not in Japanese or Chinese?  What did the use of
English have to do with the “gender” issue Mori raised in the inter-
view?59 In order to answer these questions, we need first to exam-
ine how Mori interpreted the concept of the Christian “God.”
As we have seen, when Mori talked about the position of
women in Asian nations in such Christian parlance as “the highest
and most sacred ever created by the will of the Supreme Being,”
he seemed to ascribe the root of the problem of gender inequality
in Asian countries to the Confucian/feudal ethos that originated in
China.  Meanwhile, he was immensely impressed by the Christian
ethos that set a premium on gender equality.  Indeed, while stay-
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ing in London, Mori learned that Christians treated kindly not
only women but also non-Christians and especially physically
handicapped people as equals with human dignity (Inuzuka 1986:
57–58).
The question we must consider here is what exactly Mori
meant when he mentioned the “Supreme Being.”  Or did Mori
ever think of “the God” as an entity which has personal feelings
and character like a human being?  In light of the fact that he men-
tions the “will of the Supreme Being” in an interview with Li
Hongzhang, we may recall here that during his stay in Britain ten
years before, Mori had understood Christianity as kishin no setsu
(the theory of demons).  Before he traveled to Russia in 1866, he
stayed at an inn in Newcastle where he met a “Christian” hostess
named Millie.  In his travels of Russia, he writes that the lady took
good care of him and he was “deeply moved by her kindness.”  At
the same time, a devout Christian and churchgoer, she talked to
him about the “will of the Christian God (Shang-ti) who decrees
that people love and help each other,” which “distinguishes
between humans and animals.”  And she strongly urged him to
“go to temple” with her.  Mori “had a hard time declining her kind
‘religious’ offer.”  Failing to fathom out what the woman could pos-
sibly mean by the “will of God,” he looked upon it as the “theory
of demons” (SMAZ, Vol. III: 8).
Another point to observe here is that using the quasi-religious
concept of kishin no setsu 60 (the theory of demons), Mori tries to
understand the Christian God within the Confucian and Buddhist
frames of reference (see Koyasu 2002); he uses the terms “Shang-
ti” representing God, temple meaning “church.”  Retuning to his
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interview with Li Hongzhang, we must consider the following
question again: Did Mori really mean “Shang-ti” when he said
“the Supreme Being?”  Or could it be that Mori came to under-
stand “the Supreme Being” as the absolute Christian God with per-
sonal feelings and human-like character?  As far as I can gather
from my research, there is compelling evidence to prove his posi-
tion on the religious matter.  The evidence can be found in Mori’s
letter to British linguist and scholar of Eastern religions Max
Müller (1823–1900).  The letter is included in The Life and Letters of
the Right Honourable Friedrich Max Müller complied by his wife
Georgina Adelaide (1794–1919).61 According to Adelaide’s exposi-
tion of the letter, we find that when Mori was working in the U.S.
in the capacity as chargé de’affaires in 1873, he traveled to Britain
and rushed into Müller’s house seeking advice on the question of
state religion in Japan.  Adelaide writes:
The following letter from Arinori Mori, at this time Japa-
nese Minister in England, is of interest as giving the view of
an enlightened Buddhist on the ‘Shang-ti’ question.  Arinori
had been staying with Max Müller, and delighted every
one by his bright, joyous manner.  It was he who, years
before, when Minister in the United States, had rushed into
Max Müller’s rooms asking him in ten minutes to fix on a
state religion for Japan.  He was very different now, and
with all his high spirits there was an earnestness of purpose
about him which inspired his host with a feeling of strong
regard. (1976: 97–98; my emphasis)
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Several years after he consulted Müller about the problem of state
religion in Japan, Mori in turn wrote to the distinguished scholar of
Oriental religions and languages advising as to how the Chinese
term “Shang-ti” should be rendered into English.  The letter reads
as follows:
JAPANESE LEGATION, LONDON, November 22, 1880
DEAR PROFESSOR MAX MÜLLER, —I scarcely need
to say that my recent visit to Oxford greatly benefited me,
and that I immensely enjoyed myself during my stay under
your kind care and most hospitable roof.  ‘I have since read
with much interest the copy kindly given me by Dr. Legge
of his letter addressed to you on the “term-question” Shang-
ti.  I venture to express that Dr. Legge’s translation of the
term into God is on the whole correct, though in some
cases the word God, when rendered by Shang-ti, may not
be intelligible to the Chinese or any of the Far Eastern peo-
ple, as being used to represent a living, sympathetic Being
with all His attributes of love and tenderness.  It is true that
Shang-ti has been regarded as the Supreme Being and the
Dispenser of all justice and benevolence, but never as so
sympathetic a Being as is held by the Christian faith.
In Mori’s understanding, “Shang-ti” can be construed as the cultur-
al equivalent of “God” or “the Supreme Being” or “the Dispenser
of all justice and benevolence.”  However, he draws a line between
impersonal and personal God; he figures that people from non-
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Western countries may find it “intelligible” if translated as the
humanized divinity such as “a living, sympathetic Being with His
attributes of love and tenderness.”  It will be clear from the
Adelaide’s description of Mori and what is said in this letter that
Mori was a cultural relativist.
As regards the question of whether or not Mori was really a
Christian, there is further compelling evidence to unravel the mys-
tery showing how Mori interpreted the concept of Western/
Christian God.  He wrote in English Religious Freedom in Japan and
published it in Washington in 1872.  The point to note is that the
pamphlet was also to be addressed to Grand Minister of State
Sanjyo Sanetomi (1837–1891) in Japan (The pamphlet was to be
later translated into Japanese).  The reason that it was written in
English to his countryman was plausibly because Mori, serving as
cultural diplomat, understood the importance of explaining to the
Western/Judeo-Christian nations where the Japanese government
stood on the issue of religious freedom in Japan.  At that time,
Japan was being severely criticized by Western countries for the
persecutions of Christians in Nagasaki by the government.  So he
was well aware that the political and cultural implications and
ramifications of the anti-Christian policy adopted in Japan in 1868
would work against the negotiation for the revision of unequal
treaties with Western powers.
Mori, looking at the cultural politics of Christianity at home
and abroad in light of the revision of unequal treaties, intervened
in the “international” (read Christian) community by writing in
English, so that he could redress the situation where Japan was
labeled as an anti-Christian therefore “savage” nation as opposed
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to Christian therefore “civilized” Western nations.  This is why the
pamphlet was doubly addressed to both anti-Christian Japanese
government officials and Western Christians in general.  Appeal-
ing to Minister Sanjyo for religious freedom in Japan, Mori argues
as follows:
Since religion is entirely a matter of individual belief, no
one or government can be presumed to possess the authori-
ty of repudiating whatever faith any man may cherish with-
in himself … and that irrespective of our class organization
of society, nature or the Creator distributes human qualities
unequally among us, and therefore it cannot be expected
that all will take the same view of such a question.  
(SMAZ, Vol. 2: 72; emphasis added)
What is significant in this quote is that while Mori takes a liberal
attitude toward religions in general, he seems to be very careful in
his choice of words in his discussion of what makes humans equal;
he referred to it as “nature” or “Creator” instead of “God.”  Obvi-
ously he must have intended to use the alternative terms so that
the non-Christian Japanese and Christian Westerners both would
understand the point he made about the issue of religious freedom.
In those days, the word “nature” was taken by intellectuals in
Japan to mean shou (one’s disposition) or ten (heaven) in the
Confucian sense.  In other words, it was never supposed to mean
“personified God” in the Christian sense (see Yanabu 2001: 127–
148).  Consequently, when he also mentions in the pamphlet,”
Every one that lives is himself solely responsible to his Creator for
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all his thoughts and deeds,” he takes the “Creator” to mean
“nature” as well.  As shown already, this corresponds to his inter-
pretations of “God” and “Shang-ti” in his letter to Max Müller.
As Saeki Hiroto (1958: 236) explains, historically the concept
of “religion” itself had not been fully developed and discussed in
Japan until early Meiji when Mori first brought up the question of
“religious freedom” as a national issue.  From a historical and ety-
mological point of view, Saeki (ibid.: 237) goes on to suggest that
the Japanese were traditionally not ready to discuss the Western
concept of “religion” that “presupposes a superhuman and super-
natural entity, clearly distinguishes it from humans, and connects
the latter with the former emotionally and imaginatively.”  We
may say, in this respect, that Mori was one of the modern Japanese
intellectuals who tried to interpret “religion” as a personal faith in
“what is neither a human nor nature,” which guarantees one’s con-
science and goes beyond a particular belief in a particular god or
goddess, non-Christian or Christian.  It should be clear that the
purpose of Mori’s pamphlet on Religious Freedom in Japan was (1) to
prevent the Meiji government from establishing the state religion
in Japan that would impose upon the people one particular reli-
gious belief; (2) to let it be known abroad that Japan was becoming
“civilized” enough to embrace Christianity.
The question then arises as to whether Mori was a true Chris-
tian or not.  Since Hayashi Takeji (1968) tackled the question of
Mori’s faith in Christianity, it still remains shrouded in mystery.
Then there appears to be some strong evidence in Mori’s letter to
Max Müller to settle the matter.  In it, Adelaide (Müller 1976: 97)
implicitly described Mori as being not Christian : “The following
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letter from Arinori Mori, at this time Japanese Minister in
England, is of interest as giving the view of an enlightened Buddhist
on the ‘Shang-ti’ question” (my italics).  To the best of my knowl-
edge, there is no other literature, in English or Japanese, which
depicts Mori as being an “enlightened Buddhist.”  While it is still
debatable whether he was really a Buddhist, what is more impor-
tant here is not so much whether or not he was a Buddhist, but
rather that he was not what is called “a true Christian.”
To put this into perspective, the confession of his religious faith
must be recalled here.  As we have seen, when asked by Li Hong-
zhang,” Do you belong to the Christian region?”  Mori clearly
answered in Englsih,” I profess none of those so called religions:
the Christian, the Buddhist, the Mohammedan or anything else.”
In this sense, Kimura (1986: 112) is right when he says that “As the
question of whether or not Mori was a convinced Christian, when
all is said, it seems reasonable to conclude that in a way he was
both a Christian and a non-Christian.  For Mori, however, it was
neither a contradiction nor a conversion at all.”  In short, Mori
believed in his own religion in his own way.
Then, what exactly was his religious view of nature like?
Concerning the Japanese philosophy of shizen or nature,
Yamamoto Shichihei and Komuro Naoki (1981: 161) explain in The
Sociology of the Religion of Japan that “for the Japanese, the word
shizen encompasses three forms of orders: personal (inner), social
(outer), and natural (the other outer).  And these three correspond
with one another.”  As regards the difference in the meaning of
nature between the Chinese and the Japanese words, they go on to
suggest:
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On the other hand, there is no exact Chinese equivalent of
the Japanese shizen.  In Chinese, all the outer aspects of
nature are seen as tenchi or the heaven and the earth, while
the inner aspect is called shou or innate traits.  Unlike the
import of the Japanese word, therefore, the Chinese “na-
ture” in itself does not become social and cultural norms,
although Confucianism and Taoism differ in the interpreta-
tion of the concept. (ibid.)
There is much justice in this view.  Assuming that Yamamoto and
Komuro are right about the Japanese religious view on nature, it
can be argued that Mori was no exception; his outlooks on nature
and religion coincided as such.  Indeed, there is collateral evi-
dence to support our argument.  Mori’s personal view of religion
as part of his philosophy of shizen (nature) is manifest in An Inter-
view with the Japanese Ambassador of Public Affairs on his Departure
from England (1884).  What is really interesting here is that, based
on his “natural” reflection of people in society, Mori discloses his
view of the religion of Japan as he talks about the “position of
women in Japan” in the context of “Japanese civilization versus
Western civilization” in exactly the same way as he did in an inter-
view with Li Hongzhang in China.  He states:
There is, however, one thing in which you have an advan-
tage over us and that is in relation to the position of
women.  I don’t know whether it is your religion, of what it
is.  In the Old Testament the idea of the relations between
the sexes was not what it is now; neither was it for some
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centuries after Christ.  But then there came a change, and
woman was lifted to a position of greater equality with
man.  Polygamy and bigamy were treated as crimes.  That
is very good.  With us we have still much to do.  Our
women are not in the same position as yours.  They have
not the education, neither have they the same advantages
of social intercourse.  They are gentle and pure; they are
industrious, and perform their domestic duties, but they are
not on an equality with men.  That is one of the greatest
problems with which we have to deal—the education and
elevation of women.  We are establishing girls school, in
which we are giving them a liberal secular education, like
to that of the boys; but there is a great difficulty ever with
us.  The pressure of religious principle is very slight, and
the future is full of difficulty.  How we shall settle it we do
not as yet know but we will press onward.  
(SMAZ, Vol. 1 440–441)
Interestingly, as he highly praises the respected position of women
in Britain and sees it as part of the strength of the country, he
views its origin as not being in the Judeo-Christian tradition.  This
corroborates our working hypothesis that he never believes in the
Bible story that the Christian God created all men and women
equal.  Related to this is the fact that in The Japanese in America, he
traces the history of Japanese civilization, suggesting that in the
beginning there was no tradition of male chauvinism or a disdain
for women in Japan, and that it is largely due to the Chinese feu-
dalistic influence that the Japanese people came to see women as
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inferior to men.  There is a passage in The Japanese in America that
says:
The nations of Asia pay little respect to ladies, and it is true,
in many cases.  This degradation of woman unfortunately
arose from mistaken views, inculcated in the philosophy of
China, for Chinese classics found their way into Japan
much as those Greece and Rome did among scholars of
Western nations. (SMAZ, Supplementary Vol. 1: 472–473)
The foregoing extracts reveal that in this interview held in Britain
he wants to let Westerners know that even though Japan is ahead
of China in social evolution, he admits that “women’s status” is
one of the key issues which still remain to be solved.  However, it
is important to note here that in the discourse he does not neces-
sarily associate the “gender” issue with the Christian ethos.
Instead, while he acknowledges the superiority of Christianity in
gender equality over other religions, he asserts with emphasis that
there has been a commonsense religion in Japanese civilization.
He argues:
When you ask me to compare Japanese with English civi-
lization, and especially to say whether it is better to be born
a Japanese or an Englishman, I must decline to reply.  I am
a Japanese in blood.  I cannot be impartial; but I must say
there is one thing in Japan which you have not here, and
which if miss [sic].  You had it perhaps hundreds years ago
to some extent, but we have it to a much greater extent in
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Japan.  I refer to the sense of brotherhood which binds together
all the members of one family, and extends from them to
all dwellers in one district.  There is no member of our fam-
ily, no matter how weak or poor, who has not a right to
come upon the head of his household for assistance, with
the full conviction that it will not be refused him.  When I
am in Tokio [sic], for instance, there is no man from my
native village, no matter how poor, how mean, or how des-
titute he may be, who would not have the utmost confi-
dence in coming to me for assistance.  Nor can I refuse it
him.
Emphasizing the Japanese sense of brotherhood, Mori goes on to
say:
You may say if you like is one great element of practical reli-
gion among my people.  Thus it is that we keep the second
commandment of Christ: “Thou shall love thy neighbor as
thyself.  Among other things this sentiment has very good
results.
and
In the city of Tokyo, with a population of 1,500,000, there
are only 800 or 900—certainly less than 1,000—persons
who depend upon the State for their support—that is, who
correspond to your paupers.  In London, with three times
the number of inhabitants, you have something more than
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thirty times the proportionate number of paupers.  
(SMAZ, Vol. 1: 439–440; emphasis added)
The above passages show that Mori used a few key Christian
terms such as “sense of botherhood” and “second commandment
of Christ.  The fact that Mori focused on the idea of “brotherhood”
as part of his philosophy of social solidarity may have to do with
his youthful experience with Thomas Lake Harris (1823–1906)’s
Christian community called the “Brotherhood of the New Life.”
Incidentally, as Kimura (1986: 107) remarks, Mori’s religious
thought is much closer to that of Emanuel Swedenborg (1688–1772)
than that of Harris who was Swedenborgian as well.  Both
Swedenborg and Harris were not orthodox Christians; they were
reformed Christians who looked at Christianity critically.
Although Hayashi (1968) thoroughly explored whether Mori
became Christian at the Brotherhood of the New Life, he seemed
to have failed to see how Mori managed to reconcile the moral
compass that he had had before he met Harris with the doctrine of
reformed Christianity he later came to grips with.
The pertinent question we must consider is, did he really come
to have faith in Christianity?  If so, from what did he convert to it?
Had he practiced any other religions?  If he did not embrace
Christianity after all, what “religion” did he practice?  Was he an
atheist?  To get to the heart of the matter, we need to search for the
truth in his statements quoted above.  As he makes clear himself in
the above quote, Mori was a believer in none other than what he
calls “practical religion” which “is based on “the sense of brother-
hood which binds together all the members of one family, and
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extends from them to all dwellers in one district.”  And from a
cross-cultural point of view, he likened such common-sensical,
down-to-earth ethic to the “second commandment of Christ”
which says “Thou shall love thy neighbor as thyself.”  These com-
ments would make him sound not so much like an “enlightened
Buddhist,” as Müller’s wife called him, but rather as if he was an
enlightened (= reformed) Christian who can tolerate other reli-
gious beliefs as long as they make sense.
We may, therefore, reasonably conclude that Mori was the
kind of Japanese who gave Westerners the impression of being
both an enlightened (= reformed) Buddhist and Christian.  From
this cross-cultural point of view, I want to argue that this is precise-
ly what Yamamoto and Komuro (1981) refer to as nihon-kyouto or a
believer in “Japanese religion” based on situational ethics that will
allow people to relativize and embrace conflicting elements in the
ideal and practical worlds (see also Reader and Tanabe (1998) for
other aspects of “practical religion” in Japan).  There is every rea-
son to believe that Mori was a nihon-kyouto who practiced what
might be called “Japanese practical religion.”  This, however, is
not to suggest that Mori had faith in one of those particular reli-
gions (Shinto, Buddhism, and Confucianism) that had long existed
in Japan.
According to Yamamoto and Komuro’s theory, nihon-kyou
( Japanese religion) is not so much a belief in a particular religion
in Japan as a social and cultural system that underlies the dynam-
ics of the intra-and inter-personal communication (1981: 123–156).
The principles of what Yamamoto and Komuro call “Japanese reli-
gion” are unique in Japan in that it has no such doctrines or scrip-
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tures as seen in Western religions.  So there is less likely to be a
clash of different values and norms among the nihon-kyou believ-
ers.  Moreover, since it is the Japanese language that plays a cru-
cial role in constituting the bedrock of the whole system, nihon-
kyou would not be easily understood and practiced in foreign lan-
guages.
However, Mori ventured to practice it in English in cross-cul-
tural settings.  Consequently, Mori can be seen as an “enlightened
(= reformed) nihon-kyouto; because he further applied the particu-
lar/domestic principles of Japanese religious philosophy to the
cross-national/cultural settings, trying to interpret and communi-
cate them in English.  He was probably the first Japanese diplo-
mat-politician who, in his cultural diplomacy, attempted to explain
in English to Westerners what “religion” means to the Japanese
and how it works in Japan.
What needs to be emphasized at this juncture is that, as we
have seen, Mori claimed to practice what he called “Japanese prac-
tical religion” in the East (China) and the West (America and
Britain).  On the one hand, in his interview with Li Hongzhang, he
used such Christian terms as “the Creator” or “the Supreme
Being” for non-Confucian effect, thus making himself sound like a
Christian, but later made a statement to the effect that he was none
other than a nihon-kyouto who could understand the universal
ethics found both in Confucianism and Christianity.  On the other
hand, in America and Britain, he once again implicitly and explic-
itly claimed to be a nihon-kyouto by strategically avoiding Christian
terms (e.g. God) and instead employing Oriental terms (e.g.
nature), thus embracing Christianity.  In this way he not only suc-
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ceeded in English in establishing his position as a believer in his
own “Japanese religion,” but also in relativizing dominant religious
ethos—Confucianism and Christianity—in the East and the West
in much the same fashion.
All this points to the geo-cultural international politics of Meiji
Japan in the late nineteenth century.  Since “Japan consciously
acted as a proxy of the ‘West’ on such occasions of foreign diplo-
macy (Murata 2000: 35),” Japan also sought to serve as a new rep-
resentative of the “East” when confronted with the West.  Engag-
ing in cultural diplomacy in Britain, America, China, and the old
Japan, for that matter, Mori appears to have tactically played the
inter-and intra-national games by switching the proxy roles of old
and new civilizations so that the new Japan could secure a perfor-
mative or transformative position between the significant Others,
as alternative civilization.
In this geo-cultural and political position lies his stance on the
pressing issues connected with education in Japan.  For education-
al reform to be effectively implemented, Mori believed, the issues
of religion and language had to be given top priority.  As he clear-
ly states in his Education in Japan, “Religion and language are two
subjects in which our people are generally interested,” and “An
allusion to the subject of the Japanese language bears a most direct
relation to the contents of this book.”  This is precisely why he put
forth proposals for reformation of religion and language in the
same period (1972–73).
As I suggested earlier, Mori was a nihon-kyouto (a believer in
the Japanese “practical religion” that goes beyond traditional reli-
gious, moral and ethical norms—Shinto, Buddhism, and Confu-
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cianism—that had existed in Japan for a long period of time.  And
after much deliberation he thought it best to designate none of
them as “state religion” in Japan simply because he believed in
universal rather than particular norms that would allow freedom of
conscience regardless of race, creed, and nationality.  Conse-
quently, his idea of “religious reformation” was meant to be real-
ized not only in Japan but also in her significant Others’ nations
(Britain/America, and China).  In short, Mori was the embodiment
of an enlightened nihon-kyouto who set out to break down the barri-
ers of different religions and languages.
Meanwhile, we must not forget that Mori, an out-and-out
reformer at home, was also a game player in the international
power politics.  As Hall (2003: 20) points out, his English dis-
course on religious freedom in Japan should be seen not only as
coming from his personal beliefs but also as intended for diplomat-
ic purposes.  The acceptance of Christianity and English in Japan,
he hoped, might pave the way for Japan to be allowed entry into
the international (English-speaking) communities and to revise the
unequal treaties signed by the Tokugawa government with the
Western powers.
Given his such diplomatic stance on the matter of religion
(especially concerning Christianity at home), it is only reasonable
to suppose that he must have applied the same principle to anoth-
er urgent issue: language reformation in Japan (Kobayashi 2004).
Hall, however, makes no further comments on the other side of his
package plan: the issue of language reformation that he was tack-
ling in parallel with that of religious reformation.  As we have
seen, he had a Spencerian and scientific view of language as well
― 262―
as religion in Japan.  Indeed, he set much store on social-
Darwinism and science.  He was deeply convinced that unless no
progressive measures were taken, irrational social system would
deteriorate in due course of time.
In spite of his radical thought of social reformation, Mori never
said a word for the abolition of “doomed” religions and language
in Japan, although he remarked that there was an urgent need to
“do away with the use of Chinese characters” in the language of
Japan.  According to the established theory about his political and
social thought, he is often regarded as an ultra-Westernized pes-
simist who was eager to abolish Japanese culture in favor of
Western civilization.  I must say that this is a gross misinterpreta-
tion of his discourses that was operating in the dynamics of the Self
and the Other.  The distortion of the discursive reality of his cul-
tural diplomacy arises from the literal interpretation of his state-
ments made in the larger context of the geo-cultural politics of
Meiji Japan.
It is true that there were public occasions and places in his dis-
courses where he referred to the negative aspects of the social/
political/cultural systems using controversial and contradictory
terms.  That, however, is merely a half-truth.  Contrary to the
accepted theory, throughout his introductory discourse in Educa-
tion in Japan, he strongly emphasized the collective strength of the
Japanese people: the outstanding ability to evolve by absorbing a
higher civilization without compromising their ethnic identity
legitimized by the historical and cultural continuity of the imperial
family.  As already discussed in Part I, he had an absolute faith in
the great strengths of Japanese civilization as well as its weakness-
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es.  Otherwise, in spite of commenting on the possibility of the
decline of religion and language in Japan due to the law of social
evolution, he would have never closed his introductory essay in
Education in Japan by declaring that “our intelligent race” are
“eager in the pursuit of knowledge,” and that “Japan as a nation
has no aspiration but that of the highest, and no intention but that
of the best in her relations with her foreign friends.”
Here we must also draw attention to the fact that Mori not only
had a Spencerian view of the Japanese culture but also looked crit-
ically at Western religion and language—Christianity and Eng-
lish—from a Darwinian standpoint.  As we have seen, he keenly
realized the need for religious freedom in Japan in terms of both
his inner convictions and political circumstances at the time.  By
the same token, he impartially criticized Christians’ arrogant and
self-righteous attitude toward other peoples from non-Christian
cultures, as being no less uncivilized—definitely unchristian—
than rather dogmatic priests in Japan and China.  Just as he
viewed Eastern religions as declining because of or in spite of the
law of nature, so he saw Christianity as a Western religion that
could be no better than other religions when its believers became
too dogmatic and prejudiced against what they call “gentiles” in
the East.  Thus, it was Mori’s firm conviction that Westerners as
well as Asians needed what might be called “religious reforma-
tion” in pursuit of a higher civilization.
What I want to argue is that Mori must have applied the very
same logic of religion to the issue of language reform in Japan.  He
was absolutely convinced that there is no such language that is
absolutely perfect in terms of orthography and notation.  For Mori,
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as with their religion, their language was no exception.  A new lan-
guage of imperial Japan that he had in mind would have to be bet-
ter than any other existing language in the world.  Thus he needed
professional help in deciding on the future of national language as
well as state religion; then he asked Whitney, a distinguished U.S.
linguist, for advice on national language in 1872 and then consult-
ed Max Müller, a prominent British linguist and scholar of Eastern
religions, about state religion in 1873.  In his Religious Freedom in
Japan, Mori denounced Shinto and Buddhism as too dogmatic to
ensure religious freedom for Christians in Japan; his image of an
ideal religion was one that treats people equally regardless of race
and creed, and above all, guarantees “our sacred liberty of con-
science.”  In a word, he was keenly aware of the need for religious
reformation in Japan.  Correspondingly he found it urgent that
there be language reformation as well; he proposed introducing
not only a reformed (simplified) English but also as a reformed
(romanized) Japanese at the same time in order to integrate them
into a better language of modern Japan.
Then it is reasonable to suppose that just as he saw the Japa-
nese language as declining because of or in spite of the law of
nature if nothing was done to prevent it, so he also viewed English
as a Western language that could and should be improved before it
yielded to the law of the progress and decayed.  Indeed, in his lan-
guage reform scheme, he pointed out the orthographical defects of
Japanese and Chinese while at the same time indicating that there
is a basic defect in the orthographical system of the English lan-
guage.  When he first found in Britain that there had not been
much progress in the reformation by Western scholars of the
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English irregular spellings for the past several centuries, he dared
to declare that the Japanese would take up the challenge of “com-
pleting the unfinished work” for the benefit of “not only English
speaking people but the world at large.”  What we have here is
none other than a parallel reformation of religion and language.
Furthermore, the point we should not overlook at this juncture
is the way in which Mori’s discourses on religio-linguistic reforma-
tion began to be constructed in the early 1870s.  In 1871–72, when
Life and Resources in America and his letter to Whitney were written,
he fairly criticized Western religion (Christianity) in the former,
and language (the English language) in the latter, for their incon-
gruities and inadequacies.  It is interesting to note, however, that in
Religious Freedom in Japan and Education in Japan, which were pub-
lished in 1872–73, he discussed the issues of religion and language
in Japan critically without mentioning the Western counterparts at
all.  What this suggests is his diplomatic strategies and tactics for
representing the cultures of America and the new Japan on behalf
of the right people at the right time.  As far as Religious Freedom in
Japan and Education in Japan are concerned, the message he want-
ed to convey through the discourses was that the new Japan was
eager to accommodate itself to Western civilization in terms of reli-
gion and language and thereby assimilate into the Anglo-
American religio-lingual community in the hope of revising
unequal treaties.  Viewed from this angle, it is not hard to imagine
why he decided to include Whitney’s letter in reply to his inquiry
in Education in Japan but did not release his private letter to
Whitney to the public.  In this way, he could make his diplomatic
discourses sound less critical of Western civilization.  And by high-
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lighting Whitney’s approval for the adoption of English (if not sim-
plified English) in Japan, he wanted to emphasize the message that
the Japanese were more than willing to introduce into the country
their language (English) along with their religion (Christianity) in
order to join the Anglo-American religio-lingual discourse commu-
nity.
Thus, Mori’s language attitude is inextricably linked to his view
of religious relativity.  In fact, while on the one hand, acknowledg-
ing the universal principles of science and art, he took a thorough-
ly relative approach to language in the same way as he did with
religion.  He disclosed his firm belief that the key to a successful
reformation of religion and language lies in education in Japan
that would seek to embrace universality while resting on its own
particularity or long-standing tradition that absorbs, digests, and
surpasses.
What is of most significance in this argument is Mori’s relativis-
tic position on what was often represented and prescribed as
“absolute boons” from Western civilization: Christianity and
English.  His mentality concerning state religion gives us a clue as
to how he looked at national language.  Unfortunately, remarkably
little historical research has been conducted on the question of
whether he was really an aggressive advocate of the abolition of
indigenous language ( Japanese) in favor of foreign language
(English), and of whether he was really a so-called Christian.  As a
result of religio-political backlash that ensued from his strategic yet
controversial proposals for state religion and national language, he
ended up being only assassinated by an ultra-nationalistic fanatic;
and he has up to the present been branded as a traitor to his coun-
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try.
It has been demonstrated in the preceding discussion that there
is sufficient evidence to show that Mori was neither what is called
a true Christian nor an abolitionist of the indigenous language of
Japan.  His attitude to language and religion is characterized by his
critical insight and belief in cultural relativity.  All this is reflected
in the way he treated language and religion, Western or Eastern, as
a means of education (or enlightenment) for the new Japanese peo-
ple from the perspective of a rather rational and pragmatic super-
samurai Japanese intellectual: hence, the ideas of reformed
Japanese and reformed English as well as reformed Shintoism
(/Buddhism) and reformed Christianity.
English Studies as geo-cultural/political scheme for LEEWCTIO
The most arresting feature of Mori’s attitude to Western civi-
lization in relation to Eastern civilization can be seen in his critical
approach to the relativizing of Christianity and the English lan-
guage in an effort to modernize the religions and language in
Japan.  As for the issue of religious reform, since the new Japan
was aiming at creating a new civilization higher than any other in
the world, Mori not only considered unthinking and liberalizing
old Japanese religious ethos by introducing Christianity into the
country; he was also simultaneously unthinking and liberalizing
old Western religious ethos by relativizing Christianity under the
influence of Christian reformist Tomas Lake Harris.  By the same
token, he proposed revamping the old hieroglyphic written lan-
guage of Japan by introducing the Roman alphabet into the coun-
try, while also attempting to further modernize the conventional
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English language by simplifying its irregular spellings and conjuga-
tions before it could be adopted by the Japanese.  His idea of such
reformation of religion and language was for the new Japan to
reach a higher plane of civilization in the world.  Here let me
stress again that this global and competitive mindset of his was
developed and operated in the English Studies that arguably pro-
vided him with a geo-cultural/political scheme for LEEWCTIO; it
was first nurtured in his Satsuma days, then cultivated in his gov-
ernment-designated student days in Britain and America, and fully
activated in his days as ambassador to those two cuntries.
As we saw in Part I, Mori was engaged in Chinese Learning
and English Learning, which must have caused a serious clash of
cultural values deriving from different religious and moral ethos—
Western (Christian) and Eastern (Confucian)—and different lan-
guages based on different mediums—a phonetic alphabet and
hieroglyphic characters.  In other words, his formative years in
Satsuma and student days in Britain and America were a momen-
tous period when he was to prepare himself to break with conven-
tion and build a new identity and character in the new world.
Apparently there was a fundamental paradigm shift in the way he
looked at language and religion.  We may recall here that just
before he first traveled to Britain he wrote his own “Ten Com-
mandments”62 in the traditional Chinese style that dictated his
behavior in general ranging from psychological to dietary to sexu-
al to linguistic habits.  Our concern here is the quasi-religious
significance of his precepts for his life.  Although he did not have
and practice any particular religion at that time, he had his own
moral codes of conduct based on bushido that embodied the spirit
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of what Hall called “the super-samurai.”  Of particular relevance
in this paper is his first precept for language use that says, “lan-
guage must be used strictly for pragmatic reasons; nothing more,
nothing less.”  This statement can be interpreted to mean that one
should be careful enough not to make language learning become
an end in itself.  It suggests that Mori had seen Chinese Studies
often becoming too metaphysical—overly formalized and
exalted—to function as pragmatic learning in the physical world.
Seen from this perspective, we are better able to understand why
Mori had to make a remark in his letter to Whitney to the effect
that language should be taught as efficiently as possible in order
for the learners to minimize the time spent in the study of a foreign
language and instead maximize the time “devoted to the study of
numerous branches of human development.”
Related to this point is the difference in nature between
Chinese Learning and English Learning which Mori applied him-
self closely to in his Satsuma student days; English Learning was
intended to know their new enemy nation, while Chinese Learn-
ing was not.  Put simply, the purpose of the “know-your-enemy”
studies that had emerged in nineteenth-century Japan after Dutch
Learning was to beat Western rivals (especially Britain and
America) at their own game.  To this end, super-samurai were
expected to know their own weaknesses and the enemy nation’s
strengths in order to improve themselves and win in the game.  It
is this geo-cultural and political background that would lead Mori
to take a critical and eclectic approach to the issues of language
and religion in Japanese and Western civilizations.
What needs to be emphasized at this juncture is that behind
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English Studies in late Edo and early Meiji Japan was the stream of
kokugaku or the National Learning that had existed since Motoori
Norinaga, the founder of Japanese language studies based on
emperor-centered histography which portrayed Japan as a divine
country or imperial nation under the unbroken rule of the imperial
family.  What is significant in this argument is that it is none other
than the current of the National Learning that was instrumental in
generating a driving force behind the newly emerging English
Studies in mid-nineteenth century Japan, which would in turn set
the stage for a new National Learning at the turn of the century.
What has to be noticed is that Mori clearly had a strong motive for
establishing a new National Learning, which is why he published
Education in Japan in 1873.  It follows from this observation that for
Mori the English language was a means of studying the Anglo-
American community with a focus on the British Empire as the
greatest rival of all and on America as an imperial offshoot of the
former.  Furthermore, we may say that English, by extension, was
a mirror image language for the Japanese Empire.  In fact, this is
how he developed his idea for language reform as he sought to
challenge the Queen’s English by creating a new language in
Japan as the Emperor’s Japanese.
What Mori experienced in his student days in Britain and
America—between Western and Eastern civilizations—had a
great impact on his methodological tactics to problematize and
transcend old and new linguistic paradigms at the same time so
that he could establish a new identity on an individual and nation-
al level.  As we have seen, there were two immediate and vital
cross-cultural influences on Mori’s geo-political and cultural
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thought: language reformation movement in Britain (and America)
typified by the “Moon-Alford controversy”; and religious reforma-
tion movement in Britain (and America) advocated by Thomas
Lake Harris.
As to the former influence, since Mori was trained through
English Studies in Japan to look critically and cross-culturally at
Western civilization, he must have had no difficulty in identifying
in the English language the weakness of the same kind as found in
the language of Japan; discrepancies between spoken and written
languages.  In other words, Mori had already developed his criti-
cal and relative attitude to language and languages by focusing on
English Studies (English Learning) in Japan and was thus able to
understand the nature of the problems in Britain’s English studies
(see Crowley 1989: 83–90).  Indeed, Mori saw the essence of
Britain’s English Studies as historically legitimizing the national
(Anglo-Saxon/Teutonic) and imperial language for the British
Empire.
It is also possible to suppose that Mori understood the Moon-
Alford controversy from the perspective of a comparative study of
civilizations, interpreting the following geo-cultural politics of the
English language as implied in the discourses about lingo-cultural
nationalism or national language reform movement in nineteenth-
century Britain: namely, (a) Britain’s de-francization/de-Latini-
zation; and (b) America’s un-Anglicization.  Obviously the former
(a) can be seen as a model for the new Japan’s de-Sinicization
whereby the abolition of Chinese characters (the written language
of Japan) was considered along with the liberalization of conven-
tional cultural and social ethos based on Confucianism.  The proc-
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ess of de-Sinicization took place in concurrence with West-
ernization by way of the introduction of the Roman alphabet
(romanization of the spoken language of Japan) and the introduc-
tion of Christianity as a new element of cultural and social ethos in
favor of Shinto-centered religio-political system.  Furthermore, the
latter (b) can also be viewed as a model for the new Japan’s un-
Westernization or un-Anglo-Americanization in which Mori put
forth a proposal to problematize the old English orthographical
system and thus create a new English (simplified English) for the
benefit of “not only the English speaking people but the world at
large.”  In this context, Mori confidently asserted in his letter to
Whitney that “The people of the Japanese Empire aspire to attain
the highest degree of civilization,” arguing for the need for “a good
language” that is “essential to their individual and national
progress.”  In trying to open up a new dimension of language and
religion as sites of the geo-cultural politics of Meiji Japan, Mori was
seeking a new model for the new Japan’s liberalization and rela-
tivization of those two cultural symbols of Western civilization in
relation to Japanese civilization or vice versa: hence, language as
well as religious reforms for the benefit of not only Japan but the
“world at large.”  And Mori envisioned a new civilization with a
new language and a new religion which could be characterized as
both Eastern and Western, and neither Eastern nor Western.
It was in his days as ambassador to America and Britain that
Mori revealed his hidden agenda regarding the issues of language
and religion reforms in Japan; educational reform that entailed
cultural transformation was the government’s urgent priority at the
time.  He was enthusiastic about building up an educational foun-
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dation for shin-kokugaku or a new National Learning of the new
people, by the new people, for the new people.  In this connec-
tion, it is interesting to note that the government decided to choose
America, not Britain, as its model for raying the foundations for
the national education system in the first half of the Meiji era.  The
reason is obvious.  In those days, America was way ahead of
Britain in educational reform, which is probably why Mori seemed
to have tried to win over more friends in America than any other
countries.  Indeed, his cultural diplomacy worked best in the U.S.
when he became acquainted with many influential politicians and
intellectuals who helped and worked for him, one of whom was
the then Secretary of State Joseph Henry who introduced Mori to
linguist William D. Whitney (SMAZ, Supplementary Vol. 2:
218–220).  Why was he first sent to America in the way he did
before he was appointed ambassador to Britain?  Why did he
make conscious efforts to have more sympathetic politicians and
intellectuals in America when trying to publish pamphlets and
books dealing with education in Japan?
Again, the answer lies in the geo-cultural politics of the new
Japan.  Britain and America comprised the heart of the English-
speaking and Christian community.  But they were not always a
monolithic one.  Britain was the world’s greatest Empire which
once beat Satsuma and Choshu which was to lead the Meiji gov-
ernment; while Britain then was seen by the Japanese as the
biggest “enemy nation,” it was also the biggest rival to America
vying for worldwide hegemony.  In the art of war, one’s enemy’s
enemy becomes one’s friend.  Thus, America was the new Japan’s
reliable friend or strategic partner which would allow the Japanese
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to compete with and relativize the British Empire.
Consequently, in order to ultimately surpass Britain, Mori (and
the Meiji government) felt the urgent need to emulate America as
the enemy’s enemy and began to thoroughly study the strengths
and weaknesses of the country employing the method and tech-
niques he developed from English Studies; he adopted a critical,
eclectic, and self-reflexive approach to the Self and Other; he rep-
resented not only the Other but also the Self in their language.
Life and Resources in America (1871) and Japanese in America (1872)
were products of such “know-your-enemy” studies.  The same is
true of Religious Freedom in Japan (1872) and Education in Japan
(1873).  Mori first published all these discourses in English in
Washington in a bid to win over to Japan’s side as many American
politicians and intellectuals as possible in building an imperial
nation-state in Japan as well as staking out an advantageous posi-
tion in the international geo-cultural politics ruled by the British
Empire.
Interestingly enough, the geo-cultural politics of the English
language can be seen in the dispute between the British and
Americans over the problem of English spellings and usages of
words.  In the Moon-Alford controversy, Moon (American)
severely criticized Alford (Englishman) for blaming Americans for
bad English or the abuse of “proper” English (Tagiri 1968:
289–291).  It is assumed that many British intellectuals must have
felt quite bitter about American linguistic independence from the
Queen’s English.  This has a great deal to do with the fact that
British linguist Max Müller “was said to have expressed disap-
proval” of the whole idea of Mori trying to simplify English and
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introduce it into Japan (SMAZ, Supplementary Vol. 2: 513),63
while American linguist Whitney expressed basic support for the
plan except for the simplification of the language.  Because of the
geo-cultural politics of language within the English-speaking dis-
course community, Americans were, if anything, more sympathet-
ic and open-minded than the British about Mori’s proposal to
adopt their language in Japan, although the general response from
the media in Britain and America to Mori’s idea for a simplified
English was negative.  This is part of the reason why Mori first
sounded out Americans’ view on his language and religious
reforms in Japan while at the same time critically expressing the
Japanese opinion on the English language and Christianity mainly
in America.  It should be clear by now that Mori strategically
allowed for the geo-cultural politics of the reform of their language
as well as their religion in the English discourse communities.
These observations lead to the conclusion that we can find a
direct parallel in his attitude to language and religion reforms that
were evidently intended to realize datsua nyuou choou [LEEWC-
TIO] at both local and global level.  Thus we can recognize that
the “desired end” in Mori’s language reform was to level the play-
ing field in educating the people about the ways of Western civi-
lization while trying to opening the third way for the Japanese to
improve the national Self with the LEEWCTIO approach to the
imperial Others, so that they could attain the highest level of civi-
lization in the end.  As Hall (1873: 463) states concerning the out-
come of educational reform in the intercivilizational competition
that involved modernizing the language of Japan, “Japan, there-
fore, entered relatively early in the game in the 1870s, and “took
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what seemed best or most appropriate, and by 1900 had out-
stripped each of her tutors on certain accounts: better technical
education than Britain; popular education unburdened by the con-
fessional quarrels of Germany or France; recognition of talent than
America.”  Indeed, as far as his strategy for building a new imperi-
al language in Japan is concerned, Mori’s image of national lan-
guage building would be ultimately realized in a few dacades,
although he did not live to see it himself.
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Conclusion
In an effort to verify our working hypothesis, I have so far tried
to show how Mori Arinori’s attitude to the imperial languages of
Self and Others is inextricably linked to his Weltanschauung
formed in the 1860s–80s when there was a reconfiguration and
realignment of the world-system taking place on an unprecedented
scale.  It happened that against the backdrop of the Western
impact on Japan, Mori’s geo-cultural politics of language was nur-
tured and driven by the English Learning that had carried on the
long uninterrupted tradition of Japanese linguistic imperialism
from the National Learning.  Throughout the paper, we saw a body
of evidence suggesting that his Weltanschauung was typified in his 
thymos-based desire for personal and national transformation by
way of datsua nyuou choou [LEEWCTIO]; as a matter of course, his
geo-cultural/political thought was to be reflected in his language
attitude and behavior leading to his drastic two-tiered language
reform in 1872–73.  His linguistic strategy was marked by what
might be termed “dialectic linguistic imperialism” that allowed
him to challenge the ideogramic writing system of the Chinese
Empire and the phonogramic writing system of the British (or
Anglo-American) Empire; the idea was to create a new imperial
Japanese language by taking advantage of what he claimed to be a
“new language” of Self and Others in the context of the geo-cultur-
al politics of the Chinese-Japanese-English triad (ILT = Imperial
Language Triangle) in East Asia.  As observed in Part II, what can
be found explicitly and implicitly in the text of his language
reform discourse is his daring attempt to “introduce a ‘new lan-
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guage’” or a new writing system into the Japanese Empire and thus
realize chouou in creating an imperial language of Japan in two
ways: by reforming (romanizing) the spoken language of Japan [=
abolishing Chinese (the language of the Chinese Empire)] with
datsua in mind, and by reforming (simplifying) English (the lan-
guage of the British Empire) with nyuou in view.  In spite of his hid-
den agenda behind the text in question, misinterpretations
occurred primarily due to the intertextuality between Whitney’s
and Baba’s supposition, inference and denunciation of Mori’s
English discourses on language reform, and partly due to Mori’s
lack of “systematic and explicit articulation” (Hall 1973: 469).
Although he ended up being forced to abandon his tactics in his
scheme—romanization of Japanese and simplification of Eng-
lish—, he never gave up on his strategy for building a new lan-
guage of the imperial nation-state—his seminal idea for language
reform in Japan.
In retrospect, despite the fact that he wound up unjustly incur-
ring the unsavory reputation of being a traitor to his country, his
drastic and therefore controversial proposal for a new language for
a new education in the early post-Restoration period eventually
succeeded in creating a stir in the geo-cultural politics of Japanese
versus English on an international scale; it involved many intellec-
tuals, politicians, and educators at home and abroad, thus con-
tributing to the remarkable progress of the new National Learning
in Japan.  If Mori’s language reform discourse had not been publi-
cized in Education in Japan and sensationalized by the media on a
large scale as it did in 1873, the progress of educational reform in
Japan might have been impeded by the insular and parochial
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views of some anti-reform nativists; it might have not been possi-
ble to establish a “national language” in the shortest period of time
possible; the new Japan would have missed the opportunity to
educate and modernize the nation by means of what Mori thought
the Japanese lacked—“a good language.”
It should also be added by way of conclusion that by examin-
ing closely Mori’s Weltanschauung that was reflected in his lan-
guage attitude and use in the geo-cultural politics of the new Japan,
we have found substantial clues for better explaining why he acted
bilingually in carrying out what he intented to do the way he did.
In elaborating on and solidifying our conclusions with respect to
his LEEWCTIO approach, we can look at certain defining charac-
teristics of globe-trotting Mori’s language behavior emerging from
this study.  Based on what has been discussed in this paper, Mori
can be better portrayed as an enlightened samurai pragmatist .  The
reasons are threefold.  First, he was a super-samurai who overtly
and covertly strove to deny the old Self and confirm the new
Other crossculturally while at the same time “writing/speaking
back” to the significant imperial Others bilingually in a bid to
attain the highest level of the new Self in the new world order.  It
may be recalled here that Mori was educated as one of the new
super-samurai intellectuals in late-Edo and early-Meiji Japan; his
total behavior was driven by what Fukuyama (1992) terms thymos
(isothymia and megalothymia) or kigai, which urges one to seek both
equality and excellence alternately in the struggle for existence.  In
essence, the super-samurai’s kigai mentality was disciplined by
bushido (warrior’s codes of conduct) which led them to fight and
compete with the imperial Other (Westerners).
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Secondly, most super-samurai intellectuals were ardent advo-
cates of jitsugaku (pragmatism).  Mori was no exception.  His pur-
suit of learning was highly motivated and propelled by personal
ambition and individual/national honor that required more “phys-
ical” (pragmatic and technical), if not metaphysical (theoretical and
theological), knowledge of the new world.
Thirdly, the super-samurai, engaging in the English Studies,
were ready to develop an “enlightened (as opposed to feudalistic)”
attitude to almost every aspect of life before and after the Meiji
Restoration.  By “enlightened” I mean “having or showing an
understanding of people’s needs, a situation, etc. that is not based
on old-fashioned attitudes and prejudice” (Oxford Advanced Learner’s
Dictionary 2005).  Indeed, Mori was one of the leading super-samu-
rai intellectuals of the time who were not afraid of taking risks and
venturing into the unknown world.  With all these characteristics
combined, we may reasonably conclude that Mori Arinori was an
enlightened samurai pragmatist.
Our personal characterization of Mori Arinori from a compre-
hensive perspective allows us to reevaluate other scholars’ views of
Mori’s political philosophy.  The crucial question frequently raised
by scholars of Mori Arinori is: was he a conservative or a progres-
sive?  Without slipping into this binary characterization, Swale
(2000: 16) attempts to challenge the hitherto accepted theory
based on either-or assumptions, arguing that Mori was a progressive-
conservative.  While Swale deserves much credit for his reinterpreta-
tion and integration of antithetical and conflicting discourses on
Mori’s political thought, his new synthetic concept is still a little
too weak to capture the unprecedented samurai thinker’s more
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complicated and dynamic mind-nature.  The reason for this is that
since he was an enlightened samurai pragmatist, his strategic atti-
tude to the new civilization was most symbolically exemplified by
his geo-cultural and political maneuvering in cultural diplomacy.
Swale seems to make a mistake in concluding that Mori’s line of
thought can be seen as intrinsically inclined toward conservatism
with progressivism as a secondary feature.  My argument, howev-
er, is that Mori’s mind-nature and his behavior were too dynamic
to be statically defined as essentially conservative; rather, it would
be more accurate to state that the nature of his mentality was geo-
politically/culturally and historically conditioned to be strategical-
ly dialectic and therefore highly adaptive.  The position Mori tried
to negotiate in the geo-cultural politics of Western imperialism in
the new world order demanded that he adopt (1) progressive
conservatism toward the West (the imperial Other: notably Britain/
America)—which was both assimilative and resistive; (2) conserv-
ative progressivism toward the East (the imperial Other: China)—
which was particularly separative and resistive; (3) conservative
progressivism and progressive conservatism toward the Self (new
Japan) with political and cultural uncertainties—which appeared
in both cases to be particularly innovative.  In short, Mori could
be at once progressive and conservative.  This is why he was often
labeled by both camps (the Right and the Left) as a (converted)
nationalist or internationalist.
However, as we have seen in the case of the issues of state reli-
gion and national language reform in Japan, we must always bear
in mind that he was a thymos-driven and honor-seeking samurai
intellectual diplomat with a geopolitically strategic mind, who con-
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stantly aimed at winning economic and cultural wars between civi-
lizations of the East and the West.  As with other Japanese intellec-
tuals who had advocated Japanese conventional emperor-centered
historical approach to cross-cultural assimilation and resistence, his
tactical methodology can be found in his historical perception of
Japanese dialectic/eclectic imperialism.  From this point of view
we can see that there is no point in discussing whether he was a
convert or whether he was really a progressive/leftist/internation-
alist or a conservative/rightist/nationalist.  Rather, he should be
seen as a strategist who would take risks and do whatever was nec-
essary for the new Japan to adapt to changes in competitive envi-
ronments in the new world order.  Thus, he was certainly “an
enlightened samurai pragmatist” who could go to extremes in both
directions for tactical purposes.  Even when he seemed to have
made contradictory and inconsistent statements, for Mori, as
Kimura (1986: 112) put it, “it was neither a contradiction nor a
conversion at all.”  With respect to the “complexities” of Mori’s
political and cultural thought, Kaminuma (1979: 267) is right when
he suggests that in spite of his inner conflicts and political compro-
mises, Mori persistently continued to reconcile differences
between the ideal and the real by accommodating evolving
domestic and international environments.  And it was Go¯ju¯ educa-
tion in Satsuma that played a significant role in developing Mori’s
critical and pragmatic mind.  
While Swale highlights the significance of the influence that
Spencer’s political thought had on Mori views of history, society,
and nature, Kimura (ibid.: 142–143) maintains that there are differ-
ent ends of spectrum between Mori’s Weltanschauung and
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Spencer’s, arguing that it is not so much Spencer as Swedenborg
whose philosophical elements had a much greater impact on
Mori’s interpretation of the world.  In addition, it is worth noting
Kimura’s observation that there are distinct commonalities
between Mori Arinori and Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914),
founder of American pragmatism; they were both Swedenborgian
(ibid.: 113).  As Kimura explains:
At the time [1868] when Peirce, resonating with the teach-
ings of Swedenborg, was creating pragmatism, a new phi-
losophy indigenous to America, Mori happened to have
acquainted with the philosophy of Swedenborg through an
entirely different channel while taking great pains to work
out a solution, in a very pragmatic manner, to the problems
connected with education in a nation-state.
(ibid.: 145–146)
Indeed, a parallel between the two figures can be found in the fol-
lowing portrayal of Peirce.  As Paul Weiss (1940: 254) observes:
Peirce was a metaphysician as well as a logician, a realist as
well as a semiotician, a speculative thinker as well as an
experimental scientist, an idealist as well as a naturalist, and
a pragmatist who had a theory of ethics which acknowl-
edged a fixed and universal ideal.  These were not for him,
and ought not to be for us, inconsistent positions.  Truth is
rich and complex enough to accommodate both the
abstract and the concrete, the temporal and the eternal, the
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general and the specific, the absolute and the relative, the
probable and the certain.  Pierce was a philosopher precise-
ly because he saw that these different factors were facets of
one encompassing truth and reality, and that philosophy
was not a point of view but a study of that which embraces
all points of view.
The above quote reveals that Peirce’s Weltanschauung bears a sur-
prisingly close resemblance to Mori’s.  Like Peirce, Mori believed
in the Swedenborgian and Thomas Lake Harris’s philosophy of
the “One-Twain, the Two-in-One”64 in which the world was to be
interpreted in terms of not “either A or B” but “both A and B” as
well as “neither A nor B.”  It is on such a higher (all-embracing
and synthetical) plane that Mori discovered the path of the new
Japan to create a higher (alternative) civilization on its own terms.
It was at once “both the East and the West” and neither “the East
nor the West.”  That is, Mori was seeking the “third way” to recon-
cile and integrate the universality (“general historical facts”) and
particularity (“special historical facts”) into a new civilization by
studying the advantages and disadvantages of civilizations of the
East and the West through the eigaku approach (SMAZ, Vol. 5;
401–425).  In short, Mori was a cultural eclectic who would syn-
cretise “Our and Their” civilizations.  As we have seen, in Mori’s
Weltanschauung the competition between the East and the West
was all about struggling for “supremacy between the races and the
religion as well as for intelligence, power, and wealth between two
of the great divisions of the world.”  In this way, Mori’s cultural
diplomacy in an inter-civilizational competition was intended to
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allow the new Japan to seek and create a new civilization and
thereby secure a better position in the realignment of the new
world system with then-emerging countries (such as Germany and
Japan) building nation-states in the late nineteenth century.  The
idea was for Japan to overcome the weaknesses of Oriental
(Chinese) and Occidental (Western) civilizations by incorporating
their strengths into Japanese civilization.  It is clear that the pur-
pose in Mori’s English diplomatic discourses was to realize his geo-
cultural and political strategy for transcending the significant impe-
rial Others in the East and the West.  As I have already suggested,
Mori’s cultural eclectic/relativist approach was applied to the then-
pending issue of state religion in addition to national language that
he set out to tackle.  In looking at how Mori understood the
Western concept of the term “God” or the absolute, we have made
it clear that Mori’s geo-political position in his cultural diplomacy
was strategically varied in such a way as to reinterpret the
“absolute” depending on where he addressed his personal reli-
gious faith in connection with the issue of state religion.65
Furthermore, Mori’s severe criticism was leveled not only at
old Japan’s die-hard religious and linguistic traditions, but also at
other imperial nations’ religious and linguistic ethos and dogmas
found in the old and new civilizations of the significant imperial
Others.66 As Sonoda convincingly argues, Mori’s critical attitude
to Western civilization reveals how he worked toward “de-
Westernization” (1993: 305–306; see also Nitta, Maruyama, and et
al. 1994).  Likewise, stating that Mori’s critical thinking on the
West can be traced way back to the early period when he studied
in Britain and America, Hayashi (1968: 121) suggests that “before
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they (Mori and other Satsuma students) found out the principles of
orthodox Christianity and Western civilization they had been
taught how to view them critically.”  Sonoda (1993: 305) also
explains that “Mori had met and learned from Oliphant, a fierce
critic of orthodox Christianity who was deeply disappointed in
Western civilization … It was through the eyes of those Western
critics that Mori developed his critical acumen.”  More important,
however, is that Mori’s critical mind had already been cultivated
by local education in his Satsuma days long before he met Western
critics.  We should not overlook the fact that it was when Satsuma’s
“know-your-enemy” studies actively incorporated a new Western
(English) Learning into their existing Go¯ju¯ education, that Mori
was urged to critically examine the strengths and weaknesses of
Western civilization.  As Hall (1973: 46) states, it was “young
Mori’s academic training which provided a springboard to the
Occident.”
Similarly, de-Westernization was reflected in his language atti-
tude.  As we have seen, just as Mori’s critical mind-nature decen-
tralized and so relativized the position of Christianity as the
absolute religion in the world, so he assumed a relative attitude to
the English language.  His position on the dominant language in
the world was greatly influenced and developed by English
Learning which was part of Satsuma’s progressive “know-your-
enemy” studies.  In terms of the geo-cultural politics of the new
Japan, Mori considered the weakness of the Japanese language to
be one of the major problems arising from the “particularity” of
the country as opposed to the “universality” of the advanced
Western nations.  By the same token, Mori also saw the weakness
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of the English language as stemming from the similar root prob-
lem facing the British Empire.  Thus, Mori advocated his idea for
overcoming the weaknesses of the two languages as well as incor-
porating the strengths of the particularity and the universality into
the new language of Japan.  As Stanlaw (2004: 4) correctly
observes, “the English used in Japan” is not “actually borrowed per
se, but “most ‘English’ found in Japan is created in Japan for
Japanese purposes.”  In analogy with the “logic exhibited in other
proposals of reform,” ss Swale points out, Mori believes in “ an
indigenous trait and seeks to develop it into a new universal
model” (2000: 124).  From this standpoint, Mori’s hidden agenda
for the creation of the modern Japanese (national) language can be
seen as a synthesis of the dialectic compromise between “particu-
lar” ( Japanese) and “universal” (English) languages in Meiji Japan.
It follows from this that Mori’s language reform discourse in the
1870s should be viewed as the beginning of modern Japan’s
counter-civilizational imperial language building as against the
English language as an international language.  To sum it up,
Mori’s thinking on the geo-cultural politics of the language of the
new Japan can best be characterized as transcendental and dialec-
tic linguistic imperialism which developed from datsua nyuou
(Leave the Imperial Other in the East, Enter the imperial Other in
the West—the abolition of Chinese characters and the adoption of
the Roman alphabet) into chouou (Transcend the Imperial Others
—the introduction of simplified/reformed English as part of the
imperial Japanese language).  Again, all this points to the new
Japan’s geo-cultural politics of linguistic differentiation and dis-
crimination in the ILT (Imperial Language Triangle) in East Asia;
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it is this trilateral reciprocation of linguistic intersubjectivity in the
ILT that defines national, racial, and cultural identity of the mod-
ern Japanese.  This geo-cultural politics of the new linguistic inter-
subjectivity in turn necessitated revamping the whole educational
system whereby the building of a “new language” for a new
National Learning was demanded.
It follows from what has been discussed so far that Mori’s lan-
guage attitude and his view on national language should be consid-
ered in a larger context of the international geo-cultural politics of
Japan.  To ignore Mori’s cross-cultural outlook on history and reli-
gion is to fail to appreciate the significance of his struggle for a new
language that assumed social and economic as well as religious
and cultural dimensions.  Mori’s discourse on national language
building was unprecedented in that it attempted to create a new
imperial language of Japan by relativizing and reforming all the
three pivotal languages involved ( Japanese, Chinese, and English)
at the same time; it was too original and innovative (therefore radi-
cal) for ordinary people to comprehend (It was due to such uncon-
ventionality and unintelligibility often recurring in his later dis-
courses that Mori would meet his fate).
In trying to get behind Mori’s linguistic strategy, we need to
understand his cross-cultural approach to pursuing a new para-
digm.  The hallmark of Mori’s Weltanschauung and his language
attitude can be depicted as the spirit of dialectic Self-denial for
Self-creation, which was undoubtedly the forerunner of kindai no
choukoku (Overcoming Modernity) movement that would develop
in the early twentieth century.  By denying the old Self in the old
world order, he took a chance to create a new Self in the new
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world order.67 In his spirit of Self-denial for Self-creation we can
find his LEEWCTIO approach (“Leave the East, Enter the West,
and Challenge and Transcend the Imperial Others”) to building a
new imperial language for a higher civilization.  It is important to
bear in mind that while the tactics in his LEEWCTIO approach
would allow Japan to represent either/both the East or/and the
West according to the situation, the strategy would demand that
she always take the position of neither the East nor the West.
Considered in light of his LEEWCTIO strategy, we can compre-
hend the mysteries of his seemingly contradictory behavior as a
diplomatic attempt to seek the third way in the context of interna-
tional geo-cultural politics (Kobayashi 2003: 190–204).  In this
way, Mori sought to create a new Japanese language that was nei-
ther conventional Japanese nor conventional English.  Mori’s phi-
losophy of language use and attitude can be best marked by his
counter-civilizational mentality that simultaneously and critically
attempted to assimilate into and resist the imperial Others.  It was
all about maintaining not only human dignity—independence and
self-respect—but also racial intersubjectivity in the midst of the
“clashes of civilizations” between the East and the West.
Finally, the same observation applies to the international
geopolitics of Japan today; it still remains an unsettled question
how she competes and cooperate with the imperial Others in the
face of Anglo-American and Chinese neoimperialism and neo-
colonialism (Chomsky 1993).  Just as the nineteenth century saw
the first wave of globalism in world history that forced Japan to
open the country and build a new nation-state, so we are now liv-
ing in the age of ever-accelerating globalization that calls for
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realigning the existing modern world system which was estab-
lished more than a century ago.  History repeats and recycles.
Given the global and local sociolinguistic situations today, it is
worth considering the contemporary relevance of Mori’s discourse
on language and educational reform in the past; for that will give
us a clue as to the on-going question of how the geo-cultural poli-
tics of the imperial Others’ languages—English and Chinese
—will inevitably affect the Japanese perception of the native lan-
guage in redefining the (imperial) Self in the foreseeable future.
Only after serious consideration is given to the age-old issues of
Japanese linguistic intersubjectivity as well as ethnic/cultural iden-
tity, can we not only understand from a larger perspective how the
English Studies should be conducted by the new Japanese in this
ever-changing world, but also find a better way to reform “English
language education” vis-à-vis “kokugo (national language) educa-
tion” in 21st century Japan.
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NOTES
1 As to the translation problem in the English discourse communi-
ty, Akira Irie comments: “there is a real paucity of translated mater-
ial, despite the fact that literally hundreds of books about United
States have been written by Japanese since the “opening” of the
country a century and half ago” (Van Sant 2004: x).  The reason
that translation volume from Japanese into English is smaller than
that from English into Japanese is not so much because the
Japanese mind is closed to “foreigners” but rather because inequali-
ty in the total amount of translation between English and Japanese
publications has much to do with a question of the cultural politics
of the English language that still holds sway over Japanese “public
sphere.”  This writer sees the politics of translation as a phenome-
non arising from the asymmetrical reciprocity between English and
Japanese in the arena of international cultural exchanges.  This is
closely linked to the central theme recurring throughout this paper.
2 The theories put forward by native and non-native Japanese can
explain what English as an imperial language is, and how it has
spread all over the world.  But almost all of them appear to fail to
fully explain how the Japanese have responded to the Western
(notably Anglo-American) impact and dealt with the cultural poli-
tics of English as an international language since it began to prevail
in Japan.  Extensive descriptive work has been done by many
scholars, Japanese or non-Japanese, on the socio-economic and
political factors relevant to the teaching and learning of the English
language in the periphery-English speaking countries such as India,
Malaysia, Singapore, Hong Kong (now as part of China), and the
Philippines.  And yet many seem to avoid exploring thoroughly the
historical and politico-cultural problems connected with the diffu-
sion of English linguistic hegemony in modern Japan.
3 In the original sense of the terms, “textual (lower) criticism” (and
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higher criticism) are used to mean the “process of attempting to
ascertain the original wording of a text” and the “study of the liter-
ary methods and sources discernible in a text, especially as applied
to biblical writings” (Oxford Dictionary of English 2003).  A most
inspiring work done using such a methodology is Bart D. Ehrman’s
Misquoting Jesus.  In it Ehrman (2005: 207) succinctly describes the
salient feature of textual criticism of biblical writings as follows: “I
began this book on a personal note by describing how I became
interested in the question of the New Testament text and why it
took on so much importance for me.  I think what has held my
interest over the years has been the mystery of it all.  In many
ways, being a textual critic is like doing detective work.  There is a
puzzle to be solved and evidence to be uncovered.  The evidence is
often ambiguous, capable of being interpreted in various ways, and
a case has to be made for one solution of the problem over anoth-
er.”  Meanwhile, textual criticism, lower or higher, is also applied
to the historical study of literature in general other than the Bible.
There are a number of significant earlier works related to this paper
in terms of its methodology: the classic examples of discourse
analyses employing similar methods of approach that also
influenced me a great deal are Kobayashi Hideo’s Motoori Norinaga
(1992) and Maruyama Masao’s Bunmei ron no gairyaku wo yomu [the
Reading of Fukuzawa Yukichi’s An Outline of a Theory of Civilization ]
(1986).
4 As far as I can gather from my research, Sakai Naoki (1997) was
the first to place the problem of the Japanese language in the con-
text of the geo-politics of Japan in the world; his work thus allows
us to interpret it as a serious cultural problem in terms of transla-
tion and national subjectivity.  Regrettably, Sakai has not given any
consideration to Mori Arinori who problematized the language of
Japan in light of English-Japanese translation and national subjec-
tivity in the early Meiji period.
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5 According to Watanabe Shoichi (1990: vii), given the proper
meaning of its specific historicity, kokugaku (National Learning) in
the mid Edo and early Meiji periods would be more accurately
termed the National Learning or the National Studies.  Watanabe
argues that the same is true of Britain’s National Learning in which
the history of English language was thoroughly studied in the con-
text of English cultural nationalism vis-à-vis European (Latin) cul-
tures.  By extension, I want to argue that the same applies to the
developments of what is generally called “English learning” or
“English studies” in modern Japan, not to mention Chinese learn-
ing and Dutch learning.  Therefore, depending on the context, I
shall use the term “the English Studies (English Learning)” with the
definite article in order to emphasize its specific historicity and
politico-cultural implications attached to the studying of the English
language at the time.
6 It is very interesting to note that Mori Arinori, the very subject of
study here, had thought of learning as a way of primarily studying a
particular person’s character and his thought from a prosopograph-
ical perspective (Inuzuka 1986: 42–43).
7 In the Japanese linguistic context, the English word “Chinese”
could doubly mean either chugoku-go (the language of China) or
kan-go (Chinese characters embedded in the written language of
Japan).  In the subsequent discussion I will use the word in two
ways according to the context; as a rule, I employ it to refer to the
latter in comparison and contrast with “the spoken language of
Japan”; I also intend it to mean the former, when I want to suggest
that in relation to “the language of Japan.”  Mori symbolically used
it as the language of a “different racial community” from the
“Japanese race.”
8 It is noteworthy that Mori’s English discourse should be seen as
the beginning of the modern Japanese “writing back” in English
from the Japanese standpoint and thereby intervening into the
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English discourse community.  The later Japanese writers (such as
Okakura Tenshin, Uchimura Kanzo, and Nitobe Inazo) who were
famous for their English writings can be regarded as Mori’s succes-
sors who played an active role in cultural diplomacy in terms of
defining national identity and negotiating their voice in the English
discourse community.
9 Here I prefer to use the German word Weltanschauung instead of
the English term “world view,” for it connotes more than just one’s
objective and analytic view of the world; it also implies his/her
Gestalt and intuitive understanding of the world.
10 Hall (1973: 32–46) aptly describes those who were well educated
and trained in Satsuma’s educational institution as “the super-samu-
rai.”
11 The Go¯ju¯ can be likened to young men’s confraternities which
“provides not only physical training, moral guidance, and political
indoctrination but also, in an era before the establishment of a
modern educational system, the only formal schooling available to
most Satsuma children of primary-and secondary-school age.”
And the Zo¯shikan functioned as an institution as an extension of
the Go¯ju¯ educational system.
12 Oxford Dictionary of English (2003) defines the word “pragmatic”
as “dealing with things sensibly and realistically in a way that is
based on practical rather than theoretical considerations.”
13 The essence of Satsuma’s pragmatic learning is epitomized in
“Gakumon no taihon” (cardinal principles of learning) posted at the
Zo¯shikan in 1854.  It castigates the conventional Chinese Learning
based on neo-Confucianism as overemphasizing purely literary
skills and for preoccupation with arid textual criticism at the
expense of more useful learning” (quoted in Hall 1973: 50);
“Today’s scholars, so-called, are far removed from the mundane
affairs of the moment; they are disgardful of matters economic and
live in a world apart, quite like the Buddhist clergy” (ibid.: 55).
― 296―
14 Hall’s (1973: 62) comment on this point summarizes Mori’s early
learning environments quite well: “The respect for education which
permiated the Zo¯shikan and which was reinforced by the presence
of scholars in the family and among the closest neighbors was
entirely within the scope of Confucian tradition, as was also
Nariakira’s call for scholarship that was politically aware and pub-
lic-service minded.  Yujo’s imperial sentiments and Hayashi
Shihei’s strident warnings, finally, must have combined to create
(within entirely traditional intellectual terms) some political and
strategic awareness of Japan as a national entity, set against other
national entities and beset by internal dissentions it could ill
afford.”
15 As Hall (1973: 48) observes, “the comprehensive political and
moral philosophy which the Zo¯shikan presented, however, must at
least have trained Mori to think systematically about these two
areas of life.  And the samurai school must have communicated
Mori in abundance that respect for learning and that joy in the life
of intellect which were to be among the most precious legacies
from traditional to modern Japan.”
16 It is worth noting that although Mori was not fond of keeping
documents and belongings in his entire life, his note on “Ten
Commandments” was an exception.  He had long had it in his pos-
session until he met his fate (Inuzuka 1986: 20).
17 Hall (1973: 45) translated this precept on language behavior as
“in speaking, come quickly to the point and go no further.”  While
it grasps a meaning of what it connotes, it seems to be too specific a
translation to cover its general meaning of the original sentence.
18 Die-hard scholars of Dutch Learning and critics such as
Watanabe Kazan (1793–1841) and Takano Choei (1804–1850)
were the archetypal political activists who engaged in the know-
your-enemy studies.
19 The original Japanese expression for “know-your-enemy” studies
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is tekikoku kenkyu, which can be literally translated as “the study of
one’s enemy nation.”  English Studies, which started as “know-
your-enemy” studies, gradually transformed into a branch of study
that would take on a more academic (and less political) coloration
from the late nineteenth to the early twentieth century; as a result,
it became a branch of learning engaged mainly by the politically
unconscious students who were highly interested in character-
building and the cultivation of the mind through English learning
(see Kawasumi 1988: iii).  What must be kept in mind is that in late
Edo and early Meiji periods, the English Learning was not so much
a specialized (and less political) academic branch of learning that
would emerge in the twentieth century, as a kind of “area studies”
that aimed primarily at penetrating the essence of the civilization of
“barbarian” enemies.
20 Unlike today’s learners of English in Japan, the first-generation
eigakusha’s overriding concern was not to speak but to read the lan-
guage through translation.  What is worth observing here is that no
sooner did the Japanese first encounter English than they began to
learn the language and translate them into their own.  The pinnacle
of the first-generation eigausha can be represented by what is known
as eigo-meijin (masters of the English language)” such as Nitobe
Inazo (1862–1933), Uchimura Kanzo (1861–1930), and Okakura
Tenshin (1862–1913), who were all born in the early 1860s.  They
were educated mostly in English in the 1870s–80s and thus devel-
oped their English proficiency as if it were their native language.
21 There were many scholars of Dutch Learning who were seen as
seiyou kabure or “pathologically infatuated and obsessed with West-
ern (Dutch) culture.”  Some even gave themselves Dutch names,
indulging in behaving like the Dutch.
22 In 1860 Mitsukuri Genppo (1799–1863) rendered into Japanese
Chikyu setsu ryaku (Theories of the Earth) which was published in
1856 in China by US missionary Richard Quarterman Way
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(1819–1895).  This was done not merely for academic reasons but
rather for geo-political and military reasons.  Such being the case,
there was no room for English Learning to be studied for purely
linguistic reasons.
23 The double-bind situation is perhaps best summarized by
Matsumoto Kenichi (1994: 224) as follows: “Right from the begin-
ning modern Japan ran into a dual problem of attaining Western
modernity while simultaneously challenging and overcoming it.
This is why Sakuma Shozan insisted on “conquering the enemy
with their weapons.”  Paradoxically, Japan, after all, had to deal
with the aporia of “opening the country to expel the enemy.”
24 In the introduction to Education in Japan Mori clearly revealed
his understanding of restoration and re-legitimization of the nation-
al polity (imperial genealogical line) in the history of Japan.  There
Mori details how Satsuma usurped imperial authority from the
Tokugawa government.  Referring to Ashigaka, a general in
Muromachi period (1338–1573), as a traitor to the emperor, Mori
maintains: “It is familiarly known as the epoch of the two courts,
the North and the South, the court of Ashikaga’s sovereign being
that of the North.  The Southern dynasty yielded to that of the
North, after many desperate efforts, through nearly sixty years, dur-
ing which all the parties to the original difference died naturally or
perished miserably on the battle field.  From that day to the present
time it has been a constant habit of our historical writers to serious-
ly discuss the claims of the rival courts to be considered the legal
representative of the imperial dynasty.  Those who regard the
northern court as an illegal offshoot of the imperial line, are gener-
ally respected as the authoritative historians of the period.  Our
recent revolution in its causes may be clearly traced to the growing
interest in the record of the epoch just described.  The increasing
influence of these historical authorities prevailing among the peo-
ple, particularly in the south Western part of the country (the
― 299―
Satsuma domain), inspired them with a strong desire for the
restoration of the imperial power in its fullness and entirety.  This
spirit of imperialism, having been hostile to all but the royal domi-
nation, increased in strength with every blunder of the government
of the Shioguns, and especially with those of the latter quarter of
the last century.  When the late revolution began, the war-cry
which led the imperial party to victory was the daigimeibun, or the
King and the Subject!  whereby it was understood that the distinc-
tion between them must be restored, that the Shiogun should be
reduced to the proper relation of subject or servant to his sover-
eign” (SMAZ, Vol. 5: 155–156).  Similarly, Mori further remarks,
“The declining power of the Shiogun was naturally inimical to the
rising influence of the daimios, and particularly that of the
Satsumas.  The supporters of the Shiogun thought they had discov-
ered in the proposition to abolish the Shiogunate an ambitious
design upon the part of the Satsmas to succeed the Shiogun in
power” (SMAZ, Vol. 5: 180).  As for the truth about “the late revo-
lution,” Mori intimates that “The state of affairs there developed
served to increase the anxiety of the Satsuma party, which desired
the complete overthrow of the Shiogunate.  Coup detat was, there-
fore, resolved upon.  Okubo and Saigo, both of the Satsuma clan,
displayed great intelligence and vigor in devising and consummat-
ing the plot which was to produce the result.  Iwakura was a promi-
nent and efficient leader in this conspiracy, which succeeded not
only in overthrowing the Shiogun’s power, but also in completely
changing all of the old offices in the imperial court” (SMAZ, Vol. 5:
174).  The point to observe here is that “the complete overthrow of
the Shiogunate” involoved imperial restoration and relegitimation
by Satsuma which connived with a court noble in committing
“regicide” (On this subject, see Bergamini 1972: 248–254).  Admit-
ting that Satsuma was morally responsible for the coup detat, Mori
suggests that all the people involved need a patriotic act of atone-
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ment in the new ear as follows: “The general features of the new
era, of Oseiishin (restoration of kingly government), will now be
briefly noted.  The causes of its rise have already been stated.  The
influence of a plot or conspiracy like that of the coup detat in the
winter of 2527–’28, has always been injurious to the moral charac-
ter of a nation, and to restore confidence or prevent demoralization
requires great sacrifices, self-denial, energy, and perseverance.
Patriotic motives of high order inspired the leaders of our revolu-
tion” (SMAZ, Vol. 5: 176–177).
25 Commenting on the historical awareness of the (new) imperial
Japan as a counter-civilizational (imperial) power against Chinese
imperialism, Mori relates in Education in Japan: “The relations
between the empires of Japan and China began to be more inti-
mate and permanent in our thirteenth century (A.D. seventh centu-
ry).  This intimacy was maintained for nearly five centuries… Our
political and social institutions were at an early day reformed after
the models of the Chinese….”; “Returning to the subject of inter-
course between Japan and China, which has occupied our attention
in this paper, we find that the communication first became irregu-
lar, and finally ceased altogether….”; “Thirteen Shioguns com-
posed this dynasty.  Most of them are contemptuously regarded
and cursed for their misdemeanor, in acknowledging the authority
of China.  They even insulted the national dignity by accepting
their title of King of Japan from the Chinese government” (SMAZ,
Vol. 5; 146; 153; 158).  Relavant to the image of imperial Japan as
a counter-civilizational power is Murata’s observation that “the
decisive factor that enabled this reorientation in the Chinese imper-
ial narrative toward national subjects was the example set by that
‘country which rose to sudden prominence in recent years’ and
which possessed an ‘imperial lineage of unbroken succession for
countless eras” (2000: 34).  What we have here is major changes in
the geopolitical dynamics of the empires of Japan and China.
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Raising a challenge to the formerly universal Chinese order in East
Asia, Japan gradually came to flex its muscles by attempting to
“trade places” with its regional neighbor(s).  Thus, Japan, as Okada
(2001d: 24) states, emerged as a “counter-civilizational force against
imperial China” as she was to reestablish her own imperial authori-
ty from the legal offshoot of the imperial line in 1868.  Kawakatsu
briefly (2001: 59) sums up the point as follows: “The history of
Japan is best marked by its process in which she sought to secede
from the Chinese-centered world in East Asia and thereby define
itself as a distinct entity—historically and culturally—from China.
26 That Mori traveled to Britain, the cradle of maritime technology,
on a steamship owned by English political merchant Thomas B.
Glover who resided in Japan, was symbolic of his subsequent glo-
betrotting life.
27 The following are major discourses Mori produced in English.
(1) in America: The Life and Resources In America (1871); The Japanese
in America (1872); The Religious Freedom in Japan (1872); Education in
Japan (1873); Leading Men of Japan—with a Historical Summary of the
Empire (1882); The Proposed National Assembly in Japan (I883); (2) in
China: The Interviews between Mori Arinori and Li Hongzhang
(1876); (3) in Britain: [The Japanese in America (1872)]; Correspon-
dence Respecting the Revision of the Treaty between Great Britain
and Japan (1881–1884); [Leading Men of Japan—with a Historical
Summary of the Empire (1882)]; On a Representative System of
Government for Japan (1883); An interview with the Japanese
Ambassador of Public Affairs on his departure from England
(1884).
28 The records of his extant documents reveal that Education in
Japan was due to be translated into Japanese in Japan later, but it
turned out that the full translation did not see the light of the day.
29 We must understand the geo-cultural politics of the Iwakura
Mission which was also called in Japanese beiou shisetsudan, which
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means “the Japanese legation sent to the United States of America
and Europe.”  The point to observe here is that US comes before
Europe in the wording of the appellation.  What this indicates is
that the Meiji government put a higher premium on America than
Europe in terms of national strategy; indeed, many Japanese politi-
cians and intellectuals at the time regarded “Europe” as forming
the general concept of the “West” with Britain and America at the
top of its hierarchy.  To be more precise, Britain does not entirely
belong to the tradition of the European Continent from a geo-polit-
ical and cultural standpoint; by the same token, the United States
of America should not be seen neither as part of the European tra-
dition nor as constituting a part of the British Empire, although
these two nations comprise the Anglo-American (English-speaking)
communities.  It can be argued that the Meiji Japan looked to
America for guidance in catching up with, competing with, and
excelling the British Empire.
30 Drawing on a number of historical sources, Ko (2001) demon-
strated that modern Japan’s de-Asianization amounted to de-
Sinicization.
31 Note the fact that in his Japanese and English discourses Mori
strategically used both at home and abroad the terms such as
“Japanese civilization,” “the Japanese Empire,” or “the Empire of
Dai Nippon.”  He also liked to say that the imperial Japan had the
oldest civilization in the world because of the unbroken line of the
imperial family.  It is clear that what he was trying to do was to rep-
resent the new Japan as the “oldest” (therefore most legitimate)
imperial nation in the world that “could stand on an equal footing
with the nations of the earth”—Western countries, most notably
the British Empire (SMAZ, Vol.5; 173).
32 Although I do not necessarily endorse Fukuyama’s Hegelian
view of world history, I share his argument that human thymos is
what drives people as they make history.
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33 It is worth noting that in the post-war English Studies in Japan,
Suzuki Takao (1975) and Nakamura Kei (1989) officially resumed
the debate on the geo-cultural politics of Japanese in connection
with the “English language” question in Japan in the 1970s–80s.
Aside from differences in position and perspective, Suzuki’s and
Nakamura’s works can be seen as part of the early eigaku tradition
of modern Japan’s tactical resistance to Western imperialism and
colonialism.  (In spite of his thought-provoking political agenda,
Suzuki’s earlier work on the “deconstruction” of what is called
“Standard English” deserves more credit; his 1971 proposal for
“Englic” (a de-Anglo-Saxonzed English) for the benefits of non-
native speakers of English precedes Nakamura’s “sociology of
English in Japan” and Kachuru’s World Englishes movement in the
1980’s.  Clearly, Suzuki’s and Nakamura’s strategic and tactical
approach to English is remarkably similar to that of Mori Arinori, a
pre-colonial Meiji intellectual statesman, who seriously considered
the problem of the Japanese language in relation to the English lan-
guage; he made a proposal for the introduction of a “simplified
English” in 1872 as a counter-linguistic strategy in the face of
Standard English (see Kobayashi 2001).  This paper owes much to
Nakamura’s socio-historical/linguistic theories about English and
Japanese.  In his My Personal View on English Education in Japan
(1980), Nakamura tried to give a general overview of post-war
English education and thereby take a critical look at how the
Japanese have taught and learned the language.  In his What is
English? (1989) he also attempted to formulate an explanatory
model for analyzing the question of the “English language” in
Japan by placing it in the global and historical context of Western
colonialism.  Furthermore, he sought to show in his Foreign
Education and its Ideology (1993) how we can and should conduct an
in-depth analysis of the social (and colonial) attributes of English
teaching and learning.  Thus he set out to provide us with a theoret-
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ical and hermeneutical base for putting in its socio-political and
ethno-cultural context Japanese resistance to and assimilation into
“English linguistic hegemony.”  Drawing on past national experi-
ences, he views Japan’s pre-colonial period as the beginning of
Japanese conflict between the English and Japanese languages
(Nakamura 2000a).  His interest is in exploring how the Japanese
had approached English as the language of Other, how they inter-
preted and represented English while experiencing a socio-linguis-
tic conflict between their language (English) and our language
( Japanese), and what aporias they came to confront in the process.
34 Using the terms “colonial” and “post-colonial” in the original
sense in the context of Japan only makes it difficult for us to com-
prehend the Japanese historical and geopolitical situation.  If we
look at the history of early modern Japan, it is clear that she was
being “half-colonized” under the unequal treaties imposed in
1853–4 by the great Western powers, but not totally colonized like
India.  That was when the Japanese had to put up a desperate resis-
tance, which I would like to call the “pre-colonial period” with the
word “pre-colonial” implying that Japan was on the verge of being
colonized by the Western powers.  This pre-colonial period contin-
ued until the late 1890s when Japan became more and more inde-
pendent and imperialistic as she began to colonize neighboring
nations.  All this came about as a result of her resistance to Western
colonialism/imperialism; in 1895 Taiwan was ceded to Japan after
the victory in the 1894 Sino-Japanese war (colonization in Asia); in
1899 she succeeded in abolishing Western extraterritorial rights in
Japan (resistance to Western colonialism); in 1910 she annexed the
Korean peninsula (colonization in Asia); in 1911 she finally
restored her own tariff autonomy and thus fully revised unequal
treaties (resistance to Western colonialism); in the 1920s–30s she
“advanced” to mainland China and founded Manchukuo (coloniza-
tion in Asia); in the 1930s–40s she went to war with China and the
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U.S. including other Western powers (colonization in Asia and
resistance to Western colonialism).  Here we have what can be
termed a “spiral structure” of resistance and colonization.  Thus,
the geopolitics of modern Japan in East Asia was driven by her
desire to gain independence through colonization in Asia and resis-
tance to Western colonialism.  This I would like to call the “inde-
pendent period” which means Japan being independent of the
West as well as colonizing Asia.  Whilst Lee (1996)’s work high-
lights modern Japan in the independent period, it fails to give the
larger picture of the politico-cultural continuity from the pre-colo-
nial period.  After the end of World War II in 1945, Japan eventu-
ally fell under the control of the U.S. which directly “colonized” the
country for 7 years.  In contrast to the preceding independent peri-
od, this was when Japan lost independence as her resistance to the
West and colonization in Asia were completely nullified.  There-
fore it was the post-independent-colonial period which involved the
U.S. playing the role of the “colonizer” and Japan being deprived
of her political autonomy.  And yet, Japan officially regained her
independence in 1952.  Over the next 40 years she was to make
another attempt to challenge Western powers by virtue of econom-
ic (not military) strength.  Again, the logical analysis, then, catego-
rizes this period as “post-colonial” in Japan.  Strictly speaking, how-
ever, unlike other Asian and African nations’post-colonial experi-
ences, it should be seen rather as the “post-independent-colonial”
period since it was after Japan had once had independence and
control of the former colonies that she became “colonized” and
then independent once again (But it is still debatable whether Japan
is politically, economically, and culturally independent of the U.S.
even in the “post-independent-colonial” period). Viewed in this
light, we are now able to recognize that modern Japan underwent
four different experiences in the age of imperialism and colonial-
ism.
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35 Here we’re not concerned with nanbangaku or Portuguese and
Spanish Learning that preceded Dutch Learning.
36 I must hasten to add here that during this period, among the
other imperial languages, German also placed a significant role in
contributing to the establishment of the new imperial Japanese lan-
guage.  Yet the total effects of German upon Japanese in the geo-
cultural politics of translation were of secondary importance, com-
pared with those of Chinese and English.
37 As to modern Japan’s kindai no choukoku or “overcoming moder-
nity” by “dialectic nationalism,” Dowak’s (1994) argument about
“nationalism as dialectics” gives us an insight into the dynamics of
language and culture in modern Japan.  In this context we need to
examine how the founding fathers of the modern Japanese lan-
guage such as Ueda Kazutoshi (1867–1937) and Okakura
Yoshizaburou (1868–1936) were instrumental in branching out
modern Japan’s linguistic enterprise; those two both studied under
the same oyatoi kyoushi (hired foreign teacher) named Basil Hall
Chamberlain (1836–1914), who is known as the father of the study
of the Japanese language.  Thus Ueda and Okakura were trained to
become leading philologists and linguists who would later con-
tribute to the modern language building of Japan.  As they both
inherited the cultural tradition of koku-gaku (the National Learning)
underlying the emergence of ei-gaku (the English Learning), Ueda
played a crucial role in the development of kokugo-gaku (the study
of the national language) and koku-bungaku (the study of national lit-
erature), while Okakura especially led the way in the diffentiation
of ei-gaku into eigo-gaku (the study of the English language) as well
as ei-bungaku (the study of English literature), and other specialized
branches (On this theme, see, for example, Saito 2006; Yamaguchi
2001; Yasuda 1997).
38 Lee (1996) examines how the once-small Japanese language
developed into kokugo or the imperial Japanese language in the
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early twentieth century, and how the then-expanding kokugo caused
linguistic oppression in Korea.  To be sure, modern Japan’s lan-
guage policy, as she points out, was intended to assimilate peoples
in the colonies in Japanese instead of making use of their own lan-
guages through translation, which is certainly a problem that the
Japanese today need to reflect on.  But in my view, she analyzes the
“effect” of modern Japan’s resistance to Western imperialism/colo-
nialism without giving a full and particular account of the “cause.”
Thus she fails to explain the cause-effect sequence of events from
the pre-colonial to the independent period in terms of the Japanese
linguistic resistance to English hegemony.  Japanese scholars, there-
fore, are expected to do more research on the beginning of the
Japanese linguistic imperialism (as well as the English counterpart)
so that we may have a clearer understanding of how it came about
the way it did and what it meant not only to the colonized but also
to the colonizer (Kobayashi 2001: 91).
39 While Robert Phillipson (1992) defines “linguistic imperialism”
as the geo-cultural and political situation that constitutes and per-
petuates the “center–periphery” economic structure resulting in
inequality and discrimination on a global scale, I use the term
rather as the modern Japanese awareness of language that derives
from the imperial history of the country.
40 The Japanese title of the “Queen’s English” was translated by
Tagiri (1958) as jyunsei eigo literally meaning “pure English.”
41 The media’s reactions to this issue were included at the back of
the Moon’s The Dean’s English.
42 According to Egawa (Tagiri and Egawa 1968), this book went
into the eleventh edition in 1878; the twelfth edition was published
in 1892 with the new title: Learned Men’s English.
43 Knowles (1997: 151) states that “after about 1860, there is an
increasing association of incorrect English with the language of the
working class.  Educated usage is equated with middle-class usage,
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and is asserted to be the natural standard for the nation, and even
promoted to be the rank of royalty.  In the twentieth century, atten-
tion is increasingly drawn to matters of pronunciation.”
44 According to C. J. Wan-Ling Wee (2003), the twentieth-century
realignment of the English language entailed not only “national
imperialism” that had a centripetal force at home but also “imperial
nationalism” that generated a centrifugal force abroad.
45 As Knowles (1997: 146) points out, “From the later nineteenth
century there is a growing association between allegedly bad or
incorrect English and educational failure.  At this time scholars
knew a lot about the etymological roots of English words and noth-
ing about the sociology of language.  For the teacher in the class-
room faced with the clash of cultures, the obvious inference to be
made was that working-class usage was incorrect.  There must also
have been a high correlation between this usage and failure on edu-
cational tests, and in the absence of an understanding of statistics,
the inference to be made is that working-class usage is the cause of
educational failure.”
46 Before he returned from America to Japan in 1873, Mori trav-
eled to Britain on the way to meet German-born British linguist
Max Müller and consulted with him about the issue of “state reli-
gion” in Japan (Müller 1976: 97–98).  It is highly probable that he
also talked with him about the issue of national language building
in connection with his proposal for English spelling reform.
Another important point to note here is that Mori wrote Education
in Japan dealing with the history of Japan in connection with
mythology, language religion, and science: this strongly suggests
that his Weltanschauung was being greatly influenced by those two
Darwinian linguists Max Müller and William Whitney whose
important works on relevant topics were published between Mori’s
student days in Britain and his diplomat days in America.  The fol-
lowing are their representative works: Max Müller put forth
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Lectures on the Science of Language, Delivered at the Royal Institution of
Great Britain in April, May, & June, 1861 (London: Longman, Green,
Longman, and Roberts, 1862), Essays on the Science of Religion (New
York: Scribner, Armstrong, 1873), Essays on Mythology, Traditions,
and Customs (New York: Scribner, Armstrong, 1873); Whitney also
produced through the same publisher as Müller’s, Language and the
Study of Language (New York: Scribner, Armstrong, 1869), The East
and West, Religion and Mythology, Orthography and Phonology (New
York: Scribner, Armstrong, 1873).
47 In the 1864 edition Moon cited this passage from Schlegel’s
work again, explaining the purpose of defending The Queen’s
English.
48 In Japanese, “the Emperor’s Japanese” can be most appropriate-
ly translated as koukoku-gengo which literally means “the language of
‘Japan as the imperial nation’.”  As far as I can tell from my
research, Nakamura Kei (2000a) is the first to discuss Mori Arinori
and his language reform discourse in terms of the historical and
ideological formation of koukoku-gengo (= the imperial Japanese lan-
guage) as against the imperial English language (= the Queen’s
English) in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.
49 When I refer in this paper to the “creation” of a new language in
Japan, I mean the development or evolution of an indigenous lan-
guage of Japan into a full-fledged (modern) one, rather than the
bringing into being of an entirely new language with no elements of
the traditional Japanese language; as I shall argue in Part II, the
multiple meanings created of the words “a new language” in Mori’s
discourse on language reform afford the key to an understanding of
his true intentions.
50 In the early Meiji period there were many other samurai intellec-
tuals who advocated making the new Japanese language by means of
the Roman alphabet.  Nishi Amane (1829–1897) was one such pro-
ponent of the abolition of the Chinese characters and the adoption
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of the English alphabets; he was one of the cofounders of Meiroku-
sha or the first academic society of which leader was Mori Arinori.
51 Here we may recall Mori’s pragmatic position on language
acquisition: “Be proficient in languages for pragmatic purposes.  No
more, no less.”
52 Tsuchida et al. (1998: 171) point out that “the subsequent text (or
duplicate /baby text) is not allowed to inherit its intellectual proper-
ty right from the preceding text (or original/paternal text) without
serious infringements in the form of misinterpretations.  Thus, the
theory of “intertextuality” nullifies the concept of “textual
influence” and thereby reduces the supposed intertextual orders to
the nth degree.”
53 It was the then Secretary of State Joseph Henry who introduced
Mori to Whitney (SMAZ, Supplementary Vol. 2: 218–220).
54 It was not untill the post(/neo)-colonial context in the late twenti-
eth century that an eclectic linguistic strategy was asserted by
English speakers from periphery nations such as India to be an
effective tool for resistance and assimilation in de-hegemonizing
English as the world language and instead legitimizing their World
Englishes.
55 Indeed, there was a rumor going around both at home and
abroad at that time that Mori Arinori was planning to abolish the
Japanese language and instead adopted English as a new national
language in Japan.
56 A determined and outspoken proponent of national language-
building in the early Meiji period, Fukuzawa Yukichi (1972: 148)
relentlessly castigated students for being unduly pessimistic about
the future of the Japanese language and losing the spirit of dokuritsu
jison (“independence and self-respect”) as follows: “Nowadays I find
quite a few students saying trivial things to the effect that since the
language of Japan is so inadequate and inconvenient that it cannot
be used as a tool for writing and speech-making, one should use
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English instead.  I think they are so stupid they do not know what
they are talking about.  The way I see it, they were born Japanese,
but have never learned to use the Japanese language as effectively
as possible.  The number of vocabulary of national language
increases in proportion to the growing number of books published
in the country.  There should be nothing inconvenient about it.
Before anything else, the Japanese today should work hard to
improve their speaking skill in Japanese.”
57 Regarding the patriotic leftist view of national language, Umesao
(1987: 123–124) got it right when he says: “If you argue in Japan
for the abolition of conventional written characters of national lan-
guage in favor of foreign (roman) alphabets, then you will probably
be labeled as leftist, internationalist, or even anti-nationalistic/unpa-
triotic.  But I must say this is a gross misunderstanding.  On the
contrary, the leftist’s arguments for national language reform had
always taken on rather nationalistic or statist overtones; they should
be seen as political activists who would go to all lengths to boost
the national policy for wealthy nation and strong army.  In fact,
they were much more patriotic and nationalistic than the rightists
in this respect.  They always looked to the future.”
58 We can find trustworthy and corroborative evidence to support
our view in British diplomat Sir Ernest Satow’s diary.  In his jour-
nal dated July 12 1886, Satow writes that “Called on Mori, who is
now Minister of Education: he talked nothing else.  Is friendly to
the Romaji Kai, but believes the result aimed at by them will be
reached through the wider knowledge of English which the teach-
ing of that language in all the middle schools will bring about”
(SMAZ, Supplementary Vol. 2: 222).  This plainly shows that Mori
still retained a firm belief in the “desired end” which he first dis-
closed in his letter to Whitney in 1872 and then seemed to have
partially abandoned in Education in Japan in 1873 for technical rea-
sons: the romanization of the Japanese language and the teaching
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of (simplified or unsimplified) English in ths “schools of the
Empire.”
59 His unconventional language code-switching behavior in interna-
tional diplomatic settings struck the media as rather peculiar
(SMAZ, Vol. 1: 388–389).
60 The Japanese word kami and the Chinese term shen are two dif-
ferent religious concepts (Yanabu 2001).
61 The passage quoted here was partially taken from Mori’s letter to
Müller by Georgina Adelaide (1794–1919), the editor of The Life
and Letters of the Right Honourable Friedrich Max Müller.  Although the
whole letter is not available in the work cited above, it is one of the
few English discourses made by Mori himself that reveals how he
thought and felt about religion.
62 While his personal precepts mainly consist of eight verses in the
original, Hall’s English translation is rendered as “ten points to be
cultivated” (1973: 45).  Following Hall’s interpretation, the present
writer likens them to the Biblical “Ten Commandments.”
63 Contrary to popular belief, Müller shared Mori’s Quixotic idea
for English reform as far as orthography is concerned.  Müller him-
self supported the idea of the orthographical and phonetic reform
of the English language for theoretical if not practical reasons.  He
stated: “What I wish most strongly to impress on my readers is that
I do not write as an advocate.  I am not an agitator for phonetic
reform in England.  My interest in the matter is, and always has
been, purely theoretical and scientific.  Spelling and the reform of
spelling are the problems which concern every student of the sci-
ence of language.  It does not matter whether the language be
English, German, or Dutch.  In every written language the problem
of reforming its antiquated spelling must sooner or later arise; and
we must form some clear notion whether anything can be done to
remove or alleviate a complaint inherent in the very life of lan-
guage.  If my friends tell me that the idea of a reform of spelling is
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entirely Quixotic,that it is a mere waste of time to try to influence a
whole nation to surrender its historical orthography and to write
phonetically, I bow to their superior wisdom as men of the world.
But as I am not a man of the world, but rather an observer of the
world, my interest in the subject, my convictions as to what is right
and wrong, remains just the same.  It is the duty of scholars and
philosophers not to shrink from holding and expressing what men
of the world call Quixotic opinions; for if I read the history of the
world rightly, the victory of reason over unreason, and the whole
progress of our race, have generally been achieved by such fools as
ourselves ‘rushing in where angels fear to tread,’ till after a time the
track becomes beaten, and even angels are no longer afraid.  I
hold, and have confessed much more Quixotic theories on lan-
guage than this belief, that what has been done before by Spaniards
and Dutchmen—what is at this very moment being done by
Germans, viz., to reform their corrupt spelling—may be achieved
even by Englishmen and Americans” (Müller 1876: 206–207).
Another evidence to suggest clearly that Müller was sympathetic
with Mori’s radical stance on language reform can be found in his
following statement: “I have expressed my belief that the time will
come when not only the various alphabets and systems of spelling,
but many of the languages themselves which are now spoken in
Europe, to say nothing of the rest of the world, will have to be
improved away from the face of the earth and abolished.  Knowing
that nothing rouses the ire of a Welshman or a Gael so much as to
assert the expediency, nay, necessity, of suppressing the teaching of
their languages at school, it seems madness to hint that it would be
a blessing to every child born in Holland, in Portugal, or in
Denmarknay, in Sweden and even in Russia—if, instead of learn-
ing a language which is for life a barrier between them and the rest
of mankind, they were at once to learn one of the great historical
languages which confer intellectual and social fellowship with the
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whole world.  If, as a first step in the right direction, four languages
only, viz., English, French, German, Italian is more precious than
time?—would be infinitely greater than what has been effected by
railways and telegraphs.  But I know that no name in any of the
doomed languages would be too strong to stigmatize such folly.
We should be told that a Japanese only could conceive such an
idea; that for a people deliberately to give up its language was a
thing never heard of before; that a nation would cease to be a
nation if it changed its language; that it would, in fact, commit ‘the
happy dispatch,’ a la Japonaise.  All this many be true, but I still
hold that language is meant as an instrument of communication,
and that, in the struggle for life, the most efficient instrument of
communication must certainly carry the day, as long as natural
selection, or, as we formerly called it, reason, rules the world”
(ibid.).
64 This is one of the central dogmas of Swedenborgian Thomas
Lake Harris who founded the Brotherhood of the New Life in
which Mori did some serious soul-searching in quest of individual
and national freedom and independence (see Kimura 1986).
65 As regards Mori’s strategic position in the geo-politics of cultural
diplomacy, Irie’s obersavation of modern Japan’s long-standing
stance on international politics also applies in his case: “It is plain
that the East-and-West dualism served as the one and only princi-
ple of modern Japan’s diplomacy….  There seems to have been no
universal principle that penetrates the international diplomacy of
Japan except for the East-and-West ideology.  And it sometimes
places more stress on its fatalistic cooperation; at other times it laid
more emphasis on its fatalistic collision course.  Furthermore, there
are cases where it would emphasize not only the particularity of
Japan in Asia but also the universality of the country that amalga-
mates Eastern and Western civilizations into one.  In either case,
Japan tended to adapt to the changes in the geo-cultural politics of
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Europe and other Asian nations as circumstances demanded”
(1966: 172–173).
66 Fukuzawa Yukichi (1835–1901) was perhaps the most prominent
super-samurai intellectual who took a critical look at Western civi-
lization.  Like Mori, Fukuzawa never failed to observe objectively
both sides of Western religion and society.
67 Here we need to remind ourselves of Mori’s conscious and prag-
matic effort in his youth to deny his old self (overly feudalistic iden-
tity) in the dialectical pursuit of the new self (enlightened and mod-
ern identity) in a bid to reach a much higher plane of civilization.
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